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CHAPTIR I 
THE miijm INDD8THY OP ZAMBIA
Introduotoiy Note
The subject of our dissertation is the taxation of Zambia mines 
in general. In particular we are interested in the system of royalty 
payments and the rationale and effect of the current export tax. As we shall 
see shortly the mining industry of Zsnbis is the mainstay of that economy. 
Naturally, therefore, as a necessary prelude to the discussion of the 
subject mstter, we are impelled to give a brief description and analysis of 
the relationship between this industry and the rest of the economy. This 
is by way of providing a general impression of the signifioanoe of this 
industry to the economy, noting in particular the relationship between the 
country's development plan and the industry. This discussion will be in­
valuable in helping us understand later (Chapter 2, et al) a more detailed 
analysis of this relationship and the subsequent critique of the whole system 
of mine taxation. After which, having indicated the likely effects on the 
budget revenue and on the profitability (or prospective investment yield) of 
the mining industry of changes in the system of mine taxation, we formally make 
an alternative proposal of the system of royalty payments (and export duty) 
which is the centre piece of the whole of our study project.
In Section 2 of this Chapter we discuss, again briefly, the relation­
ship between the copper mining industry of Zambia and the rest of the (major) 
copper producers of the world. This section is important in that it introduce# 
us to the comparative oost analysis of the various copper mining companies and 
countries of the world, which we later present. Riis section and the 
subsequent section in Chapter 5 on comparative cost analysis is important 
because if, as we shall see in Section I of this chapter and in subsequent 
discussions, this industry is the mainstay of the rest of the economy and forms 
more than 90^ of export products, we must feel compelled to present at least
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a working fzamawork of the ezogenoua factors %Aiioh affect the coapetitivenees 
or otherwise of this very important industry. Moreover, such a framework 
provides a useful contact to the internal factors such as the system of 
taxation, etc., which, by and large, can be manipulated to attain certain 
objectives. After all, our interest is to see whether, given certain external 
factors such as the demand and the movement of prices in the international 
copper market, endogenous factors may not be varied to achieve such economic, 
social or politioal objectives |s would have been envisaged by the Government. 
Again, it is in the li|^ of this and other ba^cground discussions that we 
later present our altemstive system of royalty payments (and export duty).
Section It TBB IKDUSTKY AND THE BCONOMT OF ZAMBIA^
The mining industry of Zambia is synonymous with the oopper industry. 
This industry is conoentzsted within a strip of land 100 miles long and y> 
miles wide. This is the "66pperbelt" and lies immediately to the south of 
the Zsmbia-Congo border and skirts that part of the Congo which juts into 
Zambia and is known as the Congo Pedicle. This area contains fantastic 
wealth - over a quarter of the world's known copper ore reserves. It is 
from such a base that the copper industry of this country has become, after 
the U.S.A., the second largest oopper producer in ^e free world. This is 
one reason why the Zambian industry is ranked as one of the "international 
firms". (Chile has consistently rivalled Zambia as the second largest 
copper producing country).
The éopperbât of Zambia supports an urban and rural population of 
more than half a million out of the oountxy's total population of three and 
a half to four million.
The industry is owned by two mining groups which, between them, own 
the seven major producing oopper mines and the only three refineries in the 
country. The Zambia Anglo-American Group (Z.A Jk.) produces about 5%» of the 
copper output from its three mines at Bancroft, Hchanga and Rhokana Corporation.
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The rest of the output ooaee from the Roan Seleotlon Trust Group (R.S.T.) mines 
at Chambishi, ChibuluM and Loan &ya. Of the three refineries the R.S.T. owns 
Maa|2tlira and Ndolai the Rhokana refineiy ^ ere cobalt is also pxocessed^ b^y the 
Z.A #A .
The Zambia Bsoken-Rill Development Company (Z.B.H.) is owned by the 
Z.A.A. and is the only producer of substantial minerals other than copper and
cobalt. The company produces, smelts and refines lead, sine and vanadium.
>It also fabricates locally produced lead into sheets and pipes. (Sulphuric 
acid is also produced but the mine in general is currently experiencing technical 
difficulties in its operations and has been operating at a loss for some time 
now).
The two groups* rights to prospect and mine arc not confined to the 
copper-bearing ores of the 66ppcrbelt area (Z.B.H. is not on the ^epperbelt).
The Groups hold in addition the right to prospect and develop what are called 
the "exclusive rights" and the "special grant" areas, which, between ^em, cover
nearly all prospective copper-producing or copper-bearing territory.
With 'ttie exception of Chambishi and the two open pita at Rchanga 
mine, production is by underground mining and practically all ^e copper 
produced is primary or virgin, i.e. mined copper. Secondary copper, i.e. 
oopper produced from old scrap is negligible in Zambia.
Operationally, there is mutual coopération and interdependence between 
the tiro Groups. Moreover, the Z.A.A. has minority interests (about y>^ ) is
stock of the R.S.T. mines at Mu^lirm and Chibuluan mine. Jointly, the
Grcups control Zambia-Congo Border Power Corporation Ltd. which, until 
the Kariba Hydro-electrie Scheme came into production, was the main electricity 
supplier to the mining areas; the R.S.T. refinery at Ndola takes copper for 
Z.A Jl. mines when the Rhokana refineiy is fully employed. The attached Table 
I illustre tea more fUlly the special financial relationships of the mining 
Groups and companies within Zambia.
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Table I
UKSLSiaSfflEaUBiàjEBiJ^
Compesy Z.A.A.Holdings Holdings by Subsidiaries Combined Holdings of ZJkJk. and Its _ Subsidiaries
Z.A.A. CROUP
Rhokana Corp -oration Ltd. I3IOI64O - 52.4*
Hchanga Con­solidated Co. Ltd. 6266667 11110574 54.
Bancroft Mines Ltd. se 24839582
Rhokana Copper Refinery Ltd. 1700000 loo.(9(
Mupiliza Copper Mines 572213 4213525 30.2^
Chibulnma Mines 271693 2001180 30.3JÉ
Chambishi Mine 175879 1295430 jo.aji
Baluba Mine 20826 153421 3o.»e
ChisangwaMine 5700 366900 30.»4
Souroei ZJkeA. Aroual Report (and Consolidated Salanœ Sheet), I966 
Hotel In some oases company holdings are not disclosed.
5.
There le also ooneidexable external control exeroieed on these 
mining groups. For instanoe, the Z.A.A. is oontrolled bgr the A A. Corporation
of South Afrioa Ltd.; the U.S. Corporation Amsrioan Metal Climax has 46^
(2)interest in R.S.T. These corporations'^  h^eve various interests and control 
power eluewhers in the world. The A.A. Corporation# for instanoe# is mainly 
a gold-mining finance house# and has various interests in industry and mining; 
the Ammriosn Climax has minority interests in e.g. The Copper Range Corporation^ 
etc. Thus# in this sense too# the Zambian industry is an internati<msl firm.
The industry operates in a market structure which cannot be precisely 
categorised into any one of the theoretical mssdost structures. From the point 
of view of the Zsmblam producers and other major producers of the world# the 
market is basically a collusive oligopoly. This is mainly bsoause primary 
copper is essentially an undifferentiated product which is sold by the few 
producers to several consumers. The prioes are# however# contract prices and 
these usually oover a fairly long period. But because some (small) producers 
sell their primary copper on say# the IM# on a competitive rather than a 
contract basis# and that secondary oopper# which is a close substitute of 
primary copper is also competitively supplied on the UNE# etc., this means 
that there are no longer a few sellera in the market. Buyers oan thus move 
between the various aspects of the market thereby modifying considerably tha 
oligopolistic nature of the primary oopper market.
In so far as the Zambian Industry is a collusive oligopoly the 
producer companies oan maximise their profits by doing one of two things at 
a time: either determine the price for any quantity of supply# or determine
the supply for whatever price this might fetch, given demand. But since the 
oopper mariDst as a whole is not oligopolistio, we can expect that the supply 
and pricing policies of the Znabian industry will be greatly modified by the 
•^ PPlyf<S«>uuad and price conditions of the copper market in the international 
economy.
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From the point of view of production or nupply# we have pointed out 
above that Zambia ia one of the major produoers of primary oopper in the 
international economy. Currently, the industry is responsible for a 
contribution of between 149^  to 16)6 of free world copper output. This feature 
does mean that the industry must exercise considerable influenoe on the overall 
tonnage or supply of copper in the world. To the extent that this is done, 
the Zambian industry exerts considerable influence on the price of copper in 
the international economy. Indeed, in so far as consumption reacts to real or 
potential supply, the Zambian industry must also have influenoe on the trend 
or expectation of demand for copper in the world economy. That is, if con­
sumers expect an ample supply or shortage of copper, they can be expected to 
adjust their consumption plans accordingly, and this will in turn be reflected 
in overall demand for copper. Benoe, in this sense, we oan say that ultimately 
supply, demand, and price of copper in the world economy will bear some relation­
ship to the production (and costing) of the Zambian oopper induetzy.
How, over the years, mineral jroduotion in Zambia has continued to 
rise both in absolute and relative terms. Althou4^  mining in general is one 
of the oldest human occupations in the world it was not commercially significant 
in Zambia until after the end of the first quarter of ihe present oentury.
As Table 1 shows, the growth of copper production in particular was rapid 
especially in the early years of the Industry's development, i.e. before the 
war. Progress continued to be made especially after the war. This trend is 
evident in our table#
Thus, from a negligible quantity in 1930, output rose significantly 
by 1934, and remained constant for the subsequent years until in and after 1938, 
when it rose sharply, reaching a peak ih 1942-43* % e  observed decline in 
output after this date was mainly the result of two factors: first there were
technical difficultiee confronting soma mines; secondly, while the rapid 
gro%rth in production imawdiatoly before and during the heat of the war was a
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retpoDse to war imtarial raquixeoKits, th# demand for these wqr raquiremente 
declined with th# gradual oeaoation of Hie war. The steady rise in post-war
demand, ref looting war-repaxation and oivilian requirements, gave the produoers 
the neoessary inomtive to expand production and output oapaoity in Ihe post­
war years. The devdhation of the pound sterling in 1949 was also a powerful 
inoentive to the produoers (the pound/prioa for sales in UJC# increased 44)6 
ovemidht) #
As the industry has continued to expand, its relative importance in 
the eooKoy has also increased. Today the industry is the biggest sector in
the money economy while its role expands proportionately to its growth.»
Thus, the development of the Copperbelt is practically responsible for tha 
growth of such towns as Hdola and the springing up of such commercial and 
teohnioal activities as store businesses, transportation and engineering in that * 
part of the country. It ia known that apart from the direct expenditure on 
itself, e.g. wages, and other domestically produced inputs, the mining industry 
in general spends about one-third of its revenues or earnings within the country. 
Such indirect expenses would include, for instance, railway freightage, timber 
and electricity purchases and service charges (say, schools, shops, hospitals, 
roads, etc.) on the (opperbelt. All this must have stimulating effects on the 
development of other industries and ancillary services.
In a more direct way, the industry has been largely responsible for 
the growth of the economy through its contribution to the Exchequer. In general 
it may be said that the oopper mines today provide 60 to 70 per cent of the 
Zambia Government's revenue. Thus, in 1965, the industry contributed a sum 
of C66m. cut of a to Lai Government revenue of C95*6m. - a figure equivalent 
to 69.0)6, Indeed, the various implications of this observation is one of the 
main reasons why we undertake this study.
The industry's development as an export sector has been similarly 
spectacular. It is estimated that between 1945 end 1955 copper production
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Table 2 
MIKE PRODUOTIO* 
(Selected Tear»}
Tear Zambian Production Short Tons World Productiott Thousand ^ r t  Ton#
Zambian Production as Percentage of World Production
1926 793 1,665 .04756
1930 9#513 1,765 .54*
1934 176,511 1,415 12.41*
1938 280,983 2,225 12.62*
1942 276,199 2,945 9.38*
1946 211,143 2,040 10.55*
1950 327,923 2,760 11.68*
1954 438,708 3,110 14.10*
1958 . 441,073 3.750 11.76*
1962 619,856 4,834 12.82*
1965 156,000 5,425 13.94*
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mine#
alone oonatltuted about four-fli'tha of total export value. Currently, the 
peroentage oontribution ia around 90* of total exporta. Thus, in 1965, 
Zambia'a total exporta were valued at ClS7«5n«, and of that £161.Im. or 
about 96.6** waa accounted for by mining alone. There are indeed several 
criteria by which the signifioanoe of this industry to Zambia oan be iUus* 
trated. Table ) below simply buttresses, in perspective, the observations 
just made. Indeed the parameters shown are sufficient to demonstrate cur 
point.
Table 5
COPPER IH33DSm TO K£T DOMIBSnO EXPORTS
Year Ret Contrib- Govern- Contrib- Value of Domestic ution to ment ution to Domestic Product Ret Dorn- Revenue Govern- Exporta estic ment f.o.r.
Copper & Cobalt ValueContrib- of Ex- ution to porta Exporta
(K millJ (X (E (K (E , (K ^ *mill) 56 mill.) mUl) * mill.)
1958 261 90 54 56 18 35 151 140 92
1959 354 167 47 55 14 26 237 220 93
I960 390 196 30 63 23 37 260 243 94
1961 375 177 47 75 28 38 241 224 93
1962 369 171 46 75 26 34 241 222 92
1965 587 175 45 72 25 34 260 239 92
1964 457 215 47 108 57 53 327 302 92
1965 576 246 45 169 134 71 375 348 93
1966 726 342 47 255 163 64 490 466 95
1967 769 296 38 266 150 56 465 440 95
Sourcet Zambia Mining Tear Book, 1967, p#2
Notea I 1 Kwsoa • 11/7 British currency - fl 1.4 (V.S.4.)
Sourcet Brown Commission Report, 1966,
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The least that one oan say la to wonder what the economy of Zambia 
would have been without mining in general, but oopper production in particular. 
This is the industry that earns practically all the foreign exchange so 
crucial for development; and tiiis is the industry that finances more than 
two-thirds of the country's development programmes# Ibis is the industry 
that directly provides employment to about 16* of the country's work foroe.
No doubt, as the economy develops, this preponderance of the mining sector will 
tend to diminish, relatively, as the contribution of other sectors increases.
Of course this is the obvious implication of a programme of economic diver­
sification and is one of the major aims of development in Zambia. Even so, 
however, mining must remain central to the economic well-being of Zambia for 
a long time.
The extent to which Zambia oan rely on her industry for economic 
development will depend, on the one hand on the quantum of mineral resources 
to be tapped and, on the other, on the market conditions for the industqr's 
product over given periods. Market conditions of a product are essentially 
determined by the nature of supply and demand for that product. In the case 
of Zambia, whereas supply can be influenced by the produoers, demand for the 
product is largely an exogenous factor. Benoe, given the resource base and 
the demand for the product as data, Zambia's growth potential or prospects will 
largely depend on her induetry's ability to compete against produoers of that 
same product in the world economy. That is why we must now attempt to review 
the Zambien induatry in relation to its competitors in ihe world copper industry 
A brief but critical analysis of Him development of demand is an essential 
part of this review.
Section III ZAMBIA OOPPER PrDUSTBT IN U)ELD ECONOMT
In Table 2 above we noted the grow^ pattern of production of Zambia 
mines in relation to the total world production of copper. The pattern is 
evidently impreaeivs, showing a rapid rise in the early stages of exploitation
u.
of resouroe# and then more or lees e oonstant rate, reflecting in turn the 
fact that expansion poaaibilitiea were being more fully exploited with the 
passage of time.
In order to appreciate more fully the relationship of the Zambia 
industry to the world oopper industry, we must males a comparative study of the 
various oopper produoers of the world with respect to their production dimen­
sions. This way we should be enabled to appreciate once more the extent to 
which the economy of Zambia can depend on her export industry, given the 
competitive advantage or otherwise of other producers. Given the resource 
base and demand conditions, the competitiveness of the various producers oan 
be said to be reflected in Iheir relative oontribution to total world produc­
tion.
To simplify the problem, we refer ourselves to Table 4 below, in 
idiioh we may observe the relative production dimensions of the various major 
oopper producing countries of the world.
Table 4
THE WORLD'S MAIN OOPPER mHING <X)UMTRp^ ,
(Mine production in terms of recoverable copper content, OOO's tons)
1958 1959 i960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
U.S.A. 979 825 1000 U 65 1228 1213 1247 1352 1429 946
USSR 463 465 551 595 646 661 772 827 854 662
Zambia 441 599 655 634 620 648 697 767 687 731
ChiU 512 601 586 605 617 663 685 645 701 729
Canada 345 395 439 439 465 458 487 510 508 596
Congo(K) 262 311 333 325 327 299 305 318 349 353
Peru 59 53 212 218 184 196 196 196 203 205
S. Africa 55 56 "53 60 53 63 67 67 137 134
Japan 90 94 98 106 114 116 117 118 123 130
Australia 85 106 122 107 120 127 117 101 122 98
Other 513 517 572 562 576 650 646 682 718 740
World 5804 404; 4681 48I4 4950 5096 5)36 5585 5851 5548
Sourcet Zambia Mining Industry Year Book, 1967, p.)2.
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Notice first the fact that Zambia's oontribution in absolute 
terms in each year for the period observed is consistently superior to 
practically all free world producers except the U.S.A. T>ie Soviet Union's 
production is superior to that of Zambia for eeven years out of the ten years 
observed. One oan argue tiiat in 1958 Zambia's relatively low production 
reflects the oopper slump that took place in the free world during that 
period. The effect is more pronounced in the case of Zambia because the rate 
of growth of g.d.p. for UUC., Za%#bia's major oopper importer, waa amongst the 
slowest of the major developed economies of the Vest that year (G.D.P. for 
U.S.A. - -0.9*, France - 2.6, UK - 0.9*, Germany - 3«^)« The Soviet Union 
would not be affected by this factor, which may explain the hi^er output there. 
Fetween 1962 and 1964 the fast rate of growth of titie Soviet economy seems to be 
reflected by a copper tonnage higher than that attained in Zei bia, This is 
presumably because the rate of economic development of countries mainly 
supplied with oopper by Zambia was comparatively less impreaaive than that of 
the Soviet Union. In Zambia itself this was a period vdien economic development 
was barely perceptible. In any case, the consumption of manufactured oopper 
by Zambia would bo insignificant in relative terms, even at the most ambitious 
rate of economic growth. The effect on total tonnage would be oorrespocdin^y 
negligible. But the post-independence years (1965-6?) would undoubtedly have 
seen a better tonnage for Zambia had it not been for the disruptive effect on 
production of Rhodesia's U.DI. (idiich we discuss more fully later).
The second point to note is that Zambia's output shows a significant 
increase in esdi subsequent year for practically the whole period observed.
It oan alec be seen that after the v%cession the rate of growth of output is 
more favourable in the case of Zambia than in that of most other produoers 
(although this in itself would not necessarily establish that Zambia was much 
better placed with respect to production possibilities). The 1966 tonnage 
is of special relevance to our present discussion. Not only because this
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represent# nearly 12* of total world production (or about 14* excluding the 
USSR), but principally because it breaks up what appears to have been a rising 
trend. As we explain later, and hinted earlier, the apparently sudden fall 
in output during this period was largely the result of fuel shortages which 
was itself the result of the economic war between Zambia and Rhodesia after 
the letter's U.D.I. In oontrast, the higher tonnage in 196? tells of the fact 
that the lesson of the preceding year had been well learnt: for instance,
the level of coal supplies had now been improved by massive stockpiling and 
so enabled normal smelting to be resumed. Similarly, concentrates hsd been 
stockpiled in order to maintain a normal rate of production in subsequent 
periods. Coupled with the fact that there ware no losses due to strikes, the 
increase of about 55,000 tons in 1967 over 1966 is easily explained.
Thus we oan say that in the absence of the artificial constraints 
just mentioned, the production possibilities of the Zambia mines are 
encouraging. The effective oonstraints will üiezefore be largely geological. 
That is, all things being equal, the expansion potential of the Zambian mines 
will be determined by the nature of the inherent oost considerations, i.e. 
costs due to the geological nature of the locality of ore reserves. Thus, 
if for instance, Chilean producers are comparatively lev cost producers, they 
would be in a more favoured position to expand production. The reverse would 
also be true. As it happens, Chilean produoers are geologically more 
favoured than the Zambian ones.^ ^^  The question of mining costs is more 
fully discussed in a subsequent chapter. It is there shown that Zambia's 
mines are, at the prevailing level of costs in the world, less competitive not 
only against Chile, but other countries as well. The economic implications of 
^is observation are there also analysed.
Given l^at the ultimate purpose of production is revenue in terms
C"*of prioe^per unit, the level of demand is critical. This we know as well as 
the fact that the price per unit is the result or emerges as a oonséquenoe of
u.
the Intev-eotioa of supply and demand. Xh the ease of the Zambian 
industry in question me also know that deoand is largely an exogenous 
factor. Thus, as hinted earlier, in determining the value of 
production, the Zambian prodneers have only one x^or variable under 
control, i.e. supply. Othervise stated, this is the only variable under 
their control that they can es^loy to influence price. Hence, against
supply, a discussion of demand and price is in order.
In retrospect #s can say that in the post-war years there was
a general slackening of demand for copper from late 1950's to early
1960's. As discussed more fhlly later, this was the reason for initiating 
various producer price siq)port schemes. Towards 1966,demand picked up 
and in order to stabilise prices downwards, to avoid consumer substitution, 
a producer stabilisation schema was in foroe, side by side with the freely 
fluctuating ÎMM prices. Then in April I966 the producer scheme gave way 
to demand preesures and collapsed, demand slackened once more. This 
slackening becems apparent towards the end of 1966, and continued throughout 
the middle of 1967* Two main factors account for this phenomenon# first, 
this is a period when there has been a noticeable slowing down in the 
economio activities of Europe# secondly after the big copper buying rush 
between I964 and 1966, consumers were no longer afraid of possible supply 
shortages, i.e. supplies were no longer as uncertain as in the earlier 
years (i.e. improved production prospects ia Zambia).
In fact, despite curtailed production in Zambia due to Rhodesia's 
UDX and uncertainties ia regard to supplies from Congo (K) idiioh is another 
major copper exporting oouatiy, copper appears to have been freely available 
on a world-wide basis (a considerable amount of copper came from the smaller 
producers, intent to cash ia on the attractive world-wide copper prices - 
all contributiag to the slackening in demsad. As we would exqpect, this
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slackening «as reflected In the trend of the IKS prices i^ch «as 
significantly being pushed downward. (See Table 5, and aoooopanying
graph).(p.Yt 4
Specifically the demand for Zambian oopper seezna to have 
followed the world-wide demand trend. Our Thbles % and 9 indioate 11 
first that total exports to Zambia's major consumer, U.K., fell between 
1965 and 1967. The fact that total British oopper imports fell during 
the same period seems to corroborate legitimately our observation.
Indeed, since a Blackening in world demand largely implies a slackening 
in the demand of the industrial countries like U.K., this oan be expected 
to reflect on the demand of the major raw material supplying countries 
like Zambia.
%om about the middle of 1967, the market has been influenoed 
mainly by two related factors# first, by the possibility, and second, 
by the reality, of a strike in the U.S.A., which has affected ne#irly all 
oopper mines and plants in that country sinoe mid-July. There is little 
doubt that had it not been for this strike a fairly substanti#d free 
world oopper surplus would have become apparent during 1967, and we could 
have expected an LMB price below the ourxent year's lowest level.
Instead the effect of all this was to convert the pot«itial or estimated 
world surplus into a real shortage. In consequenoe, the users of American 
oopper in particular endeavoured to obt#dn their supplies elsewhere.
This in turn was reflected by ste#uiily rising prioes in markets like the 
UC9.
m  so f#ur as demand can be forecasted, a revival in the trend 
is a possibility. However, for the neaur future at any rate, indications 
of a possible industrial revival in demand in Burope appear to be somewhat 
mixed. On the whole, one can only be optimistic. The upward trend of 
the U S  prices in the first quarter of I966 would seem to strengthen this
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Monthly Avermg# London Metal Ixofaange 
Mom Cm#h Prio»# of Coppw? Wixét»sm
Year 1965 1966 1967 1968
Month 
January ' 562 608 451 596
February 426 679 442 727
March 448 679 998 719
April 488 690 961
May 499 602 975
June 474 614 968
July 411 568 362
August 498 455 979
September 481 408 984
October 506 462 419
November 592 471 529
December 550 440 560
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optiniflm» Umt ## omn Mgr for oerlaiiit however, la that the B.8.
strike and the war in Vietnam would have an appi^oiahle effect on demandofshould there be any change in the eituatioiy. fbr Zambia in particular, 
prospects will be brighter once the British Government relaxes the grip 
or the financial squeese on its economy.
In order to maintain a balance in our discussion, after supply 
and demand, we now attempt to present an analytical description of the price 
of copper. Aqpirioally the most significant feature of the XJQ price 
is its apparently continued and seemingly unpredictable fluctuations.
While the producer stabilisation schema was in operation (1964*66}, 
fluctuations had been minimised, and the price levels had been toned down, 
at least in the producer meucket. On the day this scheme collapsed, UIB 
prioes were affected downwards. The attached graphic Table f shows the treiui 
of LMB between 19)8 and 1967, and the producer price between I964 and 1966,^  (9Y 
Currently, any seller can set h^is price. Thus, since the 
break-up of the producer stabilisaticm scheme, Zambian produoers price their 
oopper on the basis of the LMB*s three months* sellers' price. For its 
part this price is reported to have fallen at one time to under C540 per ton 
its lowest level for just over two years. The price was in fact stable 
in the C540-C36O range towards the middle of 1967, and was €4)9 by the 
end of the year, oompared to €4)2 at the beginning. The average price 
received for Zambian oopper during 1966 was just over €400 per ton. This 
represented an increase of a little over €100 per too over the price recei­
ved in the previous year for the first nine months of which Zambia's copper 
was sold at a nominated price considerably below the UIB level (See Table é 
and accompanying graph)
Similarly, other produoers, e.g. Chile, no longer bound by any 
terms of producer agreements, have also since sold their output at the 
price of their own choice. In all cases the prices elected by the large 
producers in particular will be considerably hitter than any that had
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b#em quoted during the life of the produoer eoheme. It is unlikely 
that under 'ttU.s eoheme produoer prices oould have gone this high.
Otherwise the rationale of the eoheme would not be tenable. We oould» 
however, have expected those prices to rise ooaparatively moderately to 
take aooount of a buoyant market.
Like produoers, oonsumers are keenly interested in the level 
and trend of prioes though their eoonoaio effast xasy be different in each 
case. With special reference to LMB and liffi-based prices, there have been 
oonsumer outcries regarding their recent level and fluctuations in the 
copper maAet. Lord MaeVhdsesa, Chairmen of the British Insulated 
Callender's Cables Ltd, (SZCC), in his annual statement to the shareholders 
(1967) seems to have expressed the general view of the users or consumera 
of copper regarding the oopper price trend in recent times. He admitted 
that considerable quantities of oopper would still be used in his enterprise, 
but, he added, "the rate of growth would be nothing like it oould have been 
with reasmiable volume of supply and stability of prioes. Can users be 
expected to plan major schemes of eleotrifioation, involving considerable 
quantities of other metal with any confidence when they do not know lAether 
oopper will be £3KX) or £700 a ton?"
This is precisely the kind of situation which the produoer 
stabilisation schéma had been intended to remedy, or, at any rate to modify. 
Rroduoers are always worried about the loss of oustomers due to fluctuating, 
and sometimes avoidably high prioes. Long-term oonsiderations are invariably 
paramount for both the oonsumers and especially the big producers of oopper.
If the producer industry is to survive for a long time, it must strive hj 
all means available to avoid any influences that tend to stifle or divert 
demand from it in the short run as well as in the long run.
Producer concern with stabilisation is as old as the industry 
itself. Ih the U.S.A. it ouloinated in the formation of a highly integrated
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oopper market as early #s in the 19)D's. More reoently. Sir Ronald Prani, 
Chairman of Zambia's R.S.T., had already begun worrying about the effects of 
the prioe fumetions as early as in the I W s .  Thus, in less two years 
from August 1934# the price is reported to have nearly doubled to £420 a ton, 
only to slump to £160 a ton by the beginning of 1938. Sudden sewings like 
those worry produoers understandably. As pointed^ a^lready, at hi^ prioes 
there are prospects of losing the mgtkmX beoause of substitution (e.g. 
aluminium, plastics). At low prioes the mines in which millions of pounds 
are invested lose money. Which is why Prani attempted in 1936 his own single- 
handed stabilisation schéma, quoting a prioe for his product below and quite 
independent of the alarmingly high XKB prioe. But, as many other such schemes 
before and after it, this one-man attempt failed, allegedly beoause other big 
produoers had mtayed out of the soheme.
The apparent sliding of oopper price in 1961 to a level of £200 a ton 
provided the opportune moment fbr the untiring Prani to initiate this time %rith 
the help of or in conjunction with the other major copper producers, his second 
attempt of a produoer sdhems - ostensibly to support the sagging price. It is 
this soheme which, having comparatively succeeded in keeping producer prioes 
stable at around £234 s ton up till 1963 and formally laundied in 1964# finally 
gave way to supply and demand pressures and collapsed in April 1966 (see Graphic 
Table 7). Nothing has so far taken the place of this defunct produoer soheme, 
and producers oontinue, as before this sad other sdiemes earlier, to live with 
their fears and do the best they can, even if this has meant for produoers like 
those of Zambia, a return to the IMS. Indeed, as we poiht out in the following 
section, the very attempt by produoers to segregate the LKB from the zest of the 
oopper market was a short-sii^ted and eoonomioslly unsound solution to the 
fluctuations problem.
Currmtly, with prices still on the upturn oompazed to the late 1938*s 
and early sixties, the main fear of the produoers is oopper substitution. How
N?w
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Buoh aotual subatitutioa will take place# will of oourse# partially depend 
on factors other than the price of oopper e.g. technologioal change dee to 
research. Thus# the raw material users are constantly searching for production 
processes which are not only cheaper in terms of input costa# but also more 
efficient in terms of any# sise and performance. Here the price of copper 
as an input cost ss against that of other commodities# is not a critical factor 
to the user#^ ivv K. .
But all things being equal# the level and the trend of prices of a 
commodity will determine how much of that commodity can be had in view of the 
prices of all other coasiodities which oould well be demanded! by consuaars to 
satisfy their particular needs. In fact it has recently been shown that at 
least in some lines of production coppsr has lost out to aluminium because of 
the relative price advantage of aluminium over that of copper. To the extent 
that this is true# Lord McPadmean's plea or warning is %fndicated.
The line of production in question is the electricity supply industry 
of Britain. This industry is the biggest single user of oopper in the United 
Kingdom. It takes about of the estimated 770#CX)0 tons of copper
consumed annually. It is here where copper is said to be in the greatest 
danger of losing out to aluminiim mainly because of the letter's price instab­
ility. It is estimated that in 196)# 36#000 tons of aluminium (which is 
equivalent to a little more than twice that tonnage of oop^ar) went into 
electrioity supply. In 196)# before copper prioes swung upwards the estimated 
consumption was only 2)#000 tons. Significantly this build up had been taking 
place despite aluminium's technical difficulties and drawbacks. More 
spmoifically# sise for sise aluminium has only 6)^ of copper's electrical 
conductivity, its mechanical strength is appreoisbly less# and it is a fqr 
more difficult metal to solder. The swit<A is most noticeable in cables which 
account for effectively half the electricity industry's annual intake cf copper.
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Admittedly# this evidence on its own is far from Ming conclusive ^  
in establishing the proposition that there is a positive causal relationship 
between prioe and consumption or demand for copper in the international market. 
But in so far as Britain imports about one third of Ihr total copper supplies 
from Zambia, then figures like these are not unimportant for Zambian 
producers (and the Government) to take note of. The point is that should the 
process of substitution in Britain become significant# the greatest loser or 
victim will be Zambia. Reduced exports fkom Zambia to U.K. means reduced 
foreign earnings on which so much of the economy depends. %is observation 
is particularly strengthened by the fact that Zambia's chief oopper importer 
is Britain. In this connection the table 3 below appears to be instructive.
Table 8
1965-1967 (OOO's Short Tons)
1965 1966 1967
France 60 55 55
Germany (Vest) 110 100 86
Italy 60 60 57
Japan 100 105 144
Spain 5 5 6
South Africa 30 30 24
Sweden 15 15 18
Switserland 10 10 11
United Kingdom 280 250 199
U.S.A. 10 5 20
U.S.S.R. 10 5 H U
Other 40 45 45
Total 740 665 667
Sourcet Zambia Mining Industry Tear Book# 1967# p«40
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Table 9
(OOO's tons)
Tear Tons
1965 564
1966 509
. 1967 451
gpttroei Trade and Navigation Aooounta of U.K.
Notice that in the case that intereata us moat in Table 9t oopper 
sales to Britain have steadily been falling off since I965# This is also 
true of total sales made abroad by Zambia. Furthermore, in each case the 
absolute decline in quantities in each succeeding year is significant. Of 
course there is nothing in all this to suggest, a priori, that recent high 
copper prices have led to substitution by British copper users and that this 
is what is being reflected by falling off of Zambian copper exports to ÜJC.
But if read in conjunction wi^ Table 9, in which U.K.*s total 
copper imports during the comperable period are ahown, the Zambian copper 
exports to U.K. are at least suggestive of the possibility of Zambia's loss 
of overseas market due to substitution. In the specific instance quoted 
earlier, we noted that the observed substitution in the British electricity 
supply industry wss assumed to be due to the unfavourable trend of the copper 
prices. The effect of substitution for any reason whatever would be reflected 
ih falling copper imports to U.K. This in turn would affect adversely the 
countries normally supplying U.K., e.g. Zambia. Bolh Ihese possibilities are 
suggeated by the two tables above. We are thus inclined to conclude that at 
least part of the decline in output exported by Zambia during the years observed 
was the result of substitution due to unfavourable copper prices abroad, i.e. U.X.
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This is prsoissly the kind of situation feared by ^e Zambian 
produoers in particular. Thus they are espeoially outspoken in Aeir desire 
to maintain stable and often comparatively low prices although the Ccvemment 
has consistently adopted a contrary attitude. Thus %Aile produoers have 
sold their oopper at prices relatively lower than those at UflS, the Zambian 
Government has nonetheless based its royalty tax on the prioes ruling at LKB 
and which are invariably higher than the producers*. Both sides appear to have 
valid reasons for adopting a particular attitude to LMB prioes. Our own 
position is stated in our oriticisa of the whole system of royalty payments 
as currently assessed. Otherwise there is no doubt that high prices are 
advantageous especially to 'ttxe Government in so far as these raise ^ e  level 
of taxable company profits, at least in the short-run. But it is equally right 
that the industry must concern itself not only with short-run benefits, but 
also with long-run survival. This is alac/rtbe interest of the economy as a 
whole.
______m w a a m ;  abb pricihq of oopperi thb hdlb of thi lme (ami) cohsx).
So far we have been talking of a copper price, the supply and demand 
of copper as though there were just one eudi price, supply and demand schedule 
for the various types or forms of copper. This simplified assumption of the 
copper market was necessary in order to keep the objective of our analysis within 
manageable proportions. We now relax that assumption and attempt to make a 
oonciae leacription and analysis of the nature of oopper, its marketing and 
pricing. The analysis is significant to the extent that it throws soma li^t 
on to the problem that faces primary copper produoers in the marketing of their 
oommodity. The analysis must therefore be invaluable also to the Governments 
of those producers. This will be especially so to those Governments whose 
revenue incomes largely depend, like the Zambian Government's revenue, on kbv 
beat and how well their export sectors sell the products. Indeed, any tax 
yolicy formulation or changes must proceed from the knowledge of product
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marketing whether euoh a policy is intended to raise the profitability of the 
given producer, or to change the level of tax revenue to the State.
The medium and large scale copper companies of the world are almost 
without exception selling their primary copper dixoctly to users. This is 
particularly true in the case of the Americeo oopper industry which is highly 
integrated from mining to the semi-fabricating or fabricator stage. The 
giants in this system at the production level are Kenneoott, Anaconda, and 
Phelps Dodge mining groups. Outside the U.S.A. there is very little integw 
ration, Even so, major oopper producing companies like R.S.T. and ZJIJL. in 
Zambia, Boyanda in Canada, Mount Isa in Australia, and Katanga's Union 
Miniers, still manage to deal directly with their consumer customers. Only 
small copper mines, custom smelters and custom refineries would sell their 
primary copper to metal mer^nta especially on the U1E. Amongst these are, 
fdr instance, Cerxo de Pasco in Peru, Bolldens in Sweden, and Messina in South 
Africa. It is obviously more attractive and mors profitable for the smaller 
producers to sell at higher prices (e.g. IMS prices) than at the comparatively 
lower producer prioes designed to stabilise the long-term market. They are 
able to cash in on this highar price without necessarily running the same degree 
of risk as that feared by the major produoers. Theirs is a freely available 
and variable supply mainly in response to short-term requiremants of the market.
About 70 to 75 per cent of copper in the free world is sold and bou^t 
outside the IMS (and Comex). That is, only 25 to 50 per cent of copper is 
dealt with at the UC, and is mainly secondary (or scrap). There is, nonethe­
less, a positive relationship between the oopper prioe at LME and that charged 
by big producers outside that market. The relationship is, of cmrse, not 
defined in strict terms - like, say,fixed ratios. Rathsr it is like that of 
a leader and a follower* ' the leader picks up a price, and the follower adjusts
to it as well as he can. Invariably, the IMS price leads the way, and the
(hnf)producer prioe adjust to it up or down. This is evident in Table ^  and the
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aooompanyixig graph.
Th# marketing of secondaiy oopper ie aonevhat oomplex. To begin 
with, the new aorap is oonsumad in the fabrioator planta: it never raaohes
the market outside the plant. Part of the remainder of the new scrap would 
partly be bought by custom smelters and refineries \AiC would sell it in a 
refined form. Any more remaining new aermp and all old scrap would be bought 
by metal merchants. This scrap includes oopper alloys. A considerable part 
of the scrap handled by metal merchants is sold directly to fabricators to be 
reactivated by them in their production processes. This reactivated scrap 
consists of clean heavy copper scrap, brass and bronze scrap which is chiefly 
used by brass and bronze mills. Contaminated scrap in ikie possession of metal 
merchants has to be refined. Metal merchants would either sell the uhclean 
scrap to custom smelters or would comaisai(m custom smelters and refineries 
to refine it for them. In normal times metal merchants would sell their 
secondary copper mainly from their offices | only a small part would be sold 
through the IMS and Comex.
Comex is a relatively insignificant market dealing in about 25^ of 
world sales. Unlike the LME, the Comex is dominated not by metal mer^mnts, 
but by a few custom smelters and a few large integrated copper producers.
Comax might therefore be regarded as essentially a producer metal exchange.
As such it is unable to generate prioes that would reflect the interplay of 
supply and demand for the %#hole copper industry. As in the case of any 
producer market, most of the time prices follow supply conditions and are 
not responsive enough to demand conditions. Because seller and buyer are 
bound together by long-term contracta, prices will be maintained at given 
levels despite the change in the balance of supply and demand.
We would thus find that during periods of excess demand, the spot 
prioes would not be high enough. This would enocurage excess consumption.
If the domestic supply continued to be inadequate, this excess consumption
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demand oould spill over to other international oopper markets. Indeed the 
Comax is 80 narrow that it is usually forced to sell its oopper at I Æ prioes, 
which are consistently higher than Comex prices (see attached graph).
This brief narrative of the multiplicity of the copper msAets 
of the world shows that it is impossible to speak meaningfully of an integrale4r 
world copper market. Both the supply and demand sides of the world copper 
output are fragmented into several portions. Indeed in some oases these 
maricet portions sre insulated from the free operation of market forces. This 
is true of countries like France, Italy and Japan. Moreover, sometimes 
governments may intervene in the domestic economy, as did the U.S.Government 
in 1967 when producers there were not allowed, by threat of a dumping govern­
ment policy, to raise the price of the product beyond a certain level. (The 
recommended price was ih the range 50 to 40 cents per lb., equivalent to the 
Zambian prioe of €504-^520 per ton. The average producer price elsewhere 
was around £400 per ton).
In spite of govt.mmant restrictions and the practices of selling 
direct to consumers, the U S  plays a central role in the determination of the 
general level of oopper prices. A closer examination of this market will show 
how.
After the war the U S  was re-established in 1954 as a definite 
response to the metal nsuAceting and price fluctuations p r o b l e m . I t s  
functions, briefly stated, sre mainly to facilitate trade in metals. For this 
purpose two types of pricing are used in the specific case cf oopper. There 
is the "spot prioe" and the three-months* contract or "forward" price. The 
idea of a forward or contract price which is fixed periodically, ie to attempt 
to ensure stable earnings for the producer and a steady consumer price over the 
period. Besides, hedging facilities are also provided so that, for instance, 
consumers are protected against sudden changes in stock prices, etc. The 
market attempts to be independent though not neoessarily a disinterested
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•rbitntor between, say, the pxoduoer end the fmbrieetor.
However, eevexel mmjor oopper produoers (e#g. Zambie) and indeed 
Bome experts have outrightly oondemned the very exiateooe of the IMS, though,
88 we point out below, the basis of iSam argument is largely untenable on 
eoonomio grounds* The argument runs along the following lines* The oontraot 
prioe system is said to have inherent tfsaknesses which make the whole system 
a worthless endeavour* It is pointed out that a terminal market with a 
speoifio time period e.g. three monthly quotation, is unlikely to take full 
aooount of market influences that are likely to operate beyond the stipulated 
period, i.e. the quotation simply binds itself to take aooount of the market 
influences operating during or within that period only, or, at least, bases 
the oontraot price on the view taken of the market behaviour during the 
quotation period. The oontraot prioe, so to apeak, oxoludes any influential 
faotors effective beyond the date quoted. Such a situation, it is oonoluded, 
oould lead to a state of affairs in which the price used overstated or under» 
stated the reel demand end supply conditions in the entire oopper market.
This position is further confounded by the LNE*a policy of "no 
foroe majeure". Thus the opponents of the Kxctenge point out, what seems 
tc be obvious, that anything oould happen to change the maAet situation between 
the time of contract end the time of delivery. And yet the LMB prioe would not 
be permitted to vary to take into account the effective faotors during the 
contract period*
Moreover the three months for whidi a prioe is fixed is regarded 
as extremely inadequate for purposes of long-term planning on the part of 
the produoers and oonsumers alike. It is pointed out that the time lag 
involved in the supply of a metal oan be very cruoial in determining the long­
term price. We are reminded of the fact that it takes three to five years 
to operate a new mine or even merely to make substantial extensions to existing 
mines. Thus, if we assume that the expansion of output of oopper in this
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Instanoe vas m foBotioo of price, then less of oopper output oould have been 
produced had the ioBedlate price been not so attractive. At a later date 
when demand has lagged behind supply, such an exoesa supply would imply a rise 
in unit costa and a fall in profitability as the prioe would be bound to fall.
In other words, had the price been a true reflection of long-run supply and 
demand conditions this unhealthy situation would not have arisen. Similarly 
if the immediate price were low, producers would not forecast capacity expan­
sion but only to find that at tiiat later date demand had overrun supply, 
implying a rise in prices and producer profits to the discomfiture of consumers.
This argument boils down to the observation that an LKB oontractural 
price could lead to disastrous results if it encouraged undue expansion of 
future output, and, conversely that it could lead to serious shortages in the 
supply of future output if it was thou^t by the producers that future prioes, 
on the basis of current prices, would not be so attractive as to justify 
capacity expansion. This is all because the US, according to this school 
of thought, does not take full aooount of such possible inflexibilities and 
time lags in supply (and demand).
The "spot prioe" of the LMB appears to be particularly obnoxious to 
the major oopper produoers. The point about this price is that it influences 
the prices at which oopper will be sold in markets other than the US. It 
also influences the trend of the three months* prioe quotations. It is noted, 
for instance, that major oopper producing countries like Zambia do not sell 
their copper on the US floor, nor, indeed do they engage in hedging transactions 
on the Exchange. Such countries sell their products direct to their customers.
The spot prioes or "daily quotations** are the prices at which the 
last oopper dials on the Exchange floor are dealt. It is these prices that 
determine the US*a official price for the day. Since 19^, fzee market 
copper outside the Morth American continent and the producer acheos has been 
priced on this UfB daily quotation. Considering that this price appears to
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reflect the demend and supply conditions of only about 29^ of oopper output
in the free world, the produoers argue that this is really a case of the tail
wagging the dog.' The prioe, in short, is regarded not as a true reflection 
of the sotual world supply and demand situation. And it ia hardly possible 
to expect the big produoers to take kindly to this system of price-deteimination.
The outlined argument reveals an inadequate appreciation of the 
nature and economic function of the IMS.
First and foremost the LMB ia a metal merchants* market. Prices
will therefore contain an element of manipulation and not infrequently 
exmggereted fluctuations. This way merdhsnts are said to make profits at the 
expense of producers, which is one main reason d^iy large producers dislike the 
LMB and its metal marchants. The produoers are quite naturally interested in 
prices that reflect long-term supply and demand, and are thus not only 
irritated, but greatly worried by what appears to them to be avoidable and 
exaggerated short-term price fluotuationa.
The UtB does not permit ocntxacts for definite or speoifio brands 
of oopper. It leaves it to the seller to deliver a fulfillment of his 
contract indiaoriminately any one of the registered brands. This ia another 
bitter pill for the producers \Aio have always been anxious to reserve certain 
areas of the world as their exclusive markets. Thus, tteugh product 
differentiation, i.e. by creating proprietory brands of copper (e.g. R.B.C. - 
Shokans Electrolytic Copper), produoers would like and attempt to attach 
certain oustomers exclusively to themselves.
So far the LKB allows contracts for three kinds of copper. One for 
"copper wire bars" refers to the electrolytic copper or high conductivity fire 
refined oopper in the form of wire bqrs of standard dimensions in the weight 
range 200-279 lbs. The second contract is for "copper cathodes" and refers 
to the electrolytic oopper in the form of cathodes assaying not less than 
99*9^ copper content. Ihe third contract ia for "fire refined oopper" of
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two classe#, eitlier of which the seller has an option to deliver. Class (i) 
fire refined copper amasys not less than 99.8^ cf oop er in the form of ingots 
or ingot bars at contract prices. Class (ii) is fire refined oopper assaying 
not less tlian 99*7^ of oopper in the form of ingots or ingot bars at the price 
stipulated in the contract less 7^ per ton.
Altogether there aie, therefore, only four types of oopper which 
one oan buy on the UiE. However, there has been in recent times, a movement 
towards increasing the number of oopper brands registered on the LME. It is 
currently being proposed to inoresse the number by seventeen uiore brands from 
Africa, Asia, jYorth and South Am rioa#
Meanwhile, the problem of fluctuations on the is as yet to be 
solved. From th jlpoint of view of copper sold b)' msrdhants on this maiket, 
the nature cf the supply of this copper seems to spell fluctuations in itself. 
Prominent s urces are, for Instance*
Old scrap;Hew scrap not self-consumed by fabricators;Seocndary refined oopper brought from small or medium customsmelters and reinfexs;Concentrâtes fjfom small or medium independent mines;Occasional paroela of excess stocks cf fabricates;Primary and secondary oopper from occasional purchaees incountries selling oopper only intermittently (including Soviet Union).
That is^ the varied nature of this source of supply directly or indirectly
imperts into the price fixing on the LME a somswhat unhealthy element of
fluctuation. This in turn spills over into the rest of the free world copper
market, where the main dealers are the big produoers.
It is convttiient at 'ttiis point to return to the main theme of this 
section, i.e. the relationship between the LME and the rest of the oopper market 
of the free world. We submit that a great deal of the allegations against 
the LME follow from a misoonoeption of the eoonomio function of this market. 
Admittedly, part of the Î Æ  is a speculative market. In this rep%ect it is the 
only meohanism for taking a view of future prices. Investors with no use for
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oopper itself oan \iso the market to am tab their vita for gain against expert 
dealer#,whose expertise and profit ooneists in part of their "speculative" 
ability to buy and sell at the right times and prioes*
It is also true that the proportion of oopper sold on the LMB is 
small. Rat it must be understood that this amount represents a surplus " 
of supply and of demand which invariably moves the prioe down or up in a 
ooRzodity market. It is these very surpluses whiA are dealt in on the 
Bxohange. In other words the LMB is essentially a markat for excess supply 
end demand. H.»nce, if there is speculation, it must, on the whole, steer 
prioes in the right direotion; otherwise it just would not be a paying 
proposition.
Thus so long as the laws of supply and demand operate in copper, 
the traders perform a useful économie function. Stabilization schemes 
should therefore not be aimed at killing the LMB, but to build it up by 
increasing or reducing the turnover, thereby correcting the markets ever- 
sensitivity. The answer to price stability does not lie in rigidly fixed 
prices, but in raising or lowering oopper sales on the free market. Then 
the "minute turnover" would not have such disproportionate effects on price.
Indeed merely to adopt the IMB price does not entirely help to solve 
this fundamental problem of fluctuations. But there is no doubt that much
of the instability will be mitigated. %e use of a forward price rather than 
the cash quotation would create a much more stable situation# The forward 
price is much less prone to sudden, upsetting sales or purcheses. Our own 
proposal in this respect is two-foldi first to raise stocks neoessszy to even 
out fluctuations over the period, and secondly to inoreasé the contract period. 
Thus if tiumover were increased a true forward market would become possible.
At pfeeent the forward market is used mainly to hedge trading positions, 
protecting buyers a/gainst a shift in price rathar than to seouxe future supplies 
An increase in stocks need not imply a rice in world stocks; it would merely
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mean that a larger proportion would be held in the U S  werehoueea or on the 
Continent. Onoe atoCks are registered in these two offioial warWiouaes, 
they oan be sold on the Exdtange if need arises*
The broadening of the forward market will also be a neoeeaary 
part of the stabilisation policy. In a broadened market fabrioators oan 
order aotnal requirements several months in advanoe* This means that 
forward trqding would beoone a far more reliable indioetor of underlying 
changes in demand. On the other hand, produoers oculd then more assuredly 
adjust output in time, and could damp down fluctuations even further by 
setting up a buffer stock in oopper. If Ihe forward market accurately 
reflected fabricator demand rater than speculative sentiment, a produoer 
buffer stock in oopper oould be effectively used against any short-term 
fluctuations.
This way of looking at the problem shows that the IMS, far from 
being dbnoacious is an ally of the producers and that stabiliaation sohemeo oan 
only work, in the present nature of oiroumstanoea, if the LKB were taken 
into confidence as part of su^ scAemea. This would be true whether the 
argument applied to scrap or to virgin oopper, whose individual prioes, as 
we know, affect each other in varying degrees.
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CHAPTER 1 
REFBREBCBS AND FOOTHOTlg
1. The main eooroea for Section I are#
R$ 1. Prain (Sir) (Chairman of the R.S.T. Group) Chapta. 1.9*4.9
C. H. Thompson & H. W.woodruff in Eoonoaio Development in Rhodesia & Nyasaland. (^nnis Dobson Ltd. London) Esp. Chapt. 7.
R.£. Baldwin in boonomio Development à Export Growth. A Study of Northern Rhodesia 1920 - 6) ^University of California Press 
1966) Rap. Chapts. 2 & 6.
Barber in the Eoonomy of British Central Afrioa • This is an extremely profound textbook disouaaion of the Political Economy of the FédératioB of Rhodeaia and %%rasaland.
2. See e.g. Mining Annual Review, May 1968 pp. 19-29# "ChangingStructure of the Industry".
Also Annual Reporta of the two Mining Groups.
9. See Tables and Graphs on Cost Trends, Chapter 9 of this work»
On Shipping ratios see file MU^6 - 11, and a relevantdiscussion ia presented in Chapter 9*
4* see R. Perlman's Article in "Management Today", Sept. 1 66, pp. 79 and I40.
9. For a discussion of 1MB and COMEX prioe trends, see e.g. MiningJournal 90/8/68 pp. I4I-I42#Perlman's artiole disousaes the nature, organisation and effect of these market aystema, ibid. eap. pp. 70-79*
6. See e.g. H. R. Rpsser'a artiole in "Optima", Deo. I969.The LMB had been non-operative sinoe the war.
7. See Perlman's article, ibid. p.79*
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CHAPTER 2
M m  TAXATICg . AH XrogRAL PART OF THE STHTOH OF TAXATIOI JM Mfaik
In the preoedlng èhapter we dleoueeod in brief the relation­
ship between the mining industry and the aotivitiea of the economy of 
Zambia. Much more pertinent to our research project we noted the faot 
that the mining Companies as a whole, i.e. the mining industry, of 
5&ambla ia responsible for the country's recurrent revenue of around 
60-709^  of the total item. We now make a more detailed analysis of the 
relationship between the mining industry and government budget requirements. 
The discuBSion which we present in this chapter highlights the central role 
mine taxation plays in the country's national development plan.
We also mention, if only briefly, the likely iiq)lioations of 
mine taxation on the prospective investmant yield of Zambian mines.
However, this aspect of mine taxation or the relationahip between taxation, 
mining costs in general and investment productivity is much more fully 
analysed in subsequent chapters. For the moment we wish principally to 
discuss mine taxation as an integral part of the system of taxation in 
Zambia. The framework for this analysis is provided by the plan period of 
the country's first niational development plan whioh spans the period 
1966 to 1970.
The mines of Zambia are subjected to three main forms of taxation, 
namely the Profits tax, the Export tax and the Royalty#Anticipating 
a fuller ddsoription, analysis and critique of this tax system, we may note 
in tliis chapter the various rates at whioh the taxes are levied. The 
profits tax ia progressive and the 1 Ability ia 98)( for every income up to 
about £100,000, and 4)^ for income levels above this operating profit of 
the company# Export tax or duty ia levied progreaaively too at the rate 
of 40^ of the difference between LMB price per ton and a nominal £900, 
i.e. 40p( (LMBP-£900). Royalty is oharged per ton of oommodity produced
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and the rate is also mildly progressive, vist 13i0^ of u a  prioe minus 
C6 (i.e. l)k(M6).
Hoe, any tax on a oorporate enterprise is sisq>ly a tax for doing 
business.In the usual case it is a tax on the income of the particular
business enterprise, end technioally referred to as a corporation tax.
■»The aesuiq)tioa is realistic that any tax is ixqwaed to achieve a purpose 
or objectives, however non-economio the objectives might seem to be.
Thus whm deciding on a system and:structures cf taxation a government 
oan be presumed to be guided by specific objectives whioh may be purely 
fiscal, economic, social or political or indeed a combination of all or some 
of these objectives. The whole system of taxation is thus geared to achieving 
such objectives. And the tax structures designed - proportional, progressive, 
regressive - become simply the expression of the means by whioh the desired 
target may be attained. Heedless to say that objectives will differ from 
government to government and country to country so long as there are 
differences of critical oiroumstanoea for the different govemmente or 
countries. Thus, in umdexdeveloped economies with surplus labour, one of the 
main objectives is tc gear taxation to the full employment of these manpower 
resources, while in advanced economies where capital is the factor generally 
in relative excess, the emphasis is duly placed on how best to fully utilise 
this factor. Speakiag generally, taxation is an instnsaeat whioh the 
government uses to attain a desired pattern of investment allocation and 
activity.
The general rule is that given the objectives, the primary purpose 
of taxation is always to raise revenue (the maximum receipt) while not 
running counter to principles cf social justice. This is normally understood 
to mean a "fair" or "proper" redistribution of wealth and involves an assur­
ance of a long-term economic stability and a maximum use of factors of 
production. It is this relationship between the objectives and the means 
to attain them whioh in fact forms the basic meaning of the theory of public
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finance and oonetitatee the eeaenoe of a government budget p o l i c y . , 
If the phenomena of (puhlio) finance axe understood in thia\ 
way, we should find it easier to understand why tarse on oorporations ^ 
or business enterprises find a place in the different tax cugrangemen^ s 
in so many countries today# The lAole system of taxation becomes ncjt
merely an instrument of fiscal policy, but rather of the wider issue of ^
r \political economy# That is, it has the added significanoe as an ina^iytfflieht
of extra-fiacal policy, and with whi<A instrument the political process\ \\whioh makes the choice In matters of finance is enabled tc prwounce thei^ \ 
or its objectives. Thus, not only would the use of taxation enable the ; \
\government to restore the balance of the eoonomio system when there is a glut 
or shortage of capital or to curb undeaired inflationary and deflationary )■ \
itendencies, but may also be used to achieve eoonomio and social oontrol over I 
produotion.(^) The government may, for instance, desire to reactivate the \ 
production of small and mediuo-sised undertakings by, say, discouraging the 
creation of large undertakings whioh, by their scale of operations, tend to 
make the operation of competition imperfect, which it may also be desired 
to remedy.
How, in theory as well as in practice, certain forms of taxation 
will be more efficient than others in performing a specific function for the 
government. In Zambia, whatever the specific objectives for whioh the three 
mine taxes (royalty, export duty, profit tax) were intended to achieve 
individually, the effect cf the taxes together is to make their main role 
that of re-allocating resources from the mining sector to the rest of the 
eoonosy mainly through public expenditure. (The intended role of the taxes 
individually ia discussed in a later chapter dealing with the rationale and 
critique of the taxes in question). This is evident from the current 
development plan, the main feature of which we sketch below.
Meanwhile we oan say that the current system of mine taxation in 
Zambia will be justified by the extent to whioh it succeeds in performing
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the funotlw required of it by the netionel development plan. That 
is^  a required aye tern of mine taxation ia one whioh ia oonaietent 
with the overall objeotivea of the national plan. Thia means 
oonaiatenoy from both the finanoial and the eoonomio requirements 
of the plan objectives.
In thia chapter our analysis proceeds essentially from the 
finanoial point of view of the system of taxation in the context of 
the plan objectives. The economic analysis and implications espeoially 
of the system of mine taxation are presented in a subsequent ohapter.
The Bational Development Plan of Zambia spells out both the eooo.6 
omio and financial objectives for the period 1966-1970^^\ The eight 
main economic (and scoial) objectives are summarised by the plan as 
fellowsI
(i) To diversify the eoonosy so that the copper industry is 
not the only main employer in the economy and so that a 
greater proportion of domestic demand ia satisfied by 
domestic production from a large industrial base.
(ii) To increase employment by at least 100,000 jobs during the 
course of the plan period.
(iii) To increase average monetary output per head from C6l per 
annum in I964 to about £100 per annum in 1970.
(iv) To maintain reasonable prioe stability.
(v) To minimise the inherited economic imbalance between the urban
and rural sectors with a view to raising the oapaoity of the
latter sector for transforming resouroes into social and
eoonomio growth.
(vi) To raise rapidly the general levels of education, as well as 
develop a wide range of specific technical, administrative, 
executive, professional and management akilla in the population.
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(vil) To provide more end better living aooonmodation ae a
requisite ingredient of a better standard of living, and 
to raise the general level of social welfare.
(viii) To develop new ooonanieations, souroee of energy, transport, 
and other eoonoaio infrastructure for a new economic order.
It is fbrther stated that in order to raise the per oapita 
income (objective iii), given the expected rate of population growth 
of 9 9)6 per annum it will be necessary to achieve a real growth rate 
of about 11)1 per annum over the period (at I964 prioes).
Another aajor objective is that of increasing substantially 
the share of QDF devoted to capital investment. By 1970 it is ex- 
peoted that the level of capital investment will be £11).6 m. oom- 
posed of £55.1 m. public, and £58.) m* private investment. This 
implies a much more active participation of the government in the 
country's process cf economic development. (Of# During Transitional 
Development Plan in I965, capital investmant equalled only 20^ of QDP).
The total capital investment over the period is also expected 
to be substantially increased. Thus it is estimated that the total 
capital investment will amount to £429m. of which £282 m. will be 
provided by the public sector, and £147 m. will be available from the 
private sector. The proposed annual rate of government investment over 
the period 1966-70 is said tc represent an increase of more than 100)6 
over the figure for I965-66, and that it is a very large and ambitious 
increase which is justified for two reasons# (a) the level of capital 
investment expressed as a percentage of the Oroaa Domestic Product has 
fallen steadily since 1957 (b) in the Zambian context, the public sector 
oust play a leading sole in investment and, thereby, give a lead to the 
private sector which mey, for various reasons, not expand as fast as 
might be desired during the early years of the plan. It is observed 
that a vigorous investment policy by government is a pre-requisite for
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dynmmlo enterprise, eapeoially when a large percentage of the 
Investment is devoted tc establishing the economic infra-structure 
which promotes the expansion of productive private enterprise.
It is also stated that productive investment by government, which 
constitutes a substantial proportion cf the Plan (see Table below) 
will have the effect cf increasing the purchasing power cf the popul- 
atitm, thus bringimg about an expansion of private industry and oomm- 
eroial agriculture by expending the public and private aeotcrs.
The distribution of this capital investment is as follows t
m S J S L
(.) 19M-&4 (t) 1964 (0) 1966-70
am. * am. * Cm. *
Public Sector \eo.4 42.) 19.2 Î4.i 2él.8 "TJ’.T"
Private Sector 245.7 57.7 24.9 69.6 147.5 94.9
Total 426.1 100.0 98.1 100.0 429.9 100.0
(a) SourceI Central Statistical Office, 1994*64
(b) Independence Tear I964
(c) First National Development Plan, 1966-70.
Source I National Development Plan p.l2
From the point cf view of public capital investment, 
this distribution represents an average level cf capital investment 
of approximately C7Qm. per annum. Capital investment over the period 
1994*1964 had averaged only about ClSm. per annum - a very poor show 
compared to the current plan estimates. Moreover, altogether the 
proposed levels of investment during thia Plan period represent an 
increase of about 990*9)6 over the last ten years of the colonial period.
The Plan appreciates that capital investment of this mag­
nitude automatically generates a considerable expansion ia the recurrent 
expenses cf ministries and departments. Annual recurrent e3q>enditure
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for the finnolal year 196^-66 was 445 ) for mlnlatrlea and aarvioea, 
and 417.1 m. for tha aarvioing of tha Public Dabi. It la aatimatad that 
flumual reourrant aapex^tura for miniatriaa and aervioea will reaoh
fk A k ^  « W V  /S-fc fJbt^tri.4»4
Yha Table below ahowa how thia recurrent expenditure will ba
allooated#
v m  ip'i
figCUHRBrr KCTIPXTDRB
1965-66 1967-68 1969-70 ]( inoreao*. 1965-66
: Miniatriaa 
1 and Sarvloaa1 45.5 62.5 74.0 * 62.5
i public Debt 17.1 19.7 24.5 ♦ 45.5
i 62.4 82.0 98.5 ♦ 57.8
Source# latioaal Oawalopnant Plan, p.l)
Haturall/f the Oorarmiant la conoamed with poaalbla adveraa 
affacta raaultlng troa auoh raourrlng axpamaaa. Hanoa différant mathoda 
are propoaad by ahich Incraaaaa of thla Item nay ba controlled and avoid 
a waatafttl axpandltuxa of oi^ltal Invaatmant, Control naaauraa will 
include coat mlnlmlaatlan ararolaaa, the uaa of outalda conaultanta, and 
tha allainatlon of overlapping aarvlcaa.
It la agalnat thla ba<d%round that tha propoaad govammant , 
revenue aatlmataa have bean nada In the Plaa^^). Flratly, tha Plan 
axpacta that aatlnata# of donaetlc reaouroas derived from projactlona of 
copper production and prloaa from 1966-70 will auffloa to finance tha 
greater part of tha development programme. Thua asqmnditura on 
capital account la axpaotad to expand ataadlly utlllalng Internal 
reaourcaa. Including reourrant aurpluaaa and domaatlo loana, to the 
fttllaat.
To tha extant that thaaa raqulramanta and azpectatlona will
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be satisfied by reeouzoee tapped through the tax mystem the govemoent 
has oonsidered It neoeesaxy that its tax policy «ill therefore be guided 
by two oalB priaeiplee, visi
(a) the broadening of the tax-baee la so far as oonpatible 
with equity» in order to assure the raaxinua partioipation 
of the population as well as oontributing to the national 
treasujqr.
(b) euMrtnIng the existing tax rates and opportunities for new
The plight of developing countries like Zambia is that the 
level of erpendlture depends largely on the effectiveness of the tax 
system as expressed in productivity» efflclemoy, growth and stability.
The extent to which the plan objectives will be implemented will depend 
very much on the econonio and administrative capacity of the tax 
system to marshall the necessary resources. In short, practically 
eveqrthing will depend on the effectiveness of the revenue and e3q>enditure 
processes of the government budget. In the specific case of Zambia 
the Plan enbisages that the tax potential (theoretically the maximum 
proportion of the national income which a country can make available 
for public services by means of taxation) can be ktssed as a whole over 
the period 1966-70. Levels of investment proposed are expected to raise 
government revenue over present figures by about 10^ or 139^  even assum­
ing no change in the structure of taxation. Such revenue (potential) 
is, of course, closely linked to the level of copper prices and 
expected output tonnages. Thus assuming an LNE price of C360 per ton, 
the current tax rates would yield revenue of the order of 470 m. to 
495 p.a. over the entire Plan period.
However, if necessary, the revenue would be substantially 
augmented by changes in the tax rate of personal income and thé indirect
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taxes and duties on oertsia gooé with reletlvely Imelastie doauads 
(e.g. spirits, tobssee, eesmetios, etc.). Ad vslogsa duties on 
luxury geods auoh aia jewellery and oesoetios oould also be varied 
te preduse the neeeasaiy revenue.
Changes in the tax struoturs are else amvisaged with partieular 
referenoe to inoome rsdistributian so that the present inoeme and wage 
differentials between lower and higher inoene braekets may be narrowed.
In this eonmeetion it may be neeessaiy te rsduee tames cm essential 
geods and servieesi in some eases negative tames or subsidies may be 
made by the state to emtoiprlses providing essential and staple feedstuff s. 
The general palioy is te raise the purchasing power of the people 
currently in the lewer income braekets relative to the better paid or 
higjber inoome ssotiam ef the cmmsunity, Coapled with a definite 
govemmsmt wages policy for the ce%mtry, ttiis tarn policy is expected to 
yield the desired pattern ef imeame *%istributiom during the plan period.
In case ineame rsdistributicm shedd create destabilising 
influences in the economy, i.e. create undesirable inflationary procasses 
as a result of a relative increase er rise in daaMstic demand, counter 
er stabilisatiam measures are also amvisaged in the plan. Generally 
speaking, in advameed eeamamies undesirable inflation cedd be curbed 
net only by means of a system of tamatiom, but else and usually in 
combination with ryprspriate measures of the central bank. But since 
the money market is still uadevdeped and the rdationship between the 
central and the commercial banks is still tamuoua, the only effective 
instrumamt available far stabilisatiom in Zambia is taxation. In 
this respeet the Govemmsmt ef Zambia bdieves that the emtamt te 
which tamatiom will be effsetive will depend,inter alia, upams
(a) the widest application of direct tarnation to the économie 
activity of the ceuntry.
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(b) the teehmleel features ef tames (rate-struoture, pregression, 
assesamaht, preeedure, ooUeetlaa and adainistrative oooh 
peteaoy)•
These measures together with ethers, ensure that the eeanamio objectives 
ef the Plan are as far as possible consistent and attainable. That 
is te ensure the realisatiem ef the desired relatianship between 
revenue and expenditure of the Plan.
The Table bale* shews the various sources of récurrent 
revenue required té meet the objectives ef the Plan during the entire 
peried.
RECURRENT RgnBtOB
fetal Reourrant Revenue, 1963*66,PreJectiams for 1966-67 to 1969-70
(Currant Prices) (Am)
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 feial1966-70
Income Tam(a) Cepper Ces.(3)
(b) Personal and Other Ces. (l)
Custams Y Xxelse (2)
26.3
13.3
12.4
32.2
11.3
13.4
31.3
13.4 
15.2
32.6
13.6
17.5
34.3
18.3 
19.8
130.4
58.8
65.9
Mineral Resources and expert Tames (3) 41.2 38.2 43.3 43.0 47.4 193.9
Other (l) 13.4 13.7 17.5 19.6 22.0 74.8
Tetd 107.0 120.7 _ JLjPiL 5 2 M -
(1) Related to O.N.D.P. prejections ef hi^ level incomes and campanies prefits, isaumes price increases ef 49( p.a.
(2) Assumes imports price increase by 2^ p.a#, duties being levied ad valeram.
(3) Assmptiom ef copper prejecüemt
I^ ùù>~ "to
l^jrpfyx.Jj • rii n / ê
(^P\rûfiii^ ^YpD'^ fi •f'l\o^lÙL Ctî< 
-" 72Lyfej j____ • • --
I Of'U.^^urce.i,. /: ' : :i
|*vCov\\C /c^ , _
_ Ct4^ f3w\S ^E'<c.tS€.^ Offerer".
/c^yecs'^ ^ts-,
nc-ciiiiiii n r o/n M //^ /A/•; Cc,/^\ /-W/v'/es /f
70
700 730 760 800
400 350 350 350
370 335 335 335
1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
Output (*000) toM
L D  Priou p«r turn (X)
Piroduoor SeUiag Price 
S/tok (Wire bers)
(a) Boiyalty end Export T n  rates are assumed umohaaged
(b) Inoome Tsm is assvned to be 4),^ of gross profits after royalties and export tax (a loser rate is to be paid by Bancroft os the new nines)# In other respoets these estimates hare been prepared on aggregative industiy basis and are currently under rerrisien mine by mine#
(o) All revenue is assumelPijMBPyear ef output; lags are ignsrsd
(d) Average mining* eperatimg and transport costs ars £153 per ton in 1965-66. rising to betseea £171 and £182 in 1970.
aoureei Vaüenal Development Flam* p#14.
Our particular inter at in this Table is the amount of 
resourees shioh the mining oonpanies* through the variouA taxes imposed 
on then* contribute to the total reourrant revenus. A graphie prss- 
entatiem ef these various souroes ef récurrent revenue easily ahess that 
the most impartant souroe of this revenue are the miming oenpanies.
A simple oaloiU.ation from this table shoes that at mo time during the 
Flan period mill recurrent revenue from the mimes fall belew 5Q^ sf the 
total recurrent revenue; in fact the loeest peint is reached during 
1969-70* ehen the percentage contribution from this source is around 
58^ This should not cone as a surprise since touards the end of the 
Rlon period one must expect either that other sources of revenue have 
increased their share of the total or that as the Plan execution is 
getting to oompletion* the everell expenditure mill tend to fall in 
oenparisen to earlier phases* and this means that recurrent revenue 
mill fall in response to this relative lull in the development of the 
economy. from readings in the Table abeve it seems* houever, that 
the relative decline of this source ef revenue beteeen 1969-70 mill be
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dus to relative imereaee# la the ooatributiMi of ethep eouroee.
At the very highest peint* oentrlbutien from the mining 
ooaqtanies is estimated to be abeut Tt/JL ef tetal reouxront revenue* 
during the Flam peried 1966-67.
From ehat me knew m d  said ef the structure ef mine tamatiom* 
there are three majer souroes ef gevemmemt revenue* i.e. the Imoerne 
er Profits tear* and the Bayalties and Export taxes. The last tee 
are usuaily banded together so that me earn talk of only two major items 
ef revenue from the mimes. A brief analysis of the Table mill give 
us some idea of the sigmifieamoe ef each tax ooo^anent from the pines* 
for each level ef recurrent revenue ehioh the mines must oentribute to 
the treasury. Again* me nay do this by referring to the relevant 
graph attached. On the graph* me cam easily see how each item coai- 
pares to the ether.
Again* a simple calculatien milt enable us to form an 
impression of the relative significance of each item. Thus* at the 
very highest level during the Flan peried* Payai ty and Erpert tames 
mould together make up no less than 6 #  ef total revenue from the mines 
during 1966-67. The lemsst point mould be 58^ during 1969-70.
From these obsorvatiems on the reourrent revenue sources 
me can say at least tvo things: the first is that government revenue
is going to rely aery heavily en sources frem the mining oc^^anies far 
the entire plan period. Seoandly* Boyalties and &pert taxes are going 
to be the most sifpif leant souroes of revenue from the mines. Per a 
oontribution sf around a third ef the total during the entire period 
income tax from the mines mill be comparatively less decisive though 
of course it mill for the mhole peried be as indispemsahle as any other 
source ef recurrent revenue.
Becurrent revenue is only ene itma of resource required to 
meet the development objectives set out for the mhele Flan period. It
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Is quite olear* ## the Thble belew eheue* that vitheut other source# 
ef resource#* recurrent revemee dome wodd be inedequate for the 
requlrcmemte ef the Asm. Omee again a qui#k inprseeion cam be 
had by leaking at the rdevcmt graph attached ckioh indicates the 
rdationship betnesn espenditurs* reourrent revenue, and other sources 
ef dsvd<qpMnt finenoe for the entire plan period
» n f i r t i B i  BMJHWI toù
1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 Totd
A. Expenditure(i) Capitd Imvsstnsnt 79.5 77.0 70.4 54.9 281.8
(ii) Bsourrent B^penditurs T5.2 82.9 64.4 96.5 339.0
Tetd Erpendituro 152.T 159.9 154.8 153.4 630.8
B. Revenue
Reourrent Domestio Locate Sdf-fimansimg
132.05.0 120.78.0 130.39.01.0
141.88.02.0
524.830.03.0
6. Leans and Aid#
Sxtemd Loans Bxtemd Aid 14.31.4 29.81.4 12.32.2 1.6 58.05.0
Tetd Bsaourees 152.7 159.9 154.8 153.4 620.8
Sourest Sationd Devdspnemt Plan* p.l5
This Tehle is else reproduced in graphic fcm to ewcMLe us cnee
more to fora a quiok impression of the dgpifloanee of the various itsns
we are andyaimg, The first paint us wish to make is the rdationdlp
between totd resources and tetd reourrent revenue. It is quits dear 
that the majS? d W M #  ef devdspnsnt flmamoe will be recurrent revenue.
At me peint during the plan period will ^ e  perosntsge oontribution of
this item be less than 73% of the tetd resourees. This is the estimete
for the period 1966-67. During 1969-70 this item will dene aooownt for
•<P{ / / 9/. A »  / ^  t % n  r-’io •/:
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abewt 90^  #f total roaouvooa requlr#& to aohiovo the âorelofOMit 
objeotivoa aa aacpraasoA tgr the total level ef eatlaeted axpeediture 
(capital Inveatmemt and reourrent expenditure).
If reourrent revenue ie #0 important in the exeoutian 
of the plan objective#* and ee hare eeen that a greater proportion of 
thia Iten i# made up ef ravemuee frcn the nines* then quite simply ve 
can say that the develepoent proepeote of the econony of %and)la are 
bound up ui^ the develepnent preapeeta of that oountyy*# mining industry. 
Thia* of course* is a point of oonnonplaoe knowledge te anyone nho 
knees anything about the eoenanie structure ef Zadia. What is parhays 
mot so oeononly kneen is the exact tax structure that makes the mining 
industry er the oempanies the iJ^ertant revenue contributors that they 
are* and the probable effects of that tax struoturs on the future 
development of the industry.
From the point ef view ef tha mining industry me have seen 
that royalties and the expert duty comprise the largest item of 
taxation. That is to ssy* the dominance of the mining industry in the 
economy or in respeet of the development plan* is largely ^to this dual 
iten of tax revenue. This observaticn means that the envisaged or 
desired reform of mine tazatioa mill be of major oonoera to both the 
government and the industry* and that in effect the eonoem mill be about 
the desired rele ef royalties and export tan in the finaaeing of the 
development plan jeetives.
Now* given the économie objectives and the level of revenues 
required to achieve these objectives, any reform of taxation mill imply 
either a change in the structure of mine taxation* leaving the amount 
of tax revenues from the mines constant* or a change in the aaoimt of 
tax reeenmss Aron the mines corresponding te changes in tax revenues 
from the rest of the eoonany. The necessary condition to be satisfied
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in this sms# is the helmee er equUihrivm heteeem revenues and 
expenditere* i.e. if the develepmamt abjeotives ere to be realised 
the equilibrium betuesm revenue and expenditure must be uaintsined 
in one f e n  er another.
Heeever* frem the peint ef view of the eoeneade effects ef 
taxation an the taxpepur (i.e. the mining industiy)* net euly the 
aneemt but else the uey in ehioh the tax is levied (and spent) is 
erltieal in detemiming the desirability ef a given syetem ef taxation. 
Thus* given the develepnent abjeotives ef the gevennent and the 
amount ef revenues required frem the miming indmstzgr* the tee sides*
i.e. the gevexuMut and the industry may still have te argua about 
the ratienality er justifioatien for eheesiag a partievlar tax 
struoture instead ef another ehioh ueuld aehieve the same amemt of 
tax revemues in aoeerdanoe uith the plan requirenemts. Given geverm- 
nent pelioy far the nimes* the argument mill essentially be abeut the 
inoentive effeots am produotian* and the oensequant effeets ef the 
tax on prespeetive investment frem both the daneetio and eapeoially 
the intermaticnsl ecanany frem ahich a oonsideruble prapertien ef nine 
developnant finance oaaws.
Thus* the currant queet ef the mimes fer a men system ef tax- 
ation invelviag a change in the mature ef the reyelty tax is based 
largely an eonsideratiens ef oests and their presmed effect an incentive 
te expand preductiem and investmamt activities. The miming companies 
hold the vie# that if the present system ef royal^ pvMmts*fer 
instance* vas nedified er even radically changed the industry ueuld 
be less eemstreimed in their preduotiom pessibilities. Zn effect* 
the uhale argiment is based on comparative cost analysis and on the 
ebservatiem that the prasemt aysten of royalty taxatian appears to be 
eut ef teuch uith changing eoenenio parameters. At this level of the 
argvment* as uell as the uay in uhioh the tax is levied* the share of
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revemu# t r m  mime taxes is no longer data. It is painted eut that 
this need met create an imbalaaee beteeen the desired total revenues 
and expenditure. Thus a redistribution of the tax liability 
throughout the eoonemy mould ensure that the passible isbalamee did 
met eoour. Indeed a case is made for tho sdno tax liability te 
be redistributed uithim the nimimg industry itsSlf• we disouss
these and rdeted issues mere fully later amd constitute a najer 
aspect ef our thesis.
Per the ni e nt me may observe briefly the relatiemsfaip 
and inplioatiens ef the taxes in questisn vis-n»vis tho mining eosts 
ef this industry. We do met* hemsver* presie that tho level of 
taxes is independent ef all other items of cost (including profits). 
The relationship betmeen eosts and taxatien as a oest is almsys 
indeterminate in preetloe since ene form of cost mill normally gffeet 
the other. Hence* the feUoming brief analysis is only a first 
apprexinatieni
The ererege preduetiSm oest for lesbian mines mas 
dZlVtT* fer an average U B  price (P) ef d@90 per ten sdd* in 19é7 
Thus* given tho royalty (B)* expert duty (S) and inoome tax (IT)* 
me can analyse the issms as fellemst
War P . d55C/LT 
B • X47 
BT. W  
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That is* the additional oest fer preduoing and selling a 
ten ef cepper at M530 is equal to the aneuat ef reymltiee plus the 
export tax levied per ton. Ih our example* this equals 
altogether* so that the total cost ef production mad sales mill be
Production Cast # dZlf/LT
Bayalties and BcpertTex • d 60/Lt
Total . d273/LT
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Gross profit is thersfsr# sqosl to d?5 per ton* shish* 
shem rsdossd hj ths imosms tax (d30) results in s m#t profit 
of shoot Ehprssssd ms s return on eipitsi this represents
s mte of yield ef less then 15g( fer the Sebbisn industiy (see Chapter 5# 
Seetion 4 of this woarik). On the basis ef this observatien* the nines 
argue that for a production cost ef dZLf/tT* at the prevailing level 
of prices* a nneh more moderate aysten ef mime taxation mould be 
desirable as this mould bring abeut a healthier level of profitability 
oonsistent uith a pdiey of industrial expansion.
There is eleaily a ecnfliet ef interest here. In the first 
place* notiee that under these conditions* the yidd of govexnnent 
revenue is altogether equal to dgC^T* representing m o m than tme-thirds 
of ths total grass profits ef the mimes before taxation of any form, 
naturally* exponents of the industry question uhether this tax liability 
on the mines is also consistent mith govemmsmt mining polioy* and* 
as stated above* shether in certain eiroistaaees it mould not be more 
rational to redistribute the mature ef the liability mithin the mining 
industry* er throughout the eeenomy as a abde.
We make mueh of this peint beoamse once me have accepted 
the fact that 2snbla*s mining industry is the baok-bone of the 
eeonoay* me must then leek to the factors that determine the mell-being 
of that industry. Since the industry is an expert sector me are 
naturally interested in the factors that bear on this industry on 
its ability te eeqpete in the intemationd market. This means 
that me must attempt to shew hear mdl the standing of the mining 
companies of Tibia is vie-adris the existing companies in the morid 
eeomomy. A comparative cost study is ixvduable in this respect.
It is important from our stand-point since it enables us to fora an 
opinion on the extent te mhich the projected sdes of capper embodied
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in the development pi we may be realiaed* It eaomot be too often 
said that euooess ef the Zambian mining industiy in the internatienal 
ee enemy ie a primary requirenent touards the fulfilment ef the goals 
of develepnemt as set out in the national plan fer Zambia as 
a mhele.
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X. Sees Chapter 4 ef this etedF.
2. See; G. C d m  In A«l.Beviev* Paper# and Preeeedinge* 1954"*Ooiperate Taxmtlom"# alee hie *Beeeje in Publie Finenee and Fiioal Polioy* Oxferd Uhivereity Preee* 1955» easay 5» eriginal editiem ef 1954» pf .90"95»
3. See# 1«A« Meegreve in *fhe Theeiy ef Piddio Finaaoe* HoOraa#Bill Book Coopaey* Ine$» pp.7-258» et el#
4. See# O.B.C.D# Report ef 1959» %y Prefeeaer Ceeeiani an the effeeteof taxatien on predneimg eotexpxieea* eapeoially Chapter 4#
5# See# The National Developxamt Plan* 1946-90» pp.5-6.
6. See# The Natieaal Bevelapeant Plan» ep. oit. - FinancialStatement* pp.11-15#
7. See; Chapter 3 of thia study fer a nere detailed account ef therelatianships beteeen preduetien* eoet* and the price efcapper.
8. The Profits tax is pregressive* and will be relevant only uherea coapany nakea an everell net prafit ef nere than £100*000.
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CHAPTSR 5 
HUS TAXATION AMD MIKIND 008TB
In the oonoludlng pages of Chapter 2 we attempted to Indioate 
that given the ooat struoture of a mining oompany, per ton of metal 
produoed* oertain ooat items aoooimted for a considerable proportion of 
total ooata of production and. sales. In this instanoe we isolated the 
royalty and the export duty as partiodhrly signifioant. Ths disousaion 
whioh we make now ie thus an elaboration of this observation. Ve are 
particularly oonoemad with how the syetem of taxation relates to other 
mining costs of the mining companies of Zambia and how all this must affect 
the entire industiy in its performance vis-a-vis competitors in the inter­
national market. We have said it several times earlier iby a favourable 
comparative cost for the mining industry of Zambia is an important condition 
in the attainment of the objectives and goals of development as set out in 
the plan for the period 1966-70. That is, what happens to this industry 
determines effectively what the development tempo of the whole eoonoay will 
be. And what the development tempq of this Industry will be depends almost 
entirely on how competitive it is in ‘ttie international eoonomy. Having said 
this we are back to the question of production and salsa ooata which ws 
propose to describe and analyse here as follows#
S«otion li Min* - PaflolUop wd gatWBO» (I)
In orÉer to comprehend mors fully the meaning of mining coats 
it is necessary first to understand ths meaning of what the activity and 
struoture of mining is all about. However, in this section we present only 
a brief,but adequate for our purpose, description of what the enterprise of 
mining involvee.
In general, mining is the process by which mineral values are 
won from the earth's crust, or, put differently, an artificial axoavation
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or «rtxmotlon mad# from tha aarth's oroat for the purpose of winning mineral 
valuea ia called mining. Defined thus, mining therefore inolude# both open- 
pit and underground exoavatione for metal and coal workings, quarries and 
oil, gas, salt and sulphur wells, but eaoludes burrow pits, railway sewer 
and water tunnels and, in general, all diggings made for oommarolal purposes 
other than the exploitation of minerals.
A mineral deposit may be worked for a profit or for other reasons. 
Particularly in the Western économies the idea or concept of eoonomio value 
Is central to any decision relating to a business venture. In countries 
like the U.S.S.R., however, it is not slways the decisive indicator that a 
venture be profitable before it osn be undertaken.^ * More often than not, 
considerstions other than profit are more important. Thus mining may be 
undertaken simply for strategic reasons even though it may not be immediately 
profitable to operate it. Moreover, even in the Western oapitalist oountriea, 
war time or oontingency planning does neoessitate undertaking operations of 
enterprises idiich may not normally be regarded as eoonomio.
The economically mineable mineral-bearing deposit ia te^uiically 
called "ore**.^ ^^  Thus without change of grade or location what is "mineral- 
bearing material" at one time may become "ore" at another throu^ the 
development of cheaper extraotion prooesees or becauee of dmnges in one or 
more of the factors entering into the cost and sale of production. This 
would lengthen th^ife of a mine and the reverse is also true. Hence the 
fact that mining, at least in the West, is understood to mean the extraction 
of mineral materials for a profit, or as "the art of making money out of ore”. 
Thus, unless a mineral deposit osn be worked at a profit it memsins nothing 
more than a prospeot.
The nature of ore itself has been defined as "the natural aggregation 
of one or more minerals from which useihl metals may be profitably extraoted".^ '
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As we have just said, tWs profitable natural aggrsgation of mineral# la 
determined by tha relatlonAlp between tha oost of production and the Basket 
price per unit. That is, this oost-prios relationship established Urn grade 
of material at whioh profit osn be realised. Material of a grade above thia 
dividing line or assay out-off is what is known as ore; material below tbs 
line is simply not osse, since it is not profitable to mine it under tbs 
te<knioal and eoonomio conditions current or forecast. Thus the standasrd 
or aocepted olaasifioation of ore is as follows:- 
>rov«d or A»»ureil 0 »
This is defined to oover prinoipally tbs ore blocked out in 
three dimensions by actual underground mining operations and drill holes, 
where geologioal factors which limit the ore body are definitely known and 
where the bhanoe of failure of the ore to readi these limits is so remote 
as not to be a factor in the practical planning of mine operations. 
Semi-Proven
This oovers all the ore that oen be reasonably estimated to exist; 
or the extensions of proved ore near at hand, where the conditions are such 
that ore will almost certainly be found but where the extent and limiting 
conditions cannot be as precisely defined as in the case of proved ore. 
Prosnective or Possible Ore
This occurs %diere the reidtionship of the land to adjacent ore 
bodies and to geologioal atruoture warrants the presumption that ore will 
be found but %Aere the lack of exploration and development data preoludes 
anything like certainty of ita actual location or extent. It can only be 
estimated as "small" or "large".
The fourth category of ore may be said to inolude all blocks of 
low grade ore that can be mined out in order to obtain aooess to richer 
portions of the ore blocks. Thia category is sometimes called "unprofitable 
sections". But then in the terminology of the economics of mining an
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unprofitable ore ia not ore; it ia almply vaate rook, at leaat at the 
prevailing ooat-prioe relations.
Parallel definitional terms are also given in the literature.
These are: Measured Ore, Indicated Ore and Inferred Ore. These purport to
be more ezaot in déterminatisg the different ore dategories in an attempt to 
minimiae problems of estimation and valuation of ore. In both systems^  however, 
the actual estimâtes will largely depend on the type of deposit - whether rich
or spotty, or uniform in content; also upon the number of visible aidfia of> ■
the block and upon the sise of the block relative to the openings from which it 
ia viewed. ^
Thus the term ore reaervei embraces all the quantities of minerals 
that can be reasonably assumed to exist. These are estimated and defined in
relation to existing technology and the prevailing economic conditions. ,i 
This means that the concept does not define a static or fixed relationship.IThat ia, as technology and economic conditions change, the tonnage (and v$lus)
of ore that can be profitably exploited also changes.
The aignifioanoe of ore classification must be self-evident. Mining 
is one of the riskiest ventures in the oommeroial world. It ia therefore of 
utmost iiaportanco to the prospective mine operator that the estimates fall 
within reasonable margins of error. In the first place his decision to 
undertake any such venture will depend on the prospective yield of his 
investment, i.e. the marginal efficiency of his capital outlay. Secondly, 
%Aether he succeeds or fails will depend on the reliability of the estimates^  
among other things, of the ore in the ground. Indeed, mine valuation poses 
as the most challenging task facing the mining engineer. Mines, whatever 
their ultimate value, must begin as prospects. It is on these prospects, 
once valus te d^  that a decision to invest must be taken, that a venture succeeds 
or falls. It may be said, for this reason, that the fate of the prospective 
mine operator lies largely .in the hands of the mine engineer or valuator.
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Mineral production in general, copper production in particular, 
is an entrepreneurial activity whidi embraces several processes, one of 
which - extraotion or excavation - we have already noted. Thus the final 
product or metal results from tha treatment of ore at various stages of the 
production plant. Such stagea ere, for instanoe, the oonecotxmtors, smelters, 
refineries, and, for specific requirements, semi- and final fabricators.
Copper scraps nay also be regarded as a stage of production, at least to the 
extent that ^is is a source of supply of the metal.
(1) Mine, ot ConqentMtoMi
These produce ores and concentrâtes which are either exported 
or sold to smelters but %diibh can also be imported by smelters 
or by merchants (who would subsequently send them to smelters, 
or order them to be scelted on toll). Merchants would sometimes 
obtain a small amount of ores irom domestio mines. But this 
is often an uncertain souroe of supply.
(ii) Umeltera
matte1 meltera produce , blister, anodes idiioh may be sold
I;. ; refineries and very occasionally also to mer^iants. These
merchants may re-eel1 them to domestic refineries or order them 
to be refined on toll,
(iii) Befinerles
These produce electrolytic and fire refined copper ^ ich may be 
exported or sold to fabricators, or vey occasionally also to 
merchants \iho would subsequently sell it to semi-fsbrioators 
to whom they would also sell parts of scrap, especially clean 
brass.
Ov) Semi-fabricctors
These produce wire bars, cathodes etc. (i.e. wrought copper) 
for export or for selling to final fabricators or to merchants.
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(▼} Copper Fabrloet<^
The final fahrioators pxoduoe all sorts of copper soxape which 
^ley can sell to consumers i.e. real investors and Governmmt; 
or they can sell their product throufdi merchants to consumers.
(vi) Copg«g Scrap
This is a special source of copper supply. The total of 
new and old scrap oopp< enter three stages of production 
i.e. smelters, refineries and semi-fabricating woiks. It nay 
also be Üported.
Production stages are, in pxaotioe, not always independent of 
eaA other. Tevtioal integration exists. For instanoe, in Zambia, the 
mines, smelters and refineries belong to one oontrolling group. It might 
be the R.S.T. or Zsa-Anglo groups of mines. In other countries, e.g.
TJ.S.A., integration may go even further to inolude semi-fabrioating plants 
and final fabricating works.
Moreover, where merchants are agents of producers they too will 
or may to all intents and purposes, be integrated with the rest of the 
production sts^s. FunottonaXly, however, merchants are only inter­
mediaries for primary producers and for the people who actually sell new 
and old scrap.
The various types of copper output produced at the various 
stages of the mining plant may be analysed fhrther. Thus, depending 
on the level of technology of the produoers* plant and/or the oontxect 
between the producer and the oonsuasr, there will be several types of final 
copper output. For instanoe, these may be pri#azy, crude, refined, 
manufactured, scrap oopper, as well as oopper alloy,
(1) Primmr Cowtier
Ve define thia as the copper reooverable from copper content 
of newly mined copper ores. This is produoed by oopper mines, concentrators.
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mitera and xeflseriee from # variety of primary oopper materiel#. Tha 
Copper Compeniee of Zambie export now onlyy oopper, bliater, eleotxolytio 
bare, and ingot#.
(II) Crude CoTOPer
This is a product of the mine# and ameltera. Copper mine# 
produce and mag export ores, ouproue jyritea, conoentratea (50^  oopper 
content), oopper precipitate# (oeoent oopper with to copper content), 
blister cake, etc.
(III) ^fined Copper
Refined oopper is the product of fhznaoe refineries %#hioh pzoduoe 
fire-refined or ousting oopper and anodes. Eleo'rolytio refineries produce 
cathodes.
The scraps produoed by refineries ooaprlse bers, cakes, billets, 
ingots, ingot bars, oathodes, oopper powders, etc. and are referred to as 
UkVBOUGHI oopper.
The semi-fabrioators of oopper produce wirebars, tubes, pipes, 
special shapes (made by axtruaion or drawing), flat products as well as 
copper powder, etc. ill these scraps are referred to as VROÜGHT oopper.
(iv) mnufactured Copper
Bo"& unvrouaht and wrought oopper are unmanufactured copper. 
Manufactured c o ^ r  oonsists of intermediate or end products of manufactureras 
or fabricators of copper products.
(▼)
(a) New Scran
Thia is the waste product which enters in the course of producing 
semi-finished and finished oopper fabricates.
(b) Old ^orap
Old copper scrap oonsists of oopper fabricates which beye reached 
the end of their uaeful lives.
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Old and new aoxap ia raflned in either primary saaltere in 
those refineries speoialising in conversion of scrap. These are known as 
secondary smelters and refineries.
A scrap producing country may either retain or export the scrap 
i.e. other oountries may import the scrap, Moreoverf countries with secondary 
smelters and refineries nay export matte, blister or refined oopper proosssed 
from scrap.
(vi) Copper AUoy
(a) "Copper-base" Alloy
A copper-base alloy contains at least 40% in a given unit of 
admixture of metals.
(b) "Copper-bearing" Alloy
Any oopper alloy with less than 40% copper content falls under this head. 
The admixture of some le a valuable metals is sometimes merely 
replacing an equivalent amount of copper. To that extent they are substituted 
for copper. With other oopper alloys, the non-copper metal imparts to the 
alloy some new properties without idiioh the incorporated oopper would not have 
the correspondinf" demand. Subh oopper alloys thus represent an additional 
use for copper and accordingly increase demand for oopper. There is at work 
hers the notion of joint demand.
(vii) "Reactivated Copper"
This is normally produoed in brass mills and copper mills by
tfhK.coiÿtrating clean oopper scrap or oopper alloy scrap into semi-finished 
or finished copper products. In these oases the prooessing of scrap in smslti 
and refineries has been by-passed.
This situation gives us two sub-types of secondary copper:-
(a) oopper and oopper alloy sorep concentrated in smelters and 
refineries.
(b) reactivated oopper or "direct use scrap" i.e. copper and
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oopper alloy acrap directly oonverted to aemi-finiabad or 
finiahed products in oopper and brass mille#
S f —  Ot R roaaotlon ib Zmmbl»
In Zambia tbtze are only four stages of production. Tha two 
fabrication stages as mentioned above do not exist here. %ers is talk 
however, that at least a semi-fabrication stags Aould be established in 
Zambia. In fact arrangements appear to be already on the w^y between the 
Government and the mining groups to eatabli^ a fabricating plant as soon as 
possible. As of now, however, the following are the operating stages.
(i) MlniB. or BrtwoUoa of 0%.
This is the stags at whioh the winning of the ore from the under­
ground workings takes place. In the case of Kohanga mine part of this is
won from opi-oast workings. At Chaabishi, all mining is open-osst.
(ii) ConoentratiQg
This is the stage at idiioh crushing and flotation of ore takas 
place. In the process the material la liberated from the waste rodk and is 
then made into a conoentrate whioh may contain anything from about )0% to 
50% oopper.
(ui) smltipg
This process further upgrades oopper content per ton of ore. 
first it produces matte and then blister oopper.
(iv) defining
This is Ihe final stage of oopper production ih Zambia. It 
consists of an eleotvolytio process which produces the highest degree of 
purity. The product is then oast into refined oopper wire bars and other 
shapes.
The final product ie exported to consumers through Beira, Lourenoo 
Marques, and Libito Bay. Since the Bhodesian U.B.I. some oopper has had 
to be flown to some Bast African sea ports (e.g. Dar-es-Salaam) for shipment
62.
to SozopoaB aazkets. Before n.B.I. the jowney to the see ooaete used to 
take about two eeeke. It now take# nuoh longer. The average tlma to 
reach tha European market# used to be three to four weeks. Again this tioo 
period ha# aince inoreaaed#
The ooats which thi# transportation time period implied have 
also been inflated in recent times. Transport ooste used to average
about £20 per long ton; now they are in the region of
Moreover, beoauee of the distance and the time taken to cover 
it, transit stock used to vary around 53^ of annual stock.'This 
peroentage muet have risen appreoiably also in raoent tlmes^  and since 
royalty is payable on output produced, and royalty ha# the. effect of cost,
the observed relative increase in production costs for the Zambia mines
would appear to be easily explainable.
Ve discuss this question of oosts more systematically in the 
following Motion, with special reference to their relationship to the 
comparative oosts of the Zambian mines vis*a«-vis other copper mines of the 
world.
Section 2t COSTS - BETIHITIOK. CAl'EOORIEB
The earning power of a mine depends not only upon the nature 
and extent of the natural rsaouroea,plant, equipment, and efficiency of 
operation, but also upon all of the critical economic factors which influence 
marketing, supply and demand, and the purchasing power of the ourrenoy*
These factors determine on the one hand the cost of production, and on the 
other the price at which the product is sold. The difference between 
the total cost of production and price measure# the **profit spread** whidi can 
either be positive or negative. A successful business, however, implies ^ t  
the profit spread is positive, i.e. the price i# higher than the cost.
A positive profit spread is what every business entex'priae strives 
to achieve, whether it be a short or long run objective. All this implies.
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in the case of # oompetitive induetzy suoh ae mining in Zambia, ability to 
compete in the world metal market. It ia a question of producing at, or 
having a farourabla ooat^prioe relation, or, technically, having a comparative 
cost advantage over competitors.
The mining costs^ ^^  may, in general, be divided into the following 
oatagorieat
(a) Operating or Working Cost#
This category covers expansés on main operations of severing 
end raising of mineral values as well as subsequent operations suoh as 
pumping and ventilation as the mine deepehs. It also includes cost of 
management specific to these operations, as well as maintenance and repair 
oosts.
It is obvious that these oosts will vary according to the 
conditiona of a particular mine. Costa will be oomparatively low tdiere there 
are massive shallow deposits of high grade. Where the deposits are deep- 
seated, narrow and erratic, the ccst will be oomparatively high.
In addition to costa relating to physical undertakings, there are 
benefioiation and admini; trstion oosts. Such wsts would include rates, 
rents and any mineral royalties.
Sometimes expenditure on preliminary operation of development 
of a mine is classified under this head. However, for purposes of calculating 
depletion allowance, expenditure on preliminary woA would be treated separate 
from all those other coats. This is because while all the other costs are 
essentially current, i.e. related to the day to day operation of the mine, 
preliminary expenditure, is, in essence, an initial, once for all expenditure. 
It has a capital value which is equal to that expenditure multiplied by a 
compound rate of interest assumed appropriate for the purpose. In this 
respect it is opposite to the calculation of the capital valua of direct or 
variable production capital.
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(b) Capital or Investment Costs
This category may be divided into two subheads:
Depreciation:
This is the rate of capital recoupment over the expected actuarial 
life of a mine. During the life of the enterprise su^ capital allowances 
may partly be used to cover recurring expenditure on necessary replacements. 
The essence of the concept is Vaat the whole of the initial capital outlay 
for productive purposes will more or lass be redeemed at the end or during 
the life of the project.
Depletion lllowanoe:
In essenceI this is similar to depreciation allowance. The 
main difference is that while depi> elation refers to the saving of capital 
expenditure made on capital equipment for productive oapeoity i.e. capital 
equipment to produce output, depletion refers strictly to the savings made 
on original or pre-production expenditure. In the ce se idiere produotivi 
property changes hands, the present ower is entitled to an annual depletion 
allowanoe valued in relation to the original price of purchase or capital 
value of the property.
(c) Full Production Cost
Pull production oosts are the total costs of production, and are 
incurred by the industry in supplying its oocmodity to the community. In
the main the oosts comprise the following categories:
Operating ooats
Investment or Capital Cost
Cost of Company taxation
This category of oosts is usually expressed in terms of unit 
weight of production, say, cost per ton. This measure is regarded as a 
most important indicator of the level of performance of one firm against 
another within the industry, or of the industry as a whole between one period
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and another. (The meaauze of "profit spread" is less sighTioant for firma 
within the industry because it purports to measure perforoanoe in terms of 
an average over a period).
(d) Royalty
Conceptually royalty is a pa^ Tsant for the severance or extraction 
and use of a mineral (or any other natural) resource. In effect it is simply 
a form of tax and the operator may be r quired to make -ttie royalty payment 
in one of two forms: either on the basis of production, i.e. unit/oharge,
or on the basis of gross profit or gross value realised i.e. an ad valorem tax 
or a profits tax respectively. In either case royalty will constitute part 
of production co-^ ts of an enterprise.
The various categories of mining oosts can be reduced to two main 
sub-divisions. Ve can regard all the oosts related directly to production 
as ”0perating or Direct Production Conte". The other sub-divisions may be 
termed "Capital Cost". Under production costs we would include expenditures 
on, say, labour, supplies, power, transport, etc. Tr;e other oatej,ory would 
include expenditure for developing a r.ine, installing plant, townships and 
subséquent additions for expansion, etc.
Theie is of course a definite interdependence or relntionehip between 
production and capital costs. Thus capital ooHts are vital in determining the 
availability or otherwise of undeveloped ore bodies, and “ttiey have influence 
on production costa to the extent that money may be borrowed for the capital 
cost and thus create a charge for recurring Interest which is chargeable in 
production costs. One can only add in this connection the fact that capital 
costs of developing a mine, calculated by reference to capital coat per ton of 
annual output, are rising throughout the world.
This upward trend of costs is also true of the production ooats 
of the main producers of copper in the world. A table produced at the Copper 
Conference held in Busaka in 196? clearly illustrates this point. It was there
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shown that tha general trend of oosts had moved as follows#
ESTIMAT») COPPER PRODUCTlcar COST TRHKD
Average Competitive BetCost, per 21#
1965 Production 166
1964 do. 178
1965 do. 194 
Source* Lusaka Copper Conferenoe, Technlaal Papers, 1967#
The Conference also produoed another table showing the straoture 
of oosts of leading oopper producers in the world. We also reproduce this 
table elsewhere in our wosdc (p. gf). We refer to it at this point because 
it displays certain aspects of oosts which are pertinent to the present 
discussion. Costs are shown not only to be so high for sons pzoduosrs, but 
also the range between ^  lowest and the highest cost producers is striking. 
This is a unique feature so far as itm mining industry is concerned. One 
usually finds that the costs of different mining enterprises do not vary 
so much.
Happily, however, it is possible to explain not only the causes 
of a rising cost trend, ss we shall see in a subsequent discussion, but also 
the reasons i*y the mining oosts appear to have varied so widely from one 
producing country to another. for the present we attempt to provide soma 
explanation for the observed cost itruoture. Indeed the explanation being 
offered is general so ^ t  similar cases of cost spread might be covered by it.
As we can see from the said table displaying the cost structure, the 
costs refer to the produotion of oompetitive oopper only. This is copper 
produced by all the leading oopper producing countries and sold in the free 
market. In quantitative terms ocmpetitive oopper refer» to the production 
of metals or minerals in which the tonnage of oopper is dominant. But in 
fact in the range of low oosta there will be or expected to be found mines
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where oopper is produoed in oonjunotion with other me tel# in equal importance 
or oompareble quanti tie#. As suoh this twin oopper output is known as Co-
Product copper.
At mines where oopper is a small proportion of the total metal 
output, it is called by*pvo<h#ot oopper. As in Ihe case of a co-product 
copper, the cost attributable to by-product copper will be relatively small, 
although the copper output itself may add significantly to the total compet­
itive copper. This wculd oonsequently modify the cost of producing 
competitive oopper as a whole in some countries more than in others where 
suoh modifying influences msy not exist.
On the other extreme, the high costs may reflect the fact that 
there are small mines or remote mines which may in addition have unattractive 
or poor grade ore, Haturally, 'tiiese will be costly to operate if only because 
of transport costs.
In other countries costs may be modified by the fact that the output 
is protected from competitive forces in the free market. Thna, "managed" 
prices would ensure that the cost of "Protected" copper was not adverse to 
the enterprise and as suoh would therefore not be truly reflected in the 
distributional chart of copper ooats.
All these considerations will modify the cost levels of the 
different producers of competitive oopper. Similarly, Aey will affect the 
structure of oosts for the leading countries in the production of competitive 
copper.
The cost of producing competitive oopper must be understood vi^ 
this background. For only when a clear and comparable definition of costs 
has been made would it be sensible to make /fvalid comparative coat analysis 
between various producers. Befor# we smbark on a comparative study of costa 
of various major copper producers in the free world, let ua look at the 
mining oosts in Zambia and the factors influencing -ttiose costs during given 
periods.
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Section Bi TOTAL PHODUCTICM AKD S^UB OORTS OF ZAMBIA
for analytical puzpoaea the coat# of the mining oonpeniea are 
divided into direct and indirect coat. The direct costs include all 
expenses incurred from the mines up to delivery to the consumer. The 
Zambian companies define the term inclusive of the provision for non- 
expansion oapital expenditure. But royalty and export tax are excluded 
and these latter two charges are treated as indirect costs.
(a) Direct CoBtei
In order to simplify our problem of analysis we suggest to 
examine this aspect of coat with ‘tt&e aid of the tables wiiich we attach and 
which ahow every important aspect of mining that contributed to the costs 
during the period for %diioh we have the figurea. The tables, which ahow all 
the major mining oompaniea of the Copperbelt, are self-explanatory. The 
accompanying graphs are most revealing with respect to the trend of total - 
production and ooata for each mine, for each mining group, and for the 
industay aa a whole.
In this conneotion the reports submitted by the mining companies 
to the Ministry of Mines are particularly informative. These show that 
taking 1964/65 as the base period, the average direct cost delivered to 
buyers, per long ton rose from £148,1 to £246.5 for the A.A. Group of mines, 
and from £149.4 to £206.6 for the £.6.$. Group at the end of the calendar 
year 1967, i.e. a rise in costs of about 66^ and 59^ for the respective Groups 
of mines. The average direct ooat for the industry rose from approximately 
£140 to about £220 per long ton during the period in question. (Actually 
the figure of C215/LT is normally used for analytical purposes).
In contrast, the A .A. Croup experienced much higher costs than the 
R.S.T. One major explanation for this was that while recoverable copper output 
fell by Tfo for the A.A. Group, it actually rose by the same percentage for the 
R.S.T. Group. Thus, given fixed ooats, this decline in output meant for ^e
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A.i. that unit oosts vould be hl^er ms the fixed oosts would now be epxeed 
over s smeller level of output* On the other hsnd» s rise in output meant 
for the R*S«T* group a oomperstive fell in unit oosts as fixed eoets would 
then be spread over a larger quantity of output* The situation for A*l* 
vqs aggravated by the faot that even oosts whi<A would normally be regarded 
as variable were not sufficiently allowed to fall with Ae deoline in the 
recovery of oopper output* Government policy is that labour lay-offs should 
be minimised as much as possible* This means that even unskilled Ikbour wages 
must form a considerable portion of fixed oosts* For an enterprise that 
employs so muoh of semi- and unskilled labour, it is hardly neoesssry to 
emphasise the effect this must have on unit ooats at a time %#hao output 
declines*
Several factors explain why the average recovery of oopper output 
for the A A* mines fell ao xerarkably* The oommon factor %Aiioh affected 
both the mining groups was shortage of fuel and the expense in obtaining 
the available quantities* The epeoial adverse factors for A .A. were the 
drop in the grade of ore, especially at Kohanga mine where it was reported 
that the grade fell from 3.49^  to 4.# over the period* A drop in grade raises 
cost sinOS it then becomes necessary to excavate a greater quantity of ore 
for a ton of metal to be recovered* It also raises costs since more over» 
burden will now have to be stripped at the various processing stSt es* Indeed, 
because lohanga produces almost of all Zambian oopper, its drop in grade 
affects the average of the %fhole Copperbelt whose grade is estimated to have 
dropped from 2*93* in 1964 to in 1966.
% e  inherently high cost Bancroft mine has also tended tc inflate 
the average cost of Urn mines of the A*A* During I964/63 period produotion 
from Bancroft made out of the total tonnage of finished oopper compared 
to 69* from the low oost producer N<hanga* ikiring 196? the ficUies were Ug( 
and 62^ respectively* Obviously, in the absence of technologioal advances
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when m high oost mine inereases its output oosts rise correspondingly or even 
at a hii^r rate.
Furthermore, both oompany groups have embarked on rather oonsiderable. 
expansion programmes during the period, and the (unofficial) estimated com­
bined produotion for 1973 la 700,OCX) long tons against a produotion level of 
607,627 long tons in I967. It is hoped that when the expected output begins 
to get to the consumer market, a favourable labour-output ratio will result
i.e. ooats of labour per unit of output produoed will fall. This of course 
depends on whether the new mines or the expansion programmas will entail the 
expenditure of more or less capital i.e. whether it will be more or less costly 
to bring extru output to the market. It could be that the expansion programme 
will entail a highar labour oost per unit of output and this could mean not a 
deoline, but a rise in the overall labour coat per unit of production. One 
thing certain, however, ia that until the expected output oapgcity cornea into 
full production, not only labour oosts, but costs in general, and therefore 
the unit cost, must continue to rise.
Apart from the general oost factors (idiioh we enumerate below) the
H.S.f. group of mines has not suffered from any special factors in comparison 
to A A. group. This is evidenced particularly by the 7* increase in the 
produotion of recoverable copper over the comparable period.
A number of factors have contrived, so to apeak, to raise costs 
for both the A .A. and the R.S.T. mines during this period. Some critical 
ones are the following: first are the labour oosta. The Copperbelt oper­
ations, as implied above, are highly labour intensive. This factor has become 
more pronounced in recent times when the fall in ore grade has necessitated 
a greater intake of manpower required to produoe the greater volume of ore 
per ton of metal to be recovered (holding technology constant). In oonseqnenoe 
output per man has had to fall. (Chile is believed to employ only I/3  as
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much labour for roughly the aaoa output, but in more ooncentrated operations). 
Besides, the polioy of Za& bianisation - including the costly training programmes 
which have been introduced - has also been felt in increased labour coats.
The Brown Comniaaion* s recommendation of 22^ inexeaae in wages from 
October 1966 would produce an increase in ooat of around fl3/ldP (with an annual 
pay roll of the order of C^On. and a normal average output of 630,000 long 
tons p.a.).
Labour now represents around C73 P#r long ton for the industry.
For A .A. mines direct labour coats are estimated to have gone up 39*, against 
only 13* for R.S.T. mines. For the industry as a whole this implies that 
wages represent a major part of mining costs in Zambia. Consequently the 
overall coot becomes very sensitive to changes or increases in wages.
The international sanctions against Rhodesia's TT.B.I. have proved 
to be an intolerable burden on the economy of Zambia in general, and this has 
been partioulsrly reflected in, for instance, the higher transport, fueli and
stores costs. It is estimated that transport/of finished oopper from the
Copperbelt to AZloan ports increased at approximately £10 extra per long ton. 
The .ransport costs of goods from abroad to the Copperbelt (machinery, spare 
parts, etc.) varied in accordance with day to day events (e.g. interruptions 
of the Benguela Railway by activities of mercenaries or terrorists). These 
are estimated to have increased between £3 to £10 extra per long ton.
The fuel shortage was hardly mitigated by the use of coal from the
Zambian mines. The Iksndabwe coal, in particular, has lower calorific tenure 
but higher ash and silica content %dilch produces erosion and abrasion in 
fumaoes, pipes and pumps. Rms reverbatoxy furnaces, e.g. at Mufuliza, 
have had to go cut of production for a time, implying that unit oosts would 
rise not onl^  because of reconstruction oosts but also because while the 
furnaces are non-operative, only a smaller tonnage (at a constant cost) could
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be proœeeed elaeubexe in the oountzy. Moreover, the puztheee price of looel 
ooel hea been made higher than that f±om Rhodesia. The Rhodesian ooal in 
turn, though relatively cheaper at one stage, beoame more costly later as the 
prioe was raised. In any case it has always been costly for the mining 
companies to have to finance the big stocks of Vankie ooal at Livingstone.
In general, transport, ooean freight and port handling (including 
airlift) have had the effect of raising costs by some $0* for A»i. Mines and 
around 30* for R.S.T. This percentage differCnoe reflects mainly the fact 
that the two mining groups did not always use the same alternative routes in 
an attempt to by-pass the Rhodesian territory to the coast.
During this period the level of produotion fell. This would be 
expected in a situation where oosts weze consistently rising at a faster rate 
than producer prices. Cutting back produotion would be an attempt to mitigate 
the rise in unit oosts. But in faot, however, the fall in produotion was as 
much a result of deliberate cut back policy as it %ma a result of work stoppage 
or labour strikes. In some oases it was the result of natural oauses like 
flooding. In consequence the 1966/67 output was estimated to be about 
20/23* lower than normal. This means that fixed costs (e.g. management, 
overheads, financial charges and most of the labour ooats) which are not 
proportionate to the numbers of units produoed have to be allocated to a lower 
production, thus resulting in a higher oost per unit of output.
The effects of lower produotion require detailed analysis for each 
mine, e.g. the proportion of 00cts attributable to labour varies from mine to 
mine. However, it is estimated that fixed costs could be around 45-50* of 
direct costs. Management and professional labour (excluding production 
bonuses) is the main factor in fixed oosts just as a large portion of ordinary 
labour is. In the case of "ordinary" labour, this fixity stems from the fact 
that neither Government nor the mines themselves, ss a matter of policy, will
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allow the produoin^ oompanles to deoreaee the labour foroe in times of low 
production* This mssns that only a wexy small portion of labour oost will 
ba variable. Such oo^ ts may include bonuses and a number of other fringe 
benefits normally reoeived %ihen the times are good. Labour lay-offs will be 
negligible. In conaequenoe it is believed that the whole item of "lower 
production" could have led in I966/67 to an increase of €2)^ £30 per long ton.
Technical f motors, as we have said, have also played an important part 
in raising costa. Thus, not only was the ore grade decreasing between 1)64 
end 1967 but also the ore had to be excavated from more deepened mines. This 
tends to raise not only the recovery costs tut also thm haulage and hoisting 
costs.
In addition, this has been a period of world wide inflation. The 
tendency has been to shift rising factor oopts to oonsumsr prices. This 
has meant that goods pMMAaaed abroad, and to some extent locally, have 
required a greater outlay than would be made under normal oiroumstanoes. In
fact the oost of stores in general are estimated to have gone up 20^ for A.I. 
as against 46^ for R.S.T. The higher peroentage inorease for R.S.T. mines 
is largely due to the greater use of inputs for the Group's reverberatory fur­
naces. Such inputs will be fUel in general, but ooal in particular.
This tendency towards increasing costs in the world is also the
result of the closure of the Sues Canal ^ diich oonaequently led to higher cost
of frei^t and "sales realisation". In this case it has been necessary toefinance a big pipeline for fuel, with the expected favourable effaots on sales 
realisation.
Different mines will have oost problems peculiar to %iem. We
have here presented a general trend of direct costa in broad outline and believe
it sufficient for our purpose.
(b) Indirect Coat
As we have already said, the major elements in this category of
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ooata axe royalties sod export tax. The analysis of the osusal faotors 
of these elements is oruolal for our project as the elsmants era important 
detaxninanta of total production and sales costs.
Again, we do not propose to labeur ouraelvea with a rigmarole of 
description and analyais of this aspect of costa. Instead we refer ourselves 
to the attached tables to note how these elements have affected the industry 
over the period observed. The acoompasying graph, the figures for which are 
calculated from the tables on production end sales costs, to %diich referenoe
has already been made, bring into clearer relief the relationship between
(ktdirect and indirect oost. Ve are/this point particularly interested in how 
royalty and export duty have moved and influenced the total production and 
sales cost over the period in question.
Only a brief comment on these tables will suffice for our purpose. 
The base period is given as 1965/66 and the terminal period is 1966/67.
As we will recall, up to April 25 1966, copper was sold based on the 
producers* price but the royalties were calculated in accordance with the 
formula based on the 1Mb quotation. Therefore, in spite of lower sales 
prooeods in I565/66 (f270-£5D0/lT.), than in I566/67 (CJQO-CAOO/lT.), the 
royalties were higher. (The exception here is Bancroft Mine which reoeived 
an aba tenant free the Government in 1965/66).
From April 25, 1966, a new tax, the Export Tax was applied.
This affects oonsiderably the total sales cost during the period 1966/67,
88 can be seen when contrasted with the total coats in the preceding period 
1965/66. This tax has since remained a major constituent part of the 
indirect oost incurred by the mining companies of Zambia.
Royalties are diarged per unit of production, and because sales 
are soaatimes affected ty restrictions on railings, the unitary charge of 
royalty per long ton sold has been high in relative terms.
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TABLE II
TOTAL oost OP KODUCnOE AKD 8AIES 
A. A. GBOUy
PERIOD
RHOKAKA
1965/66 (ends June 50th) 1966/67 (end# 50th June)
Zambia Anglo-Aaerioan Oroun
Production 96587 LT. 8I929 LT.
Sales 97525 " 75962 "
Sales Proceeds £289.0/lff. £593.7/1%.
Cost of Sales excluding depreciation L245.8/LT. £549.1/LT.
Direct Cost C185.1/LT. €253.0/1%.
Indirect Cost (i) Royalties £ 58.7/LT. £ 52.5/1%.
(ii) Export Tax - £ 43.6/1%.
RCHARGA (ends 51st March) (ends 51st March)
Production 257650 LT. 187132 1%.
Sales 256107 " 195374 "
Sales Proceeds C275.2/LT. £580.9/1%.
Cost of wales excluding depreciation £100.9/1%. £280.4/1%.
Direct Cost (X) £127.1/1%. £176.1/1%.
Indirect Cost; (i) Royalties £ 56.8/1%. £ 57.1/1%.
(ii) Export Tax - £ 47.2/1%.
BANCROFT (ends 51st March) (ends 51st March)
Production 56540 LT. 52609 LT.
Sales 35856 LT. 33116 LT.
Salaa Proceeds £275.0/Lt. £581.3/1%.
Cost of Sales excluding depreciation £519.6/LT. £385.9/1%.
Direct Cost (x) £262.6/1%. £261.6/1%.
Indirect Coat (i) Royalties (ii) Export Tax £ 56.8/LT. £ 56.8/LT. £ 47.5/1%.
Cost less revenue from ore processed for Nchangm 1244.6/LT. £245.4/1%.
The average direct coet of A A. Group at 51at March I967 (the Balance of Rhok- ana is at yoHi June) was £200 per long ton.
(X) Direct Cost include provisions for noo-ejqmosiom capital expenditure.
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TABLE II.1 
TOTAL COST OF F80IPCTI0H AID SA1E8 
R.S.T. oapc?
PERIOD 1965/66 1966/67(ends 36th June) (ende 3Cth June)
Roan Selection Trust Group
KPFULIRA
Production
Seles
Sales Proceeds 
Cost of Sales 
Direct Cost
Indirect Cost (i) Royalty
(ii) Export Tax
150500 LT. 
153964 LT. 
€303.2/1%. 
C228.63/LT. 
+4148.79/LT. 
t 62.23/LT.
£ 16.61/1%. (X)
118392 LT.
120124 " £411.0/1%. 
f2B5.04/l%. 
♦£192.64/1%. £ 48.36/1%. 
£ 44.04/1%.
LGABSHYA DIVISION
Production
Sales
Sales Proceeds 
Cost of Sales 
wireot Coat
Indirect Cost (i) Royalty
(ii) Export Tax
97600 LT.
97476 " 
£306.4/1%. 
C273.46/I.T. +€192.14/1*.
£ 69.97/1*.
£ 18.55/l.T. (X)
76940 Vt. 
81136 12. 
C411.6/LT. 
C336.73/UT.
+£241.09/1*. 
£ 49.17/1*. 
£ 46.47/1*.
Production
Sales
Sales Proceeds 
Cost of Sales 
Direct Cost
Indirect Cost (i) Royalty
(ii) Export Tax
22659 LT.
22965 "
£298.5/LT. £250.96/1%. ♦£172.00/1%. 
£ 65.49/LT. 
£ 15.47/LT. (X)
17641 LT. 
18446 " £411.0/1%. 
£324.06/LT.
♦£230.57/1%. 
£ 48.17AT* 
£ 45.32/1%.
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TABLE II.2
PERIOD 1965/66 (ends 50^  Jime) 1966/67 ^(ends 50th June)
CKAKbISHI
Production
Sales
Sales Proceeds 
Cost of Sales 
Direct Coat 
Indirect Cost* (i) Royalty 
(ii) Export Tax
10059 LT. 
6229 LT.
£315.7/1*.£366.89/1®.
+£275.03/1*.
£ 69.30
£ 24.56 (X)
(X) Ttw Export Tax oaoe loto foroa 00 April 25, 1966, 
The Average Direct Costfor R.S.T. Group £140/1%.
15807 1%. 
j.12579 LT. £404.6/1*. 
£352.57/1*. 
+£259.99/1*. 
£ 48.17 
£ 44.41
£215/1*.
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Hov ob#erv# the #ff#ot of all thaaa factors on the oompezatlv# 
coat position of tha Zambian ooppar mining companiaa in the world ooppar 
industry#
SECTION At COST COMRARISOM - ZAMBIA COPPER KQI2S vs. OTOER COPTER 
HIKES OF THE WDRID.
(a) Mining Costa^^^ - Underground vs# Open-Cast Opérations#
In the category of the large open-pit copper mines of the
world cited here# Kohanga mine has a seemingly very unfavourable stripping
ratio of at present 1)#5# The oost per ton of ore mined over the period
1967 in Kohanga is about £1#63 (fU^ 62)^  Dividing this figure by the
stripping ratio (i.e. 15*5 ♦ 1 • 16.5) we obtain a oost of ^ #28 it7§J
per ton of material moved# This figure falls between the range of ^ #20
and ÿ)#)D. Which means that Kohanga's operational oosts are comparable to
costa of similar operations elsewhere in the world. In fact# if the relatively
high costs of transportation of equipment and fuel were allowed for# Kohanga*a
position mi^t even be much more comparable# i.e. more efficient than compare
able operations in say# the U.S. and South imerioa#
In general# the operational costa of au^ large open-caat operations
will not vary ouch# It is said that the most significant variations in oost
are in the categories of haulage and general mine oost. Haulage costa vary
according to mine elevation# pit profile# crusher location and accessibility
of a dump area; but general cost variations depend largely on the overhead
cost items included in the category#
Mining costs for smaller opwx-pit operations are generally known
to be much hi^ier# firstly because equipment (shovels and tracks) will as a
rule be smaller# thus raising the operating costs per unit hic^er; and
secondly# because production %rill generally be low, general expenses will in
many cases be higher per unit produced. It is instructive in this respect
79.
to note that the Chamheshl mine (R.S.T.) has a ooet of around )A).50 or )/6 
per ton of osterial moved. Apart from the smaXlnesa of its oper%tions# another 
cause for the high coat is that only a relatively small quantity of the over» 
burden is soft so that drilling and blasting coats at this mine are relatively 
hidb.
Generally speaking the large copper open-pit mines are said to 
show a much lover mining cost than underground mines. It is estimated that 
an average large open-pit copper mine in South America or the U.8JL. would 
produce one ton of ore at ^ 0.75 (-5/4)* And the total average mining coats 
in the Americas for both open-pit and underground mines are said to be around 
^•64 (6/- • £0.3). In contrast the average oost of mining of Zambia mines 
during the period 1966/67 were oonsiderably higher, as can be seen below#
The type of ore mined has special significance to comparative cost 
analysis. Depending on whether one type of ore is, say, sulphide, oxide, 
refractory, or mixed, trsetment oosts will vary accordingly. Normally, 
treatment costs of straight sulphide ores are much cheaper than those of the 
other type. For instance, although the Peruvian Taquapala mine has a low ore 
grade (around 1$6, containing also a significant quantity of molybdenite), the 
costa are relatively low because the ore body is a strai^t sulphide ore.
On the other hand, although they have a much higher grade, K^ianga and 
Chambeahi nines have mixed ores which result in higher treatment oosts and 
lower nmtal recovery.
On aggregate, while the average oost of mining one short ton of 
ore in the Americas is around 6/- (•£0.3)# the cost for the major mines of 
Zambia varies between £1.23 (Hufulira) and £2.38 (Bancroft) as follows#
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TABLE 12 
AVERAGE 003T 07 MDŒNO. 1966/67
Productlon/Oze/roB £/LT iMine 30/6/67 Metal Ore Tÿpa Ore Grade
*nan Antelope 6,040,000 ST 90 1.40 UG 1.89*
Mufulira 7,190,000 " 70 1.25 uc 2.50*
Chibuluma 690,000 »• 90 2.64 UG 4.19*
Chambeahi 820,000 " 105* 1.70 OP 2.55*
Hhokana 5,355,000 " 100 1.60 UC 2.0%*
TTohang* 5,545,000 60 1.88 OP-UO 4.29*
Bancroft 1,619,000 130 2.56 uc 3.48*
♦Cost of the first 7 non tha of 1967/68.
The oost of £1.88 at Kohanga mine is of particular interest in our 
diflcuaaion. We will recall that 'ttie oost for the Kohanga open-pit (as 
opposed to the underground) mine has been cited as around £1.65 per ton of 
ore produced « and is comparatively so high because of th excq tionally high 
stripping ratios. It nsana that in fact the underground operations alone 
are responsible for a oost of around £2.11 per ton of ore produced for the 
mine as a whole (i.e. underground plus open-pit operations). The modifying 
effect of low-cost open-pit operations on tha overall oost of Kohanga mine 
is self-evident, and makes the mine the comparatively low-cost mine that it 
is now known to ba.
At £1.70 the mining costs at Chambeahi mine must be regarded as 
remr.rkable for the simple reason that in general open-pit mines are low oost 
mines. It is, of course, possible to explain this fact. As already 
mentioned above, this is due partly to the fact that being a relatively small 
its unit oosts will necessarily be higher. Besides, a relatively large 
part of the overburden is hard rook, thus adding to the difficulty and coat 
of stripping, and henoe to the high stripping ratio.
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Indeed, Chaabeehl is not the only exception to the rule. Thus, the 
Chuquioamate mina, a#id to be the biggest copper open-pit mine in the world, 
has a higher coat of production than El Teniente, the biggest "underground" 
mine in the world. It must be added quickly however, that El Teniente is a 
special caae of an underground mine. Locationally, it is aituated in a hill 
so that the ore has not to be hoisted up and water problems, common to all real 
underground mines are not existent here and there are practically no pumping 
costa.
(b) International Coepetitivencaai Zambia vs. Other World Producers
Mention has already been made of the fact that the Luaaka Copper 
Conference produced a table showing the I967 structure of costs of leading 
producers of competitive copper in the world. We reproduos Aat table here 
for ease of reference, in the ensuing analytical discuaaion.
TABLE 15
ESTIMATED AV«p^ gff OF "COMPETITIVE" COPPER IK LgADIRO COIWTMDBB. 1967
Country TotalCapacity( OOO
Competitive As Proportion to Total Capacity Hat Cost LT. Break-EvenCost LT.
Peru 954 64 170 129
Chile 795 94 175 152
South Africa 143 100 172 158
U.SU. 1622 97 189 172
Australia 140 94 194 176
Phillipinea 95 94 195 179
Canada 599 n36** 232 185
Zambia 781 100 279 217
Congo (K) 930 100 294 244
Elsewhere 635 24 250 290
Kon-Soviet World total 5572 61 214 183
* of Canada's production is by/co-product at nominal cost.
Souroei Luaaka Copper Conference, Technical Papers, 1967.
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These estimated costs were standardised by taking #11 production 
to the electrolytic stage, delivered to customere. The term "net oost" in 
the table is defined to include all chargea except taxes on profits. So that 
terms such as royalties, export taxes and duties, customs duties, interest on 
borrowed money, depreciation and replacements expenditure are included. And 
the price at idiich scat is computed "net" is taken to be £350 per long ton.
The "break-even" cost refers to the point at which oost equals price and the 
term excludes any provision for depreciation of the original capital investment.
In the footnote of this table its authors make a special comment on 
the Canadian output capacity. A 369^  competitive output capacity is believed 
to be deceptive because 38g( of Canada's production is a by-product at nominal 
cost.
It is alsc apparent from the table that the tropical African producers 
are in the highest coat bracket of the major producing territories. Ait 
although the U.S. Producer costs may appear comparatively low, they can be 
expected to go up as a result cf -ttie new ^ iree year wage contracta subsequent 
to the ending of the copper strike.
In contrust, Chile producers can expect a relative decline in net 
costs in the foreseeable future. It is believed that the figure of £173 wee 
probably on the high side of estimation. Admittedly, the recent wage increase 
of 39^ is impressive but this has to be seen against the long-term output 
expansion programmes.Thus it is expected 'ttiat Si Teniente will increase 
output capacity from 162,000 long tons to 232,000 long tons; Chuquicamata 
from 290,000 to 460,000 long tons, in conjunction with the Exotica mine. This 
output would greatly lower costa in the future. Moreover, every I3 months 
the Unions and Companies revise the labour contracta, and usually the wage 
increases reflect mainly the cost of inflation plus of course a small real 
increase.
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Poulble wage Inoreasea in Peru ooold probably also be largely 
or totally offset by pocoduotion Inoreesea. Moreover, most Peruvian mines 
enjoy conditions of low oost produotion. Tor instance at Toquepala the low 
oost conditions are most favourable: i.e. the ores are all of the sulphide
type and therefore extraction coats are low, and the distance from the mine 
to the seaport ie only 116 miles; loading in the mine is largely directly 
in railroad caret and the stripping ratios are low.
Zambia nines are not placed in a similarly advantageous position. 
The American producer "Bagdad Copper Corporation"is said to have hi d a 
production cost of 18.4 cents per pound in 1967. This would be equivalent 
to £147 per long ton. None of the nines in Zambia can produoe at as low a 
cost as that. During the same calendar year *ttie average costa per ton for 
the various Zambia mines were as follows:-
TABU 14
AVERAGE PRODUCTION COST PER TON ZAMBIA MIKES. 1967 (£/LT)
Mufulira 162.8
Chibuluma 214.)
Chambeahi 232.0
Luanshya Div. 241.5
Rchanga 204.4
Rhokana 241.9
Bancroft 285.5
As noted earlier (page 4$) the average cost for the industry was 
around £213/LT (• 27/ per lb.). At this level of costs of production, the 
Zambian industry would be placed in the low cost bracket comprising 60)( of 
free world produoers. But in order to arrive at the comparable "net cost", 
royalties and the export tax have to be added to give a total of around 
£275/LT (for a break-even prioe of £33D/UP). (note: Table 12 shows Zambia*i
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"net coet” to be £279/LT in 1967). At thie level of ooete Zambie minea 
aze placed in tha bracket comprising of producers with high coats.
Having made these observations, we may, in the particular case 
of Zambia mines, briefly indicate the implications of much levels of costa 
on the yield of investment. The brief appraisal is important because it 
indicates the extent to which the industry in Zambia can look outside for 
foreign capital inflow. This, as we know, is always one of the major sources 
of investment capital particularly in the mining industry of this country.
For instance, Rio Tinto-Zinc has 11^ interest in the Rhokana mine. Anglo- 
American Corporation holds nearly 30^ interest in Zambia's main holding company 
Z.A.A., and, as we may also remember, we noted that the giant American Metal 
Climax has 46)6 interest in Zambia's R.S.T. mining group as a whole.
There are also significant minority shareholders resident abroad.
Again the appraisal is essentially indicative rather than decisive. 
This is because of the unsAisfactory data available for the analysis.
(c) Investment Efficiency or field of Zambia Mines.
The break-even copper prioe for the Zambian mines as forecast by 
the Government in the ourrent national development plan is £550/LT. Ve have 
seen that at this price the average net oost for tha Zambian mining industry 
equals about £275/LT,y which is reduoed to a net profit of around £41.23 by a 
profit tax of about 45^ #^ ^^  ^ Given a base or parameter, this net profit 
is easily expressed as a rate of yield of capital investment.
Some of the bases used for this purpose are the book value, the 
market value of the skorea, new value of replacement of the installation, etc.
A widely accepted system used in the mining industry in the U.S.A. is to refer 
the profit to the year's sales value - i.e. £41.23 to £330, or about 11.8)6.
Another rough system will be to appraise the yield of new investment, 
given that the average investment in a new nine required to produce one long
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ton of finished copper in here, ie around C500/LT* Suppose then that the 
expected net profit from the new investment is oomporehle i.e. £41.23; in
thie oase our yield would he or 8.29)6.
500
If the hook value or the aseete velue were used, this net profit 
for the Zambian mines would yield a peroentage rate of about 13.79)6. (The 
asset value of the mining oonpanies was approximately £200,000,000 according 
to the annual report I966/67# that is, around £)00/LT. for the normal level 
of production of 650,000 to 700,000 long tons per year).
Hov, ordinarily, a rate of return in mining investment consists 
of a normal rate (i.e. return as interest on capital) plus a substantial 
additional amount that should accrue in proportion. to the hazardous n,ture 
of mining business. This is i*y the rate of mining profit will be generally 
high relative to profits on say, most replenishable investment aaeets (See 
Chapter 6, esp. Sect. 2 of this study). It is thus observed that to be 
satisfied with less than 10)6 annually would show a lack of acumen, and a much 
higgler rate would not be exorbitant for most mining ventures. Quite clearly, 
therefore, the investment returns (or the marginal efficiency of investment) 
of Zambia minea are, at say 8.2956, unsatisfactory from the international point 
of view.
Hor is the assumed rate of return on assets value attractive enougdi# 
Thus normally accepted yields for the mining industry in developing countries 
which involve the "mining risk" plus political and other risks are considered 
to vary between 15)6 and 20)6^ ^^  ^(and sometimes even more) on investment.
This makes our figure of 13.79)6 compare very unfavourably both in terms of 
the industry's own previous psrfozmance und with respect to the normal rate 
of return in the international economy. All this reflects, of course, the 
recent increases in production and sales costs of the Zambian mines. No 
doubt had the costs moved according to the estimated trend in the devdlopment 
plan, profitability in the mining industry, &t the assumed price of copper.
86.
would have been attzaoiive even by international standards • (The Plan aemimea 
ooete of £135/ldr. for the period 1963/66, rising to between £171 to £182 in
1970 .j
The industry is obviously less attraotive, on our reokoning that*^
had been expected by both the Government end the Mining oompanies of Zambia. 
There is oonfort, however, in the knowledge that for the period observed, 
the oost factors responsible for this comparative unattraotiveness of the 
Zambia industry were largely short-term. Thus, apart from the wage coats, 
the main coat increases were largely the result of the economic war between 
Zambia and Rhodesia. To ^ia extent, we can say that the prospecta of the 
Zambia industry are not as gloiStagf as our calculations above mifht suggest. 
That is, in the long-run the prospects of the industry are determined by the 
geological nature of the copperbelt vis-a-vis the nature of the copper 
ore body of countries like Chile, Congo, Peru and the U.S.A. Thie is what 
will be decisive in establishing the comparative competitive position of 
Zambia mines in the international copper market.
The Copperbelt of Zambia oontaina some of the richest copper ores 
of the world. At an average copper content of around 3)6 to 4^ , the quantity 
of the Zambian orebody is by far among the highest, compared to some of the |
American orebodies (e.g. in Peru and the U.8.A.) where in some cases copper 
content is only about one per cent). This would give the Zambian industry 
a long-term competitive advantage over the other world produoers of copper. 
However, as we point out in section (a) above, this advantage will be 
modified by the fact that chemically the Zambian ores require a greater outlay 
for treatment per ton. This is why even althou^ comparatively some Peruvian 
mines may be endowed with an orebody of low metallic content, because the 
chemical nature of the ore is easier to treat, the cost of mining ie more 
favourable in Peru than it is in Zambia. This means that even in the long-
8Y,
run the Zambien industry is less oonpetitive than similar industries elsewhere 
in the world, ceteris paribus.
Hence, in order to make the overall cost-position of the Zambian 
industry more favourable and more competitive, cost factors of a non-geological 
nature would require to be appropriately adjusted or reduced wherever possible. 
Indeed, this is largely why, given the level of production costa (other than 
tax costa), the present-day debate cn taxation of the mines is one about the 
presumed adverse effects of royalties and export duty on the competitiveness 
of the industry in the world economy. The popular argument against the 
royalty and the export duty is fairly familiar ^ough basically illogical.
For, as we point out in Chapter 2, if all items of oost including taxes 
influence each other one way or the other, ad we know that the selling prioe 
itself normally represents a major part of the production costs, it is not 
possible to single cut a particular item of oost as being responsible for the 
industry's comparative high costa (or high prises) without invoMng oneself 
in circular reasoning. This is not denying the fact that the two oost items 
of taxation observed form a significant part of total costa which account, 
together, for the industry's obse:ved comparative cost position.
Our argument in this connection does not stem from the fact that 
the proportion ofioost attributable to taxation i.e. royalty and export duty 
etc. is cooperatively significant per set but rather from observation of the 
possible incentive (or disincentive) effects on industrial production and 
investment activity of the mining aéctor, given Government policy on the 
development of the industry. Thus, in our tax proposals, we take the view 
that a system of taxation which does not discourage the expansion of production 
and that of productive capital is desirable, in the specific oase of Zambia 
it is a primary requirement towards the fulfillment of the develAposnt 
objectives of the economy.
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OHAPTSR 4
A cRirittro OP m »  t o ation in z a m b u
Ih the preceding chapter ee indicated the relative significance 
of the various items of oost which together are responsible for making the 
Zambian miming companies leaa competitive in the world economy. That is, 
ve attempted to demonstrate that Zambian mines are becoming less competitive 
in the international market when one compares peeduction coats plus non- 
income tax liabilities. Vé also noted that at a rate of yield of 13*75/ 
on capital, the Zambian industry was less profitable and oonaequently less 
attractive to prospective investment than had been expected or desirable.
In thia chapter our task is to analyse the syetam of mine taxation 
in so far as it is relevant ia determining the level of profitability and 
attraotiveneas of the mining industry.
The mining industry of Zambia, as we know, ia subjected to three 
main types of taxation, e.g. the Royalty, the Profits tax, and, in the 
caae of copper output, a tax on exports. #s now propose to discuss these 
tax structures more fully and critically.
A.. Romrr
Our treatment of the royalty problem at this point of our study 
is in three main stages. First we describe the current system, its 
deweation, etc. #e then analyse its major implications in so far as it is 
a static formula. In the final pages we show that our main criticism does 
not follow simply from the observations made in the preceding pages, but 
rather that there is a fundamental fault inherent in thia formula, principally 
from considerations of industrial productivity.
In Zambia the question of mineral rights and ownership ia defined 
by Chapter 91 ot the Laws of the country(^). The minerals in the soil of 
Zambia are the property of the nation. Thus, in contrast to ths oonoept of 
privats ownership no person or peraoos can become rich overnight on die-
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oovsring mineral ore# underneath their land. In fact the Aot provide# only 
that a person or oonq^ any ean obtain proapeotlng lioeaaea and finally be 
permitted to work the mining location for profit after a oertifioate of 
special registration has been iaaued to him* Be will be required to pay 
the stipulated annual royalties in addition to a profits tax, and, if he is 
mining copper, a duty on exports#
Specifically, the royalty payment is prescribed by Section 17 of 
the Chapter 91, 1965* At the prices of metals ruling at the preesnt time, 
the various mineral royalties are paid as folloesi
Copper - 15*5/ of a certain average of spot and forwardIHB prices of several types of finished copperminus £8*
Lead - 10/ of the U S  price, minus £l.l6.0d.
Zinc - 12/ of ths U a  price, minus <2*10*0d*
Cobalt and Cobalt-bearing materials sold in forms other than alloy- 5/ of the gross amount per lb.
These are in fact a number of other minerala and metals on which 
royalty la paid by the mining companies. The mineral rights were transferred 
from the British South Africa Company (B.S.A.O.) to the Government of Zambia 
on the 24th of October, I964. Since then the Klnsa Department has been 
empowered to assess and to collect royalties every month. The Department 
is also responsible for collecting all rents due to Government on Special 
Grants of the Mining Rights and Exclusive Prospecting Licenses, Inspection 
Payments, Registration fees, etc.
The four types of royalty quoted here should suffice to illus­
trate the meaning of royalty and how, in the case of copper, the formula 
is arrived at. It is clear from the formula, that for each different 
type of mineral the royalties are a uniform levy for all mines producing 
them.
The royalty payment itself is comparable to an ad valorem customs 
duty. The amount on each type of metal will invariably depend upon the
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LMB prio# for the given metal. In the oase of oopper, the UIB prioe in 
the formula will be that of refined copper.
The copper royalty formula 15*5/ P - C6 ia arrived at ae 
folloeai the simple unweighted average of the IMB spot and forward
average price of electolytic wire bare, leas 10/ , is cosq>uted. This is
the price P in the royalty formula.
Depending on the level of price P, the actual computation of 
royalty will vary as follows#
(1) If P is leaa than £53, the royalty (r ) is R - 0.02P.
(2) If £60 P > £35, the royalty (-R)-0.0255P*
(5) If £ 8 0  P >  £60, the royalty is Bm0.123P - £6
(4) If P>£80, the royalty is B-0.15P - £8
Now, the price of copper has been above £80 since 1946.
Therefore only the last formula i.e. RH0.15P - £8 has application at 
present. This formula can be re-written if the unweighted average of the 
spot and forward prices during the months of production without the 
deduction of 10/ is denoted by P. So that the P in the royalty formula 
becomee B*p (.9), and the royalty formula then reads#
R - .13p (.9) - £8
R - .135P - £8
R - 13.5P - £8
This formula has been in operation, unchanged, ainoe its 
inception by the B.S.i.£. in April 1937* This eiqplains the price ranges 
for which differential royalty percentages were fixed.
The reform of the royalty tax interests the mines greatly since it 
ie regarded as the most onerous tax that the industry is made to bear. 
However, as pointed out earlier, this in itself would not be a valid 
argument for reform of the royalty tax. m  the following paragraphs 
we indicate why the need to review and reform this formula is long overdue.
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A# just Bsntioasd above, the derivation of the ourrent copper 
royalty formula reflects the trend of the effective parameters during the 
time of its inception. Thus, from 1952 to 1959 the average annual XJQ prices 
fluctuated between £)1.7 per long ton in 1952 and £54.7 in 1957. The 
Zambian Planning Office calculations alao show that these LMB figures fell 
to £40.7 in 1958 end £42.7 in 1959* It thus appears that at the time it 
was thought that a price of P - p(«9} * £55, corresponding to p - £61.1, 
was an exceedingly h i ^  one. For this price a royalty of 2/ (i.e. 0.02P) 
was fixed. If P were to rise to £60, correspoading to p • £66.6, the 
approximate royalty was deemed to be increased fXom 2/ to 2.25/ (0.0225).
A further increase to p - £86.8 may have been considered highly unlikely, 
but if it did occur an increase of the royalty from 2.25/ to 12.5/ P 
less C6 would be payable. The implicit assumption here ia that costa 
would lag far behind prices per ton. finally, a rise of P above £80, ' 
corresponding to a rise of p above £08.8 was pezhapa thought to be hardly , 
Hence a royalty equal to 0.15P less £8 was merely a theoretical or hypothetical 
ceiling.
Thus it is apparent that the price range which seemed realistic 
in April 1957 ley between leaa than P - £55 and P - £80, corresponding to 
leas than p - £61.1 and p - £66.0. The royalty between these limits 
varied from 2/ to about 5/« The maxisnm possible would be 0.15P - £8, 
corresponding to 0.155 P - £8.
Mow, over the years, the purchasing power of the British pound 
sterling (B£) on which thia formula is baaed, like many other ourrenciw 
in the world, has been dwindling. But the current royalty formula does 
not reflect thia fact. The formula oen, however, be updated by the use 
of an appropriate price index, although this may not be necessary from the 
point of view of fiscal requirementa. On the other hand, it ia true
that the level of industrial or company profitability will depend, over 
the years, on whether or not cost faotors like royalty are constantly
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adjusted to the general trend of prioes.
The annual wholesale prioe index in I965 is given by |the Miniatsy
of Lands and Minas in Zambia as 4.165# Thia oorxesponda oloeally to ifbm
:■ \Ifigure given by the "Statiat" in the same year. Thus, applyiij^ this \ 
resulting naltiplier of 4.165 to the prioe range of the royalty) forsnla,\^ 
the values of the re-appraised roycdty formula are obtained, as iehovn \ 
in tha attached table. Vote that to bring the royalty for the pHce of 
e.g. P - £80 in 1957, or £555*2 in I965 up to date the deduction of^ \£6 would 
alao have to be multiplied by 4*165 to take aocowt of the depreciation of 
the pound. The formula would therefore read# ^
B - 0.U5P - £25 \ \01 K - 0.1125$ - £25
\Similarly, the forsnla for the price range above P - £80 in 1957 or £555*2 ^  
in 1965 would read (note that £8 in 1957 he# the same purchasing power as 
£55.5 in 1965)#
a - 0.15P - £55*5 
or a - 0.155P - £55*5 
We can see that compared with 1957 the royalty in I965 constituted 
a much bigger share out of the UIS price on the basis of the operation 
of the current royalty formula. This results txom two main reasons#
(1) because the price p has risen from under £61.1 to over £86.8 at 1957 
purchasing power of V£, or f±om under £254*4 to over £570.2 at the I965 
purchasing power of B£| (2) because the deductable items £6 and £$ per ton
stayed the same instead of being raised to £25 and £58.5 respectively.
In effect, therefore, these increases of royalty payments occurred while 
costs rose much more than prices. Oorrespondingly, the relative 
profitability of the industry or company is less than it otherwise would 
have been.
9$*l
arnuuTiov qf pmqi u m s  
I965jnxct JKDbE 4*165 ism ma)
PSICS RAKQb AT FURCHASIHO POWER OF <1 IV 
1957
UVDVR
P £55
P £55 
P-£6l.l
AT PÜBCHA8IVG PO#m OF £1 IV 
1965
P* £229*1 
p . £254*5
C0RRB8P0VDIVG ROYALTY FORMULA APRIL 1957*
R^0.02P 
R ' 0*016?
FROM P=£55 
TO P^£60
P £60 
^'£66*6
P -£249*9 
P =£277*7
R -0.0225P 
R-0.02025P
FROM P^C60 P ^ £80
TO P.£80 P=£88*a
P £555*2 
P -£570.2
R -0.125P • £6
^0.05P 
R ,0.1125P - £6 
*0.045?
P £6 
P:?£8
P«£25 
P £55*5
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Another aspect of the formula ia that in ita operation aa an 
ad valorem duty, it has economic implications which may not be*desirable 
from the point of view of industrial productivity in general. These 
implications nay be illustrated by the following brief accounts
(a) As a general statement the oosts of raw materials, i.e. royalties 
are an increasing part of a rising price. In the example below it can be 
seen that the rate of cost increase is comparatively much faster than that 
of prioe at a price of P - £80 or_g « £88.8. In fact the rate increases 
rapidly below thia prioe, and in the range above it the rate of increase 
becomes less because the deduction of £8 becomes a smaller and smaller 
proportion of a rising price, vis.
At p - 88.6 £8 ia 9/
f - £500 £8 ia 2.6/
P - £400 £8 ia 2/
p - £500 £8 is 1.6)4
Conversely, this means that as the price decreases the decrease of the royalty
is more than in proportion to the price decreases (some exponents may observe
a case for lower prices which have also the effect of dampening the desire
for copper substitution by overseas customers).
(b) Aa long aa prices rise faster than costa in general,
the relative increase in royalties charged in this formula, is offset 
by the relative decrease in all other costa, %.g. transformation costs 
(i.e. extraction, concentration, smelting, refining and casting costs), 
marketing costs, transport and insurance coats and administrative costs. 
Conversely, if prioes fall more rapidly than oosts, the relative decrease 
in royalties ia offset by the extent to which these other costa increase.
That is, the profitability of the industry depends on the overall relative 
changes in prices and costa.
(c) The Zambian royalty tax ia levied aa a proportion of unit value
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#f fr*duotl«B. Ib #ffeot it m##m# that «bar* salas are lass than 
praduotlan* the tax raisas prablams of liquidity* and this oould 
oraata sariaus short-tara prablams far the industxy (sea Chap tar 5» 
Saotioa d) * ahioh is raquirad ta pay tha tax in oash and not in tarns 
af stacks or imvantorias.
In this oonneotian our priaaiy in tare st is mat so mush 
the relatiamship betvaan royalty and tha oost prioa situation af the 
industry as a sÈ&ala# Wa ara oaneamad primarily with the relation­
ship batwaen rayaity and the oestfprice position of each ossq>asy or 
firm in tha industry. It is impartsnt to make this distinotion 
because tha relatiamship of royalty ta industry is not macessarily 
tha same as that batwaan royalty and tha individual company. A 
raalistio axpansiamist industrial policy needs to make this distinction* 
and in tha faUawing pages wa shew w#y this is nacassary. In Chapter 5» 
wa recammand ahat wa consider to be the desirable and consistent royalty 
base in tha context of govemmamt palicy and develapmsnt plan require­
ments.
Given that any system of taxation ar rata of tax is designed 
to aohiava ar help achieve a certain acemomic* political* ar social 
objective* as outlined by the gavemment* tha main criticism af tha 
currant royalty formula is therefora mat that it makes tha mining 
companies pay in rayai ties relatively mare in I965 than they did in 
1937. Tha criticism is basically that:
(a) As an aj^  valaram tax* tha royalty has aconaedc affects which 
ara mat conducive ta a general industrial expansion programma* i.e. 
it dees mat amoauraga tha expansion of tha mining sector* centrary to 
gavanmant raquiremsmts. This is bacamsa tha faimi&a* as in all cases 
af a gamaral valarsm ar salas tax* applies without duo considaratiam 
af cost'price situations in particular ar different mining companias
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in tha industry* nq>irieslly* this has had tha affaet af making it 
diffioait if nat impassible far high oast mines ta remain in business 
during pariads ahsn prioas hare ralativaly fallam* or coats hare gone 
ralativa ta prices. The situation has beam partioslarly sauta 
in cases ahera a marginal firm or ccmpamy has alsa beam unable to 
actually sail its output as a result af diffioultias arising from 
dambia's accmamic mar with fihedasia since tha latter*s IDX.
Moraavar* apart from tha raquiramants of an azpansioaist 
Industrial policy* it may be argued that* mcrally* enterprises af 
différant endaamants should be treated diffarantly. Indeed* govanment 
palicy on tax reform states tha need far équitable treatment af the 
tax payers. Psrfasps in no ether line af acancmio activity aauld tha 
principla af equity (both harisomtal end vertical) be mere rdavamt than 
in tha mining industry. It is especially relevant because it is alsa 
cansistsmt uitK tha industrial expansion policy af the gavemmsmt.
(b) From tha point of view of the industry as a ahola* the formula 
results in gavemmsmt ravonues vhich are nat properly related to tha actual 
capacity of tha industry to yield the particular revenues. This arises 
from tha fact that tha price in tha farmola at vhich tha ton of capper 
is assumed to be sold* is nat* in rasent times* the price at vhich the 
M b i a m  industry sells its product. Thus as mated earlier that from 
tha 1930'# to April 1966* there operated in one form er ether some 
producer stabilisation scheme. That in* therm vara alvoys tee maim 
copper prices - one at the LU* and another for the producer market.
Ivam today* the L O  prices at vhich Sambiom producers sell their 
capper ara mot identieal to these on vhich tha ZaWMsn royalty is 
dssyuted. Thus* far tha industry as a vhale tomabla "capasity" would 
be defined* in our ease* in terms of tha value of capper on the basis 
of pradmcer prloae or prices at which Sambion co^omias sell their 
copper
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Slnoe our maim imtaimst la with tha taxahl# oapaoi^ of th# 
ooapanj rather than tha iaduatry* a daairabla dafimitiom wohid taka 
imta aaeamt mat amly tha prioa at which tha pradoBt is said* hut alaa 
tha oaat situatiam af tha diffarant oampaaiaa. This is tha assansa 
af aur abjactlam (a) abava.
Usimg bypathetical data ia tha attashad Table 16 A and B* 
we elaberate caocisèly the twa criticisms abeve. Table A clabarates 
tha first eriticism, shawimg hew tha tax may affact oampamias of 
different east structuras. Hctiee particularly tha ralatianskip 
batwaem rayalby amd a caepany's grass profit at various L D  prices.
It is interesting te observe that at a price of £250/t»T royalij constitutes 
about 32.239( of oompamy A*s grass profits* omd about 31.6% of conpapy 
B e# But tha some amamat of royalty* i.a. &25.Q^T results in a lass 
of about A5.4^fer oeapopy Oi lha maral is simple* leud,claarj 
the higher the oompapy's casts* the heorier the weight of royalty tax.
That is* this system of taxatiom meoms that the percentage of grass 
profits received by the Oefam msnt of Zambia in royalties (and ether taxes) 
riaaa with the casts of Him caapopy taxed.
Becent (1966-68) industrial and opployment prcbloms at Bancraft 
and Xsbme mimes hare arisen principally as a raevdt of this phonomonom 
(at Xabwa imheront technical difficulties were mare central te the problems j 
Indeed* in reeagaitiom of this omomolaus effect of tha royalty* the 
geversmcmt famd it necessary - we would say desirable - te oxompt same 
of these high cest mines from paying royalty (at least for a while).
Xabwa mine actually received a royalty rebate from tha govarwnent.
Bow consider Table B. The results af ^ e  twa prices on 
the basis ef the currant royalty and expert formula are recorded in 
raws 6 and 7. (The inclusion ef the export tax f o m d a  dees mot detract 
from the main argm omt). Botice that whan the toxea are assessed on 
the basis of the LBB* gcvammomt revenue from this source is consistently 
higher ever the whole range ef prices than idiom the basis is the producers'
9?(a) 
TABUG 16
A.
COPPER MIRES - REVXXCEv COST» PROFIT. 
(C/IÆ)
}
LNB 250 275 375 500
R0TAL3T 25.8 29.1 42.6 59.5
EXPORT TAX - - 90.0 60.0
COST A 170 170 170 170
Gross Profit 54.2 75.9 152.4 190.5
Incoms Tax 23.0 52.9 56.3 81.0
Net Profit 51.2 49.6 76.1 109.5
COST B 200 200 200 200
Cross Profit 24.2 45.9 102.4 160.5
iDoome Tex 10.3 19.9 43.5 66.2
Net Profit 19.9 26.4 58.9 92.3
COST C 240 240 240 240
Gross Profit 15.8 5.9 62.4 120.5
Inoome Tax - 2.5 26.5 51.2
Ret Profit - 3.4 95.9 69.9
99(b)
TABLE 16
B.
COPPER MIRES - REVEKÜB FROM bOYAIÆT AND EXPORT TAX
(i/M)
1. LME 400 450 500 550 600
2. P 550 400 450 500 550
5. C 220 290 240 250 260
4. G(«I2S-C) 180 220 260 500 340
5. C* (—P—o) 150 170 210 250 290
6. R+Et (i) JÆ 86 112.75 159.5 166.25 195.0
7. R+Et (ii) P 59.25 86.0 112.75 159.5 166.25
Xayi LME # Lmidon Matai Exofaanga Prioa
P " Prioa at Which Produoara actually sail thair oopper 
C m Coat of Production par ton 
RfEt « Bavanua» cum of Royalty and Export Tax
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prie#. Th# LEE #v#rmge yléld af 139*5 repr###mt# am iaeraaaa af 
araumd 24% ovar th# aeranga yiald uaimg tha produaar prioa (Avaraga m 
112.75).
Of eauraa thia raauXt iarlvaa from tha foot that aa aaaoaa 
a aanaiatamtly higher LUI prioa eoaparad ta that ef tha praduaar. A 
diffarant aaaaaptiam aauld yield différant raaulta. But tha aaaumptian 
ia mat anraaliatie. Aa rafaranoa ta tha praaedimg Chaytara wLU ahaa» 
tha tendanay af tha pradasara haa haam ta aell thair pradash at a prioa 
laaar than that ruling at tha LBB. The argamamta for ahd agaimat high 
ar law prioaa ara aall-kmaam. Our aaaoarm in thia diaouaaiam ia purely 
ta paint eut that ae long aa tha eurramt farmala aparataa tha any it 
dèea» it will alanye gdaa apurlaua raaulta if tha LBB and tha Praduaar 
prioaa ramaia diffarant. And than aithar the gevanwent or tha
mining eompamiaa gat mar# au^ of it er leae hy it.
Thia aituation ia evidantly umaetiafaetefy and muat he maaloaa 
to all ccnoeimad.
Haring painted eut thaaa ahart-oaminga ef tha current royalty 
feimuia* it ia anly fair from tha point of view af gerammant raranua to 
mate fra# tha tea tahlaa aheve tha fallaaii^
(a) the aenaitirity of avarall gavemment revenue with raapaat
to tha oeppar price movamaota on tha LBB.
(b) tha amamat ef revenue due to royalty and expert taxea.
(Thia point ia atraaaed mere fully in Chapter 2 with raapaot ta tha rale 
af royalty and ao^ert taxea in helping carry out the country*# devalap- 
ment plana during tha Plan periad 1966-70.)
It ia lagitimnte ta paint thia eut in order to mpprecieta tha 
fear that gavemment might hare in imtraducing a new faxmuln. That ia* 
tha Ocvemnant may feel* rightly ar aramgly* that the "right" amount 
af ravanuea from rayaltiaa (and export taxaa) with raapaot to total er
100.
overall govemHmt ravamua#* oanot be mar# or la## than tha ourrant 
yield from this sourse. This miqr be dietetad by the raquiramants 
of other plan objectives.
Our reply to this apprehamsion is that it is mot mooessary* 
at any rate in this instamoe* to rua comtraiy te one objective in 
order to attain another. 8e long as taxable capacity in tha country 
as a abcla is still under-utilised - amd it is still mder-utilised 
in Zambia - it is pessible to achieve both a oonstaint level of government 
ravenm# and a desirable structure of mine taxstien. In principle* to 
achieve this pesitiom it is neeeassry only to vary and gear tha tax 
atrmoturas (new* old and reformed) apprspriateiy. Thus* me 
ia our appraisal chapter that the applieatiom of our royalty need not 
haxe adverse off eats on the overall government ravenme requiramemts.
In effect* the raquiramsnts of both sides* i.e. government and industry* 
ire shown to be quite scnsistamt from both fiscal and economic 
considerations.
Bat first a mord about the other tmo forms of nine taxation - 
i.e. Profits and fiq^rt taxes.
B. PROFITS (IKCOMB) TAX
The corporatiom tax in Zambia is progressiva. It is hbeut 
38% for income cp to about 4100*000 and 49% above that inceme level 
or eperating profit of a mining compaey.
Distributed eerporate eermings ara taxed at tha parsons! 
level on the basis of total income mhan aush mamings are received by 
residamts within the ceuntry. The personal income tax is also 
progressive. Thus* for an unmarried person nom-taxahle inceme is 
4if3C* but for a married taxpayer it is 4960 (i.e. mere than twice 
the sise ef abatsmsmts to a single person).
However* dividends are not taxable if and when they accrue 
to parsons outside the country (although tha dividend received may 
be subjected to taxatiom in tha country in which the dividend is
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received).
The rule# govemimg depletion end capital allecaacea are 
contained in varioue eeetiona of the relevant aehedule# of the 
income tax lav.
Thus* the rate# at ehieh depletion alloeaneee are made are 
defined in ZaCbia by Part (vii) af the Fifth SehedidLe to Section 33 
of the Income Tbx Bill* 1966 (i.e. parce. 24-26 of the Bectiom)
The 1er does not provide far dejdetton allceamcee for copper* bet 
previde# for depletiom alleeancee in raepect of gold and silver 
mines at 10%* coal mining at the rate of 3%* and all other minerals 
mined at the rate of 2j%.
Special provisions also apply with respect te rsds^>tion 
alloeanoes. The tem "redemption alloeences" is defined by the Zambian 
lav to oeven
(a) depreciation alloeences of produstive eqnipmsnt
(b) aHeesBces on pre-predmction outlays met exceeding 4100*000 
in any charge year or fiscal year* i.e. 1st Jdy sf one year to 30th 
June of the nsxt year.
The pre-preductiom outlays include expenditure undertaken te 
acquire the right to mine ninerals in Zshbia* e.g. expenditure on surveys* 
boreholes* trenches* pits end ether prcperty amd sxplsratoiy works.
The mftes governing redemption allowances are of parüeWLar 
importance to us because of the rdevsnee they have in respect of the 
small mince rcyalty peliey whieh we present subsequently. The najer 
provisions of the existing lav are contained in Part (vi) of the Fif^ 
Schedule to Sectiom 33 of the Income Tax Bill* 1966* thus:
(1) If the building of a mine may else be classified as em industrial 
building or if implements* machinery and plant ef a nine may also be 
classified as industrial equiposnt* the mine owner or cperater may 
irrevocably apt te have these properties treated under Parts (i) amd
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(il) of the SohtduLe. Be cam than olaim initial allawaneaa (bafara 
first usa) af 10% far industrial buildings and 20% for Inplamsnts* 
naobinary and ÿlant Hs can for any year af usa claim a scar and tsar 
allcaanoo* which is 9% for industrial buildings* 30% for heavy self- 
moving mechanical apparatus* 20% for ether implements and plant.
(2) Where the preceding option is net made us» of* the whale ef 
the inceme from mining eperaüons is entitled to redamptiom allowanee 
under Parts (vi) mad (vii)
(3) The rules for redeeptien allewances are drawn up to cover 
seven different cases as feUews:
ROLES OP CAPITAL RKDbbPTIOB
CASE It Mines operated by omXLng oenpogr (par. 18 ef the Fifth Sohedde) 
The capital expeaditurs te be redeemed in any charge year is the 
ammmat ef unredeemed eapital expenditurs at the beginning ef the charge 
year plus the capital expemditure om the mine incurred during the jrear. 
This aggregate amount is divided by the msAer of years remaining in the 
approved estimated life ef the mines. (The sppreval is given by the 
Commissioner ef Texes). The resulting quotient is the redae^ticn 
allewanoe for the charge year. The unredeemed capital expenditure 
includes pre-predustien expenditure am surveys* borsheles* development* 
interest em loans used for mining purposes and expenditure en building* 
woxks* equipmemt* shaft-sinking and premia (rents) for the use ef build­
ings* works and equipemnt.
There is an upper limit in the above estimated life of these mines. 
In the case of lead and sine it is tem years* and in the case of copper 
and other mines it is twenty years.
CASE Hs lines epemted by companies which are not the owners.
0ASE Hit Mines owned er (grated by partnerships* sde-preprietorship 
and other hion companies".
The rules for both eases H  mtd HI are identical. The Commise-
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lamer ef Inoam# tax abeve detexmlaes the redemption allewanoe 
permitted in any charge year* unleaa the non oenpany omier ef the mime 
deliver# an eatlmate of the nine* a life of which the Conmiasiomer 
approves. In that ease the redemption allowmroe is exactly the same 
as fer Case (l).
CASl Iff ben-eentigueus mines* currently nom-predueing which are 
owned or operated by the emiers er eperaters ef a currently producing 
nine.
The owner or operator of a non-eentigueus nine who is not 
producing Aozn this mime in any charge year* but is preducing frem 
another nine is permitted to deduct a redsmptien allowance in respect 
ef capital expenditure on the non-oentigttous mine from the inceme ef 
the predmcing mine.
Ciai Tt new Mimes.
A new nine is defined as any independent workable mining wider- 
taking whieh first commences production after 31st March 1953 er has 
been re-epened and re-oemmeaced production er has changed emership 
and was re-ergamised with substantially new develepmsnt and plant and 
oemmemoed regular production after 31et Marsh 1933. Stypese the 
estimated "life" of the nine to be five years. The redemptiem allewnces 
will be calculated as fellows:
For the first year; Total capital expenditure up to the end of the 
year divided by five. Per the second charge year* unredeemed capital 
expenditure at the beginning plus capital expenditure during the second 
year divided by four. For the third year* unredeemed capital expenditure 
at the beginning* plus capital expenditure during the third year divided 
by three. For the fourth year* unredeemed capital expenditure at the 
beginning* plus capital «cpenditure during the fourth year divided bj 
two. Fer the fifth or final charge year* the redemption allowance is 
equal to the sun of the unredeemed capital expenditure at the cemmemee-
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ment of the year plue the whole of the capital expenditure during the 
year# for aebaeqment charge yearei the idiole capital expenditure 
during the year.
CA8B TZt lines where operations have permanently ceased.
The permanent cessation of the operations may he due to the 
expiry of the life ef the mine or to the termlnatiom of the ecneessicm.
The closing of the nine m y  he quite moxpeeted. Technical difficulties 
may have caused the cessation of the operations or the concession 
grantor nay have the right to texminate the concession without or at 
short previous notice.
These Instances illustrute why the remaining life of the mine 
could not he estimated shead of such happenings. This is the chief 
reason for the special previsions for calculating redemption allowaneee.
The allowances arc calculated as follows;
Consider cessation of operations in the seventh year of tha active 
life of the mime. The unredeemed capital expenditure at the beginning 
of the sixth year* i.e. the year preceding cessation is ascertained.
To this is odded the eapital expemditure incurred during the last six 
years of operation. The sum is divided by six and this equals redmm>tion 
eoô>enditure for each of the six years preceding the cessatiom. Appar­
ently if* in fact* a different reda^tiom allowance was made during any of 
the six years preceding the cessation* because the cessation was not 
anticipated when it occurred* a retrospective re-assessment of tax 
liability would have to take place.
CASS Till Mines idiich change ownership. .
The special provision necessary for this case is the likelihood 
that the payment made far the mine by the new omaer is mot identical 
with the unredeemed capital expenditure incurred by the previous owner 
and clalnable by him at the end of time of the change of ewncrehip.
It is possible that the payment for the nine is far in excess of the
iS
uarsdHeed capital expemditure. In this caa# the payment fer the 
mine would be equal to the replacement value of the building and equip­
ment plue the agreed value of the ore# in the grewid which include# 
eapitalieed exoea# profit# during the remaining life of the mine. It i# 
equally poeaible that the consideration paid for the nine is far less 
than the unredeemed capital expenditure. It is further possible that 
the new owner of the mine did not pay aay consideration whatsoever* e.g. 
if the son inherits the mime from the father. The Income Tax Law 
provides that the old and the new owners of the mine should make a 
statement to the Income Tax Cemmissioner as to the cost of these assets* 
which would rank as redemable capital expenditure. In case the 
cemmissiomer does not accept the Statement* he alone may determine the 
amount of capital expemditure ranking for redeaption.
Having outlined these redemption rules* we mow propose to
«make a rather critical comment on their iqplieations. Here specifically* 
only two aspects of these rules interest us most* as these have a 
direct bearing on the small mimes Royalty policy wdiich we attempt te 
present subsequently.
The fallowing are the aspects and ctitique of the redemptiem
rules:
(l) The cwmer or operator of a mine may apt to claim eapital 
allowaneee for industrial buildings* iaplamsnts* machinery* plant and 
premium connected with this miming operation.
This stipulation in effect treats these capital equipments as if 
they were met part of a mine and yet if used in another aeration they 
are regarded as part of aay such industry. It does else mean that 
although the owner or operator may opt for these allewances so that he 
receives an initial allewanoe at the beginning of the life of the 
mine of equal to 1G% fer buildings* 20% for implemmats* machinery and
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plant* no suoh initial allowance# are granted to him if he doe# not exeroiae 
the option. Psaauaably thia is to simplify sooounts for purposes of taxation. 
In effect* however* 'ttie stipulation discriminates* a priori* in favour of 
Industries other than mining. Again this is contrary to established govern­
ment policy on the development of mines.
(2) Pre-produotion oapital expenditure and oapital expenditure creating 
new mining capacity are treated equally. The two expenditures are added 
together and together entitled to oapital redemption.
In fhot* however* these expenditures are of a fundamentally diverse 
and different nature. The pre-produotion expenditure is of the nature of a 
gamble. It may not result in the disoovery of any mineable ore body at all. 
Its amount per ton of ore eventually mined is completely unprediotable* and 
may vary enormously from one mine to another. Yet if the pre-produotion 
expenditure were not undertaken some resouroes of the country would not be 
disocvered at all* and others may be dieoovared mu^ later than is desirable.
It is in the interest of Zambia to provide the maximum encouragement to 
undertake this pre-production expenditure.
The stipuletion in paragraph 17* sub-seotion (4) of the fifth 
Schedule is not entirely consistent with Government mine development poli<y.
It says that the excess over £100*000 in any charge year of pre-produotion 
expenditures "on suiveys* boreholes* trenches* and other property and 
exploratory works undertaken to acquire the right to mine minerals* is not 
eligible for redemption allowance. This stipulation imposes two limitations 
on pre-production expenditures. First* that pre-produotion expenditure must 
not exceed £100*000 in any charge year. This sews to assume that mine owners 
and operators are reckless with exponditure on exploratory works. If so* at 
least Pfrt of the fault must lie with the supervisory provisions of the 
Ministry or Department of Mines.
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The main objection to thia stipulation is not so much that it 
restricts allowable ib44r|>tion expenditure to a maxlaum of £100*000 - some 
form of expenditure control would be necessary in practically every case 
where huge public funds are Involved - but that it makes no comparable 
allowances for the subsequent stage of mine development. Thus* in 
prescribing "expenditures on exploratory works undertaken to acquire the 
ri^t to mine" as the only dc^Aebable expenditures* in effect the stipulation 
restricts ce(Aa^on allowance to prospecting expenditure only in areas held 
under prospecting licenses# As soon as a special grant is obtained* which 
conveys the right to mine* such prospecting expenditures as will have been 
incurred would not be included ih the dcAic^ble expenditures.
Vfhile Ihe large mines may not be deterred in their effort to 
develop the mines because of this condition* the small miner is likely to be 
severely restricted in carrying out the actual process of mine development. * 
It is not unlikely that the small miner's little oapital will all have been 
spent in exploratory works. 3y the time the mine prospect is ready to be 
exploited* the shortage of capital would ««an that the prospect would be 
abandoned* implying a worthless expenditure of effort and capital which would 
otherwise have been profitable in the long-run.
These observations also indicate why it is necessary to separate 
pre-production expenditure from capital expenditure to create productive 
capacity. The e exists so mic&i knowledge about mining and metallurgical 
engineering that the risk element involved in the latter type of oapital 
expenditure is small compered with the risk involved in the pre-production
Arc.capital expenditure. This means thatwlmre expenditure deductions^  allowable* 
these would be greater for pre-production than for productive capital.
With reference to Zambia* the Government is determined to encourage 
small and medium mines as much as possible for very good reasons. First* 
one expects that as the mining engineering Department of the University of
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Zambia producae African mining engin«#ra, many of them will ventura to sat 
theasalvas up as indapandant mine owners or operators# In s sense* this 
would be one of the most desirable and exciting ways to encourage African 
entrepreneurship. Secondly* the example of South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia shows that a viable medium and small mines policy can help to 
atain an optimum utilisation of the mineral wealth of a country. In Zambia 
practically all mining relates to lead* sine* vanadium and copper; but in 
South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the whole range of minerals are being mined# 
The same development can be expected here in Zambia once the engineering 
knowledge is widespread and exploited by both large and small miners.
As well as engineering knowledge* however* the availability of 
oapital is a crucial factor. As implied sbove* rapid development of small 
mines is bound to be impeded by the soaroity of capital. The prospectors 
end developers of small shining locations will have run out of capital by 
the time the ore bodies discovered by 'tiiem have been proved. These small 
prospectors and developers would have to sell out to others the ri^ts to mine 
because they have no oapital left. This is one main reason why we suggest 
tat the prospectors and developers should be allowed to recoup the pre- 
production oapital expenditure at least in the first few years, say two years* 
of production in one way or another. They would* for instance* be excused 
from paying royalties* export tax or the profits tax to enable them to recoup 
expenditure.
Needless to say* we inoorporate these proposals in our small mines 
(Royalty) policy.
C. TOORT TAX OR DDTTt
The Copper Export tax formula reads 40% (P - £500) for every long 
ton of copper exported* where P is the average IMS price for the month of 
reckoning. This tax, it will be recalled* was introduced in April of 1966.
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In effect this expert tax foz«uitlM>pexQtes aa a pxogxeaalTe aalea 
tax. In -ttila eenae, it haa economic effects similar to those arising under 
the royalty tax. We noted that a general sales tax is indifferent to the 
particular cost positions of the firms in the industry. A brief example will 
demonstrate* once aoxe^  our objection to this form of taxation in so far as it 
is levied on a producer industry like thejoopper mining industry of Zambia* 
where the various producer companies operate under different cost conditions.
Assume t%ro companies A and B. The cost of company 
A • 200 
B . 2$0
If the price per ton of oopper equals £500* then the export tax equals £80.
This represents 26.6% of A’s gross profits paid as export tax, nnd 52% paid 
by B. That is* the tax rises with the rise in costs of different companies.
The rationale for introducing the export tax in April 1966, as we 
know* was the Government's desire to siphon off excess profits which, at the 
tims^the mining companies were making as a result of relatively high LME 
prices at which they were now selling their copper (having abandoned the 
produoer stabilisation schema). If so* it may be argued ihat the Govemmemt 
could have achieved the same result by merely adjusting the profits tax 
appropriately. Indeed it can be demonstrated that a profits tax has less 
diaincentim effects on the production possibilities of the various producer 
companies. This foHowe from the fact that the tax is normally based on net 
profits i.e. on the residual income of a business enterprise. The weight of 
the tax is relative to the cost position of ea^ individual firm. Iliie is 
the essence of a proportional profits tax* which the Government could have used 
in this case.
aIt is also true* however* ^t/sudden imposition of a profits tax 
or a ohange|Ln the structure of the existing system of profits taxation* mi^t
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oonoelvmbly result In political outcries against the Oovemmant. Indeed* 
given the comparative economic effects of the export duty on the one hand* 
and the profits tax on the other* it seems legitimate to présumât that Covemoent 
choice for an mxport tax of this nature was Isrgdy motivated by political 
considérations. Morsmver, this was made even more feasible by the fact that 
at the prevailing level of prices and costs* the effect of the tax at the margin 
of production would not be appreciable# So that from both economic and 
political considerations* the export tax can be seen to have been a reasonable 
(Aolce of Üie Goveznment.
The tax was obviously a usefbl or practical short-term device 
from the point of view of the Government. But in the long-run* the Zambia 
Government and the mining industry will need a tax based on a mors economically 
rational consideration. As pointed out above* the etport tax* like the 
royalty tax* has economic effects which are not desirable from the point of 
view of both the Government and the mining industry.
From these considerations, the need for reform of the export tax is 
as self-evident ae that for reforming the royalty. This is the task of our 
Chapter ).
lU.
CHAPTER 4 
REFERENCES AKD FOOTHOTES
1. See Appendix X and Appendix 2 of thia work* for oontxaet*
2» In our ^etem the price used for oomputing royalty is based on the price at which the producers sell their product. See Chapter 6* Section 1$
3. See Appendix 1* esp. sub-sections 3-6 inclusive, for contrast.
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CHAPTER 5
TAXATIOM FOR ZAMBIA MIRES; DETERMIHIEO THE BASE FDR ROYALTY TAX
Ih# bam# of royalty payment wa proposa ia auoh that it takes 
aooount of all the ozitioal cost factor# related to the total production 
or gross value of ^ e enterprise. In contrast to the current royalty 
system* our formula is dynamic and specific to individual companies paying 
the tax.
Ve begin by stating the principles and considerations relating 
to the determination of capital value in general. In Section 2 we prescribe 
conditions under whidh the Government may make a maximom claim of royalties 
payable by the mining companies.
SECnOM Ii DETERMIMATIOM OF CAPITAL YALOli FRIMCIFLE8* OOMSIDESATIOBSl
The term "actuarial valuation"^  refers to the mathematical 
(or aritbsmtical) processes by %dii^ the physical quantity of an economic 
project is translated into financial values. Actuarial valuation may take 
place or be solicited for a number of reasons. It would be necessary to 
valuate a project* for instance lAen a change of ownership ia being 
considered either by outright purchase or sale* or through consolidation with 
other properties* and sometimes it is needed when fbnds are to be solicited 
for through sale of stock or bonds or by bank loan* or idien planning a broad
revision of operating methods or installation of iiqportant* long-life
equipmsnt. The appraisal may also be undertaken for purposes of real estate 
taxation.' * In all these eases only a financial unit has meaning* and on it 
alone can an economic decision be taken to change property ownership* to 
invest* or to devise an appropriate tax structure.
Consider for instance the valuation of a mine per se. The
ultimate value of a mine depends on the profit that can be obtained by the
extraotion and sale of the ore over and above the return of the capital 
invested in the property. This is the value to which the actuarial value
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must be eppxoxinated. Row in order to epproximmte this final figure at any 
time during the life of the mine future profita have to be estimated and then 
translated into their actual worth at the time the valuation is made by dis­
counting them to a present value at a predetermined rate of interest.
This present value figure is Ihe crucial indicator for all economic 
purposes for which valuation may be solicited. It is psrticularly crucial 
for investment decision making in a mining programme. A mine is a wasting 
assets henoe each individual dividend represents not only 'âie interest on 
the investor's money put into the mine* but also a partial return of his 
invested capital. By the time #e mine is «diausted the investor should have 
had returned to him the money he contributed to the venture together with the 
interest on that money while it was in use. It is necessary therefore to 
set aside such a portion of each dividend that* at a given rate of interest* 
the annuity thus created will* when the mine is worked cut* equal the capital 
invested at a normal profit.
This practical view point would also be an important factor in 
any exchange of property. It is invariably the viewpoint taken by a prudent 
investor in a mining enterprise.
The actual methods of discounting future profits to present value 
range from simple to complex and may differ between countries and from one 
period to another as valuation techniques advance cr dbange. However* 
presently it is generally agreed that the straightforward single rate discount 
method* in addition to being simple* adequately takes scoount of all the crucial 
factors in assessing the oapital or present value of a pioperty.^^)
In any discount system for computing capital value* the fundsmentsl 
parameters of a project are the proposed output* the expected cost* and the 
expected price of the output. The change in magnitude in any one of these* 
holding others constant* necessarily alters the capital value of the project.
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stating tha mattar simply* gross profits ara osloulatad for tha 
lAola period of the life of the projeot. Aron tiiis all coats are deducted 
and a net profit obtained for each future year. Among these deductions are* 
for instance* depreciations* taxation and depletion. A further deduction 
would also be made of pre-production costs where these existed* e.g. expenditure 
on ahaft-ainking* buildings* etc* The discounted expected net profits 
togetiier constitute be eapital or present value of the project. This is 
the purchase price or the amount which if invested today would be repaid with 
commensurate profits by Üie end of the actuarial life of the property. It 
also represents the discounted sum of each and all those dividends* after 
allowance for any estimated further capital expenditure or necessaiy works 
and equipment.
With the aid of a sin^pa rate discount system* we may clarify this 
point as follows. Let us suppose for this purpose that the life of a 
oapital project ia estimated as five years* and that the expected annual 
receipts for each of the five years are as foUowet a net profit stream ef 
£2*000; £2*500; £3*000; £1*500; £1*000. Then the capital value of this
terminable receipt stream ia the sum of all these receipts st the end of 
each of the next five years* discounted back to the present moment; dis­
counting consists of multiplying the receipts of eatAi future year by the 
appropriate power of the discount rate or ratio.
For instance* the present car capital value of £2*000 st the end of 
the first yeqr will be that sum of money* which* if invested at a stated or 
current rate of interest would grow to £2*000 in one year. If the rate of 
interest be 5%# the following formula would give the discounted value X of 
this receipt* vi**-
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X • 1 0.05 • £2*000
X - J L  - £2*000
1.05
The dleooumt zetio in this mae equals 0.93258* Multiplying the
expected inoome stream in the first year by this ratio we obtain the present 
or capital value of £1904.76. This is the sum which would grow to £2*000 
if invested for one year at a rate of interest of 5%.
Similarly* the receipt of £2*500 can be trsnsformed into present 
value by multiplying it by the discount ratio for one year* and multiplying 
the result once more by the discount ratio for one year. That is* the 
present value of a sum receivable at the end of two years is that future receipt 
multiplied by the square of the discount ratio. In fact* the principle of 
the single rate discount system is that the present value of any future sum 
of money is that future sum multiplied by a power of the discount ratio equal 
to the number of years elapsing between now and the receipt of the sum. The 
matheostioal formulation^ of this principle is stated as:
P « %diere P • Capital or present value(Ur)n V - Expected future income 
r m discount rate or interest rate 
n m number of years of ennuities
Applying this principal to the nat profit stream over the five 
years in our example* the capital value of this net profit stream can be 
written thus* where d is the discount ratio and k the capital or present value:
X - 2000d ♦ 2500d^ ♦ JOOOd^ ♦ 1500d^ ♦ 1000d5 - £6761.45
This mathematical statsmsnt says that if £8781.43 were invested 
today at the rate of d^5% per year the annual withdrawals of £2*000* £2*500* 
£3*000* £1*500 and £1*000 would exhaust that sum at the end of the fifth year.
In other words* the present value or xurohsse price of the expected inooom
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stream ovsr the five year# ia this sum at 5% per year#
This is the general prlno iy ilir of the single rate disoount method 
and the way in which it is applied to determine the oapital value of a 
property# The capital value of a mining programme can similarly be determined, 
giving due cognisance to the nature and implication of pre-produotion costs#
Take for instance a copper mining prospect# We have stated above 
that the value of a mine depends on the value of its ores in th# product market 
after allowing for all attendant costs# If we know the total quantity of 
copper that can be recovered Arom a certain copper ore body, then ve can arrive 
at the value of this ore as followst ascertain the value of refined copper 
at the overseas point of consumption# From this value subtract the intervening 
costs between the consumption sod the mine points, 'ttie cost of extraction and 
refining, and the pre-production outlay. Ihe result is the value of the 
mineable ores in the ground. Dividing this by the number of tons of ore, the 
price per ton of ore in the ground is obtained.
Suppose that the ore will be mined over a five yesB period as
followsI
1st year 10,000 tons
2nd year 20,000 M
3rd year 5,000 N
4th ^  5th years 2,000 n
A receipts steam for the mined ore over the lAole of this period is 
obtained by multiplying each of these five tonnages by thaj^ xpected ex-mine 
price and netted by subtracting all appropriate costs during the year of 
extraction. To obtain the oapital value or present value of thia^ oining 
programme each of the five items of the net receipts stream is then discounted 
back according to the discount rule.
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The prooMs of disooimting the oapital value of the relevant 
pre-produotion eoeta ia the reveiee of the procedure just deaoribed above.
The term pre-produotion outlay oovera all aorta of costa incurred before the 
actual extraction of ore eould start. Such various fees and costs will be 
incurred over a period of time. They are not estimated or expected future 
costs; these are funds already sunk in the venture. Therefore their present 
value must be obtained by cumulating these expenses forward at a compound rate.
Suppose that there were three items of pre-produotion expenditures,
viit-
£5,000 three years ago
£2,000 two years age
£5,000 a year ago
The present value of this stream of past expenditure is the sum of money 
to which these three expenditures would have grown inclusive of interest up 
to the present moment. If the rate of interest is 3%, then the last year's 
expenditure would have grown to £5,000 x 1.05 « £5250. And the expenditure 
of £2,000 two years ago would have grown to £2,205# the £5,000 three years 
ago would have grown to £5,000 x (1.05)5 («1.157) to yield £5472.87. The 
present value of these three pre-production expenditures would therefore add 
up to £10,928 - £5,250 + £3,475.-^  ixze:,;
Thus to calculate the present value of pre-production expenditure 
we simply reverse the original ba<dcward discount formula. That is, for Ihis 
type of cost, the capital value formula is;
Y • P(1 + r)® Where Y « present value of pre-production cost
P - Actual past expenses
r « discount rate
n « number of years to date
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by taking account of all tha ralcvant cost factors in tha two wsya 
dascribed here, the oapital value of the ores in the ground is finally 
determined. Thia is the value of the mine to the owner of the mineral ri^ta. 
For instance, if the mineral ri^ts were owned by the state, the idiole of 
this value would be payable to the State.
SSCTZOV 2t CAPITAL VALOB OF KIHEABIS ORES* MAXIMUM ROYALTIES CLAIMABLE BY TBS GOYERHMCTT OF ZAMBIA.
We have seen how the Capital value of a mine may be derived in 
general. In every case, the starting point ia the value of ore at the 
(overseas) point of consumption. But the value of ore can only be determined 
as part of the value of the final product (metal) for which it is an input.
^s pointed out in the preceding section, the estimated supply, price, and cost 
are crucial factors in determining this value. But once determined we can 
express this oapital value in terms of value per ton of metal (since we will 
have sscertsined the tonnage to be mined over the specific time for which the 
value estimated have been made).
To arrive at the value of ores, the process of determination can 
be presented as foHowei the value of the metal at A e  (overseas) point of 
consumption is designated as item (l). This is the estimated gross value 
or total reoeipts of the enterprise and whiA must now be discounted to give 
the capital value of the property or mining programme in question. We must 
Aus allow for all the critical attendant costs which are also appropriately 
discounted to their present or capital values. The critical costs are all 
those coats which, if not adequately allowed for would omuse the mining 
production prograams to become ineffioiwt or even inoperative in the long run, 
Strictly speaking the relevant costs are therefore factor input payments plus 
all the oAer payments which the Government require the nines to make. The 
royalty can be levied on part or the whole of the residual net oapital value
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of tbi# mining progrrooe («## mttaohod Sohodiilo)*
In gonoxnlt #ii# pxooMW involv## onpitnliMtion of xmooipts and 
ooatm and dadnoting one twom the other to arrive at the capital vain# of the 
mineable ora# in the ground. Thua, aa againat item (1), me ahall aagr item#
(2) to (9) in our oompitation aobedul# oompria# the a# oosta. Note, however, 
that item# (2) to (8) in thia aohedul# are multiplied by a oompotmd factor.
Thia ia explained aa follow#: take, for inatanoe, deduction item (2) i.e.
the export duty on refined metal. it prenant only oopper exporta ara 
aubjected to thia tax (by the formula 40g( exoeaa of LMB price over CJOO).
Thua, if ILb LMB prie# ia €450, the duty amount# to £60. Thia duty ia peyabl# 
to the Government in the month of production. Bat the aala of the product 
ia not neoeaaarily effected within the partioular month.
Sttppoae then that the mining company itaelf haa to wait on an 
average 90 day# after it baa paid the export duty before it received payment 
for the refined copper from the ouatomar abroad. Thia period of waiting ia 
technically called the "atandard day# of credit**. In practice the company 
would not pay or uae it# own ahare capital to finance the 90 day# of waiting. 
That ia, the company would borrow finance to pay export duty while it 
await# payment or receipt# for ita product. Hie company would then repay 
the loan at a borrower*a riak rate of intereat for the 90 daya. Suppcaa ttiat 
the borrower*# riak rate of intereat (b.r.i.) per annum ia (» 0.06). Then 
the intereat coat of 90 daya imiting before the Cender could receive the 
(export duty) loan repayment from the company would amount to:
(£60) (90 daya) x daya
- (*.60) (0.019)
- £1.184
- g* 3a. 6d.
Hiia credit coat can be added to the export duty by the aimple formula:
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OÛMPDTATIOI SGHS2XJLE IND FROCEDORB
N.B. s.d.p. atmndmrd dmy# in production
b.r.i. borrowers risk rate of interest
n.r.p. normal rata of profit
s.d.o. atandard daya of credit
(1) Value of a ton of metal at the (overaaaa) point of
delivery to ilhm consumer (e.g. fabriactCr). 
leaa (2) (Export duty/ton) % [l (a.d.o.)
less (5) (standard intervening coat/ton) x |[l (a.d.c.)
(defining to consumption)
less (4) (standard refining coat/ton) x (l + (a.d.p.)
less (5) (Standard intervening coat/ton) x [l + (a.d.c.) 
(Smelting to refining)
(Standard coat smelting concentrates/ % ^ 1 + (a.d.p.) 
ton metal)
b.r.i.
leas (6
leaa (7 
leas (8
leaa (9
(standard intervening coat/ton) x |l ♦ ( a . d . c . ) j  
(mining - smelting)
(Standard extraction and con­
centration cost/ton metal) x [l ♦ (a.d.p.)(-^ ^^jj^ -)]
Actual pre-production coat/ton metal.
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(EX. LOTI) ( 1 ♦ (90 mis) (%^ -^ )  j 
- £61.184
The oompoond fhotore for the déduction item# ()) to (ô) hmve to he 
similarly underatood. Fût each of these items a atandard period of credit 
reckoned in daya haa to he aaoertainad. Once the period ia aacertainad, 
credit is neoeaasiQr to finance these coats for the standard number of daya 
(a.d.c.). for these items therefore the abbreviated formula would read
Co.t jxM..d.o.) ( ^ f ^ ) ]
Note, howmv^r that deductions item (4) (refining coat per ton of metal) 
or item (6) (smelting coat par ton of metal) are multiplied by a different 
factor that does not contain a borrower's risk interest but instead a normal 
profit rate (n.r.p.). We may explain thia too.
Refining# smelting# concentrating and extracting are the specific 
mining operations for which a mining company buysy implements, equipment and 
plant with ita own capital. In addition it would borrow money to finance 
entzy stock (e.g. explosives)# stocka of ores in prooeaa (e.g. expenditures on 
ore in the prooeaa of being extracted or concentrated or refined) and exit 
stocks (e.g. stocks of refined stocks awaiting transport). On all these 
oosta a mining company expects at least a normal rate of profit. Alternatively 
the profit mark-up coild be determined or mxpreased as a return on total 
capital inveatmant.^^^ This would be the rate of return on capital investment 
vdiioh any efficient firm can earn in the foreign countries from which Zambia 
obtains her capital.
On the basis of profit maric-up on costs the mining companies would 
expect to make this profit on all paid out costs and imputed costa. Tim 
paid out costa are wages, salaries# costs of purchased inputs (explosives# 
electricity# coal# coke, drills# etc.). The imputed costs are depreciation
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of pxe-produotion capital outlays and capital azpanditara on production 
aquipoant.
If vs take deduction item (4)» i.e. the atandard coat of refining 
one ton of metal# and we assume the normal rate of return or profit (n.r.p.) 
to be p.a # then the nxmal rate of profit on this item would bet 
(Standard refining cost i.e. a.r.c.) (Standard daya during which one ton of 
blister is at the refinery i.e. a.d.p.) From which we may
derive a complete formula# thus:
(•.r.o.) j^l ♦ (a.d.p.) (}§5^S^)'\
Standard coats as per deduction items (3) to (e) ma> be defined 
as the low costs of a normally efficient enterprise# while actual oosta may 
be the hlg^ costs of an inefficient enterprise. Thua# we can say that the 
coats at Mufulira mine are, in this case# the basis of calculation in otr 
schedule. Bancroft mine# on the other hand# would be representative of high 
cost mines in Zambia. As can be seen# l^ia definition places pressure on 
marginal and generally high coat mines. In itself it can be argued that t^tiia 
pressure would be desirable if high cost mines are to be driven or forced into 
finding cost-reducing or more efficient methods of production. On the other 
hand# the more efficient nines like Mufulira and other low cost mines of 
Zambia will be the main source of Government revenue# since at the oomperatively 
low level of oosta# the emerging residual capital value subject to taxation 
will increase correspondingly.
Hms the conetraint imposed by '^ his definition of standard costs 
is that it pays to be more efficient or to operate under conditions of oosqpaxative 
low costs, but that inefficiency or hi^ costs In general will not pay.
However, high coats do not always reflect inefficiency of operation, but may 
be due to difficult and inherently costly conditions of operations. Hanoe 
this constraint or definition of standard oosta may penalise and discourage
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the development of potentially dynamic antexpxiaee which axe ouxxently 
operating under difficult and costly conditions* Thia would not, of 
course, be the case where such coats would be deductible for purposes of 
determining the net capital valus subject to taxation*
Now, on the assumption that operations are efficient, and that 
abnormal oosta are deductable for purposes of taxation, the resulting tax or 
royalty is specific to each mining company* on this reasoning, a less 
complicated and simpler definition of standard coats would be the average 
costs of each mine. Indeed, the usual procedure in evaluating a mining 
property for purposes of taxation is to calculate the average cost over a 
period of (normally) five years for each mine. The rationale for this 
procedure ia that past records of say, production, coat of mining/ profits 
can be expected to give some olue to future production, cost of mining, and 
profits. A much longer period than five years of past records would often 
cover phases of the oompany's history that are not representative of what may 
be expected in the future. Otherwise the average cost figure ia appropriately 
adjusted to take account of expected changes during the ensuing period for 
which the valuation at tax assessment of the mine is being carried out.^ ^^
While accepting the general prinoiple of this procedure, we believe 
that a mors mpresentative figure in this oalculation would be the moving average 
cost in each mine for the specific production process (e.g. concentrating, 
refining, smelting) during the specified preceding period. This measure ia 
prefaxable because, aa statistical theory will tell ua, it modifies untypical 
variables of a aeries. The basic information for these calculations would 
be had from tables similar to the attached.
Thia baas will obviously be more sooeptable to miners, especially 
the high cost ones. This is beeause the relevant coats for calculation rSlate 
directly to the partioular mining enterprise. Her would the low cost mines
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TABI£ 171
m m j *  coma Ftfovncsnsm costs (c/iæ m j m m  to sutto)
(Finanoiel Tear ended June 90th)
1261 ISM 12^ 12M 12gZ
FINISHED PRCDTJCnOH 10842 A S # # i a % 2 150500 118392
Costa: Mining 55.00 44.53 49.98 59.75 70.11
Concentrating 13.66 12.00 11.66 12.25 13.92
aaslting 9.30 8.78 8.42 10.25 17.49
Refining 8.00 8.19 8.23 8.31 10.61
GeneralEzpensee 14.10 10.50 U .52 12.98 18.50
Source: lM/6-11
TABU 17B
BAMCROI'Ty MINES LTD. C30PF8R gKOBUCTIOM COSUB BSL. BOIIRS)
mi. 1262 A2É& 1261
piKiraED PRODUcno^ ■QAM ,3240 83762 5654!? 32902
Costs: Mining 66.) 99.4 104.1 109.2 102.3
Conoentxating 16.2 16.) 16.4 16.0 16.4
Smelting i).e 14.0 15.0 17.6 16.1
Refining 14.6 13.5 13.0 16.0
Generalb^qpenaes 40.6 53.6 59.5 59.4 63.1
Souroei 1A^6-1X
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have anything to lose by thia base. In eaA oaae, the resulting residual 
capital value is the maximum available for taxation with least disinoantive 
effects on production and investment activity in general. This is hi^ d^ ly 
desirable and consistent with Qovemnant policy on mine taxation and 
development#
Returning to our computation schedule we may note that only 
item (9) refers to actual costs# H&eee aré actual pre-production costs 
for such quantity of ores aa contains one ton of metal.
Thus, the residuum, after deducting item (2) to (9) from item (l), 
we have said, is the property of Ht» nation, and can be claimed in the form 
of a royalty from the owners, or operators of the mine. Under the specified 
conditions, this residuum represents the maximum amount of tax that could be 
levied on productive capital without bringing about adverse effects on the 
level of production, and on the comparative attraotiveness of investment 
opportunities in the mining oompeniea or the industry at large.
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AWAt«A| Cf vpb J^^FOSSD ROTALTT fOBXJhU
In formulating our royalty principla we will no doubt have 
touohed on several points, and certain germane factors may not have been 
noted. Thus, in this chapter we attempt to elaborate on and to clarify 
certain points or issues eiqplicitly or implicitly arising from this 
principle. More specifically, we do this in order to re-emphasise the 
need and the realism of such a royalty principle or formula in the 
context of the economy of Zambia.
SBCTIOi _Ii TH8 VALUE OP OBB IH THE QBOOIP) VS. PRICM Of MBTAL
Suppose the value of the ores in the ground were determined 
according to our royalty principle. Suppose also that this value 
would remain unchanged for the period of assessment. Further suppose 
that the price of copper at the overseas point of eonsu^>tion actually 
changed during that assessment pericd. Vhat would be the economic 
implications of all these observations?
(!) Assuming an unchanged price of finished oopper for the whole 
period, the mining companies could make hi^ier profits whenever they 
succeeded in reducing all transformation, marketing, transport and 
administrative costs. The companies would undoubtedly consider this 
a healthy situation.
(ii) Assuming the price cf copper changes during the period while 
the transformation, marketing, transport and administrative costs remain 
unchanged, the mining companies would make increasing profits (Windfall 
gainii), as prices rose, and Jedreasing profits or even losses ("Windfall 
losses") as prices fell.
Thus, in determining the value of ores in the ground in 
advance, the government would be ensuring that the mining companies had 
an incentive to reduce costs, which cost-savings they would be allowed
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to retain as efficiency earnings not subject to our tax.
To achieve this it is thus necessary first to ooxqmte the 
value of ores in the ground using a pre-determined price of copper.
For this purpose we suggest to oompute the median copper price.
We would arrive at this price by the following procedure:
(i) the unweighted average spot and forward prices during the 
last three months could be ascertained. This would come as near as 
possible to a six month moving average price centred on the last day 
of the price information. Let this price be denoted by X.
(ii) the median price for the year just ended is then computed^
Let this price be denoted by P.
(NB. In both (i) and (ii) the length of time over which the series 
are observed can be varied depending on what is considered appropriate.
But too long a period is likely to yield unrepresentative results of 
the price movements.)
(iii) the median price for the year just beginning or for the purposs 
of determining our capital value per ton of copper might then emerge as
Î - X - (? - x)
- 2X - f
Using this price, the value of the ores in the ground is then 
determined according to our system. Having determined this value, 
our royalty could then be computed either as the whole of this value or 
part of it only. This is the amount of tax the mines will be expected 
to pay to the government throughout the period for which the assessment 
has been carried out.
At present, government policy on this issue of royalty payment 
is substantially contained in the Statement of 7th Hsy 1965. The 
Statement^^) reads•
"(a) the present formula, which was extablished by the B.8.A.C0. 
for assessing mineral royalties, should be retained.
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(b) Conoessions may be neoeseezy in respeot of those existing mines 
operating at a loss, and
(o) that in order to encourage development of new mines, the govern­
ment is prepared to receive and consider representations for 
granting special concessions in respeot of the new mines.
It is the view of the government that this policy will alleviate certain 
handicaps which some mining companies are or will be e^ qperienoing and 
will at the same time encourage the opening up of new ones."
Our discussion of the royalties versus tLe value of ores in 
the ground indicates, however, that none of the concessions of the 
government statement spelled out in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) will be 
necessary if our rsyalty system were to be applied. The rules for 
determining the value of ores in- the ground make sure that mines are 
not operating at a loss because their ore has been valued too hi#i. 
Reflection shows too that it is not necessary or desirable to undervalue 
the ores in the ground of say, new mines so as to render them profitable. 
Tot one thing, mines are not pioneer industries in Zambia; they have been 
operating here since I906 so that more is known about their technology, 
costs and management problems than of any other industry operating 
in Zambia. On the other hand the annual or periodical re-determination
of the value cf ores in the ground should be a guarantee that new mines 
will not be unprofitable because their ore has been overvalued. It 
does seem, consequently, that new mines would do well to support the 
substitution of an economic price of the ores in the ground in place 
of an inflexible, and, with due respect, out-dated tax.
Business men have been known to resist innovations even if 
favourable to their own interests. It would not be surprising if some 
Zambia mining companies would oppose the valuing of the ores in the 
ground while at the same time clamouring for royalty oonoeeeione.
This would happen in spite of the fact that the valuing of ores in
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the ground would cleowiy oonéede to them ell they oould ask for In 
faimeéa and equity. This ia the logical oonaequenee of a royalty 
prinoiple based on the residual value of a capital investment programme. 
That is, in defialng the supply price or the opportunity cost of the 
productive factors, the prinoiple also establishes the basis of the 
royalty tax.
The system will not permit a deliberate underprising of 
productive factors, e.g. labour, in order to restore the profitability 
(or a relatively higher net capital value) cf aa inefficient business.
And in so far as the royalty is pre-determined, the cost of inefficiency 
must be absorbed by the particular prod\icer enterprise. This latter 
constraint ensures that the nation will not be deprived of revenue 
from such a non-replanishable asset as ores in the ground.
SECTION 2> THE HATE OF PROFIT I C0N8IDHRATI0N8 AMD CRITERIA
All things being equal, a given rate of profit or return 
is decisive in our formula because it
(a) determines the net capital value of our mining programme, and 
consequently
(b) determines the amount of tax levied as royalty on this programme.
Thus, the amount of royalties payable according to our royalty 
formula will dppend on the various rates of profit used to capitalise 
the whole (expected) income from the given mining project or programme. 
Since we assume the various rates of profit to be related to the oppor­
tunity costs of the relevant productive factors, the present value and 
the net capital value as well as the royalty based on it will all be 
greater or smaller according to the amount of profit considered 
appropriate and allocated to those productive factors.
Otherwise stated, a prospective investor will consider an 
investment expendAture justifiable if the net yield on that investment 
project at least equals the rate of "interest" which discounts the
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future oaeh flows of the project into equality with the capital cost
i.e. the relevant rate of interest (- profit rate) nust he one whioh 
results in a sero net present value of the capital project. In effect, 
this is the discount rate whioh becomes the relevant rats of profit for 
the partioular investment project, or the entire investment programme.
To illustrate/entering into the ohoise of a desirable or 
appropriate rate of profit on investment we suppose a prospective 
investor faced with two alternative investment opportunities each requir­
ing a capital outlay of 1000 monetary units. He can either invest the 
capital in a company whose management is sound and in which investment 
is absolutely safe and the future yield can be guaranteed to be constant; 
or he can invest it in a company where there is a one-in-ten chance 
(" risk), not only of not getting any income but of losing the capital 
during the year (or specified period). In these circumstances, if the 
first investment should appear to offer the investor an annual income 
of 50 (i.e. 59^ ), he will not wish to invest his capital in the other 
company unless he can get, in addition to the 50 monetary units that 
he would get from the first, that proportion of his capital which 
corresponds to the probability of the lose (i.e. one-tenth of lOOO).
He will therefore want a total yield of 150 monetary units, i.e. 159^ .
If the actual yield is less than this, all things being equal, the 
investor will choose the first investment. Thus the 10g6 differential 
rate is critical and it is the one that is going to be crucial in the 
assessment of the capital vadue of our elected project or programme.
From the point of view of fiscal policy, it is sometimes 
argued that such a risk premium should not be subjected to taxation 
because strictly speaking it is not "income" but corresponds more to an 
insurance premium which the investor might, in theory, pay to an
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insurance company to cover himself against the loss of his capital; On 
the other hand, it ia pointed out that even if this were true, the premium 
income is real once received by the claimant who may aocordingly be subjected 
to a given form of income tax.
The debate goes on. But from oonsiderations of investment decision­
making it seems legitimate to regard this kind of differential as representing 
the amount required to "convert", in our case, the second investment into 
one like the first. In other words, for this kind of investment a "normal" 
rate of profit cannot be less than IJfi if it is to be sufficiently attractive 
to our prospective investor.
Moreover, apart from the probability of loss of capital and income, 
the premium rate may be related to other factors. Thus, suppose there were 
tiro alternative projects available, each of which gives the same average rate 
of yield over a long period. But while one gives a constant income, the 
other yields a greatly fluctuating income with wide deviations above or below 
the average. In this case too, the prospective investor decides against the 
second investment. Here the critical consideration is not the average return 
on capital over the whole long period. Bu^ rather it is the annual returns 
that will determine whether or not ^e one project is more attractive than the 
other. The differences in annual earnings can be employed to advantage else­
where (either as dividends or investment).in the years before the end of the 
"life" of the project. Hence a much higgler average rate of yield would be 
required if the second project is to become as attractive aa the first.
This means that where capital investment is both risky and yields 
an irregular annual income, the premium necessary will be correspondingly 
h<g^er relative to alternative investment returns. Stating the matter gener­
ally, no one will be willing to accept a capital riek,^n income risk, without
(2)obtaining some compensation or an adequate premium.' ' It is this premium
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>^loh determine# whether a desirable rate of profit will be 8)6 or I596 in our 
computstion schedule• The essential point is that the given rate is determined 
or chosen on the basis of comparative yields of alternative inveetments# 
is long as we use observed data, the market rate of return calculated will 
include risk premium. Therefore it is not neoessary for the Government to 
calculate risk premium separately. This means that in the case lAere a 
prospective investor must choose between alternative investment projects in 
Zambia and elseiAere in the world, the rate of profit realisable on the 
investment in Zambia must be related to the rate of profit on similar investment 
expenditure elsewhere in the world. This in fact seems to be the basis on 
which the mining industry of Zambia assumes the appropriate or desirable rate 
of profit to be at least 159^ .
The assumption is based on the knowledge ^at mining investment 
in general is not worthwhile if it cannot yield a return of to 20^ or even 
more. In the specific cases where, aa in countries like Zambia risk is 
net only of an economic, but of a political nature (i.e. nationalisation and 
general political instability) the expected rate of return in mine investment 
is even much higher. à more concrete example of this observation is illustrated 
by the yields of capital investment in some of the South African mines. Of 
the three best yields in recent years, the hipest is 2).296, followed by a 
20.6)6 yield, closely trailed by a 19.6^ yield.
Row, the copper industry of Zambia is to a considerable extent 
reliant on foreign investment capital. This is a point whioh it is impossible 
to overemjAiasise. In üiis sense the Zambian industry competes keenly for 
foreign investment capital, and success means simply offering a rate of return 
that is better than that offered by competitors elaeidiere in the world. When 
this has been said, it can be seen that a rate of return of 15)6 would not seem 
to be asking for too much from the point of view of the industry.
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The diffioulty of detoxminlng an objective rate of profit aziaea 
not only from statistical considerations, but also from considerations of 
subjective valuations of Oovemnments and Company managements alike. Statis­
tically, it is not always possible to say, for instance, that a return of 
on investment in Zambia is the same thing as that rate of return on investment 
in Chilean mines. Experts have consistently pointed out that these figures 
are sometimes not comparable because of the different bases used in calculations 
in different countries (even in the same country). Hence in saying that a 
2096 return on South African mine investment is obviously more attractive than 
a 1596 in Zambia, one is presumed to have adjusted for any possible anomalies 
in the bases and parameters used in Aese calculations. Otherwise the
statement on its own has no content.
Normally, a rate of profit expresses the relaticmship between 
capital and income. Sometimes it is necessary to distinguish between s rate 
of profit on loan capital, or on share capital, or on total capital. In üie 
usual case, the retd of profit reported in company accounts ref es to total 
capital, the majority of whioh is usually share or equity capital. For 
purposes of assessing the productivity of capital, the rate of profit refers 
to the relationship between incremental capital and the net income arising 
from it.
Quite clearly, the prospective investor is primarily interested 
not in the return on total capital of the company, but in what his capital 
will earn if invested in that company. In other words, the critical rate ia 
the marginal efficiency of his investment. Conversely, this is the rate of 
profit which the company must promise to offer if the investor is to be 
induced to provide his capital.
In our case, this is the rate of profit whioh the mining companies 
of Zambia must promise to capitalists if capital is tc flow into this industry. 
However, the problem always arises because cf disagreements between the
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Government and the industry. It is usual for the companies to assume a 
much hi^er rate than 'ttiat assumed by the Government. The companies do this 
because it is in the interest of their shareholders and other investors to 
use a high discount rate of profit. On the other hand, a low rate of profit 
ensures that Government revenues from company profits will be relatively 
hi^er. In developing countries the issue is bo^ political and economic 
since most of the capital is foreign owned and to allow a much hi^er discount 
rate than is "nacessazy" would be unpatriotic as well as deprive the country 
of the much-needed development resources. This is because any investors' 
profits would largely aorue outside the host country.
This stalemate evidently calls for some form of objective system 
for determining the desirable rate of profit from both industry end Government 
point of view. This is particularly desirable in view of the fact that 
countries like Zambia compete keenly for the supply of international capital. 
Some such system would be useful in determining what a competitivé rate of 
profit will be on investment in Zambia.
One simple sys eu would be to construct a rate of profit from 
past Accords of invdstment yields in the Zambian industry. (In fact this 
is precisely the basis of modem te<diniques in forecasting or determining the 
desirable rate of profit except that in this case the information is fed into 
a computer for analysis and results). To the extent that this can be done 
an average net profit could be computed over a specified period, say two to 
three years of past records. To the extent that the capital market is highly 
competitive, this rate of return would approximate very closely to the supply 
price of capital in a perfectly competitive market. Our main interest in 
this calculation is to attempt to provide a bench-mark from which both the 
Govemamt and the Industry could begin to bargain about what was thou^t to 
be the desirable rate of profit. In other words, the final or actual rate 
of profit selected would be a modification of this computed rate in the light
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of current and expected masicet trends.
This spprosch must have particular appeal to the Government since 
it will now be left to the mining companies or the industry at large to 
prove idiy the computed rate of return cannot be applied in discounting the 
partioular investment programme.
The table below indicates the basic approach implied by our 
simplified system;
Year c Me Tjr My &Me
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. 1000 1000 50 50 5S( 5;
2. 1200 200 500 250 125;
3. 1500 500 540 40 22.6; IJ.3;
4. 1900 400 400 60 21.0; 15.0;
0 " Total capital
Me • Incremental capital
Ty a Yield on total capital
fty a Yield on marginal or incremental capital
The required result is computed from column (?) of our table.
In the ease lAere the distribution in this column is not generally constant, 
a more stable measure may be used, i.e. it may be thought desirable to use 
a median or moving average rate of profit for the specified period observed.
3ECTI0H 3: FaEQUEICY OF RE-DEHKMIMATIOH OF PRICE OR YALta OF ORES HTHE OROmn)
The current royalty formualadates back to April,1957, and has been 
ia operation since, unchanged. This is in spite of the dianges broua^t about
by the war and the post-war economic convulsions, including the Korean and 
the Vietnam wars, and the political emancipation of most colonial territories
and their advance towards economic freedom. Of ccurse, as we mention and
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•mphasise alacwhara, auoh ^ngea in the aoonoalo and political environment 
would not neoeaaarily require changea in the current royalty formula to take 
place. Strictly, changes in the royalty formula would be called for aa a 
matter of Government policy in view of the economic and other objectives to 
be achieved by making the requisite changea»
Nonetheless, to the extent that the current formula is static, it 
would not come as a surprise if it should be hopelessly out of touch with the 
economic facta over a long (or even short) period of time. In contrast, our 
system of royalty payments oould never suffer from such a weakness. Thia 
is because, onoe we have at#ted the objective and essence of the royalty tax, 
our system allows for a frequent re-determination of the prioe or value of 
the ores in the ground. We consider this ingredient as one of the most 
important in our formula.
Ideally, re-determination should take place gs often as:
(i) the price of copper changes
(il) the standard costs of transformation, marketing 
transportation and administration, change.
(iii) export duty changes.
How short the interval between one rs-deteraination and the next should 
be depends upon cost (and equity) considerations.
To begin with an annual re-determination should be attempted; 
Practice may show Hhmt the interval between re-determination could be 
increased from 12 months to 24 or )6 months. It is impossible to be 
certain about this without expérimentation.
Suppose, however, that a system of long term prioe determination 
is preferred. This would assume certainty of demand and supply conditions 
over the entire period. Applying the system of mine valuation, the value 
of the ores in the ground would be ascertained over that period. If so.
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the best way to induce incentive to cost-xeduotion would be to require the 
mines to pay this royalty as a luoqp sum to cover the specific period. Thus, 
for a period of 20 years the royalty payable might be calculated as £10,000. 
This need not be paid all at once. An instalment system may be devised, say 
£5,000 at the beginning of the first ten years, and the remaining £5,000 to be 
paid at the beginning of the second ten years. The main point is that
however it may be paid, this sum constitutes a portion of fixed costs over the
period.
Two distinct advantages are apparently derived from this hypothesis; 
the mines can look forward to a long period of planning; and secondly the 
nines are encouraged to reduce costs since they know that any such cost-savings 
will not immediately be lost in the subsequent period, e.g. the next year, 
as standard costs are adjusted to take account cf cost changes. That is, 
for a considerable tioM the mines, if they can reduce the costs of production,
can go on enjoying such efficiency earnings. The system would also ensure
a non-variable revenue for ^e State from Ihe mines for the whole long period.
But the implicit assumption that supply and demand conditions will 
be cextainly known over such a long period (say 10 years) is, of course, hig^ ily 
speculative if not exactly hypothetical. Over a long period the likelihood 
is that supply and demand conditions will diange in such a way that ihe value 
of the mineral property and hence that of royalty may be altered drastically.
If so a lump-sum hypothesis would imply either that the mines axe unduly 
favoured if during that period the changes in the price-cost relationships 
have resulted in relatively high profit earnings for the enterprise, or that 
they have been unfairly treated if, although cost-price relationships have 
changed in such a way as to result in srelatively high costs, the mines have 
still to pay the lump-sum.
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Indeed, the objection to this hypothesis is akin to that vhicAi we 
have already advanced against the system of royalty payment as it applies 
today. This is that over a long period, prices and costs change. Therefore, 
unless these chan es are constantly watched and adjusted, an inequitable and 
undesirable system of royalty is bound to result# It makes no difference to 
the principle that in the one case the payment is monthly and that in the other 
it is a onoe-for-all for the period as a whole. The basic principle cannot be 
altered by these considerations. Thus, if we desire to determine royalty as 
a tax consistent with the production possibilities of the enterprise and 
Government policy, we cannot overlook the supply and demand conditions of the 
productive factors (labour, capital) for reasons*of expediency, especially over 
such a long period of time. Once we have decided to follow a rational system 
of pricing we cannot in the same breath opt for an irrational one and then only 
idien such an irrational system favours us.
The lump-sum hypothesis is evidently not consistent with the logic 
of Government mining policy and industrial productivity in a dynamic market.
Thus we believe that in all oases re-determination of values should be as xegulsr 
as possible. This we recommend wi'tti due respect to the enormous problems that 
are necessarily a feature and part of property valuation, especially mining 
programmes.
SECnOI At ROYALTY (« CAPITAL) TAX vs. INOOMS (PROFITS) TAX^^^
The essence of our proposed royalty formula is that Ih e  resulting 
tax is a capital tax. As such it has economic effects which are basically 
different from those that would result from levying say, a profits or income 
tax on an enterprise. From the point of view of revenue, however, one form 
of tax may be seen to be as good as another. Thus, if a company has an
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Income equal to,say, ^  of ita capital, the result is the same whether its 
income is charged at 20)6 or its capital at lÿ. In each case the absolute 
amount of tax yielded equals 1 monetary unit, given that the capital value 
in question equals 100 monetary units.
But this is as far as the equivalence can go. In effect, there are 
fundamental differences between a capital tax and aprofits tax. In particular, 
the differences arise from the effect the respective taxes have on the allocation 
of pxoduotive factors. For instance because a general uniform or profits tax 
catches certain items of cost as inoome(e.g* interest on equity or ordinary 
share capital),this may cause an internal redistribution of investment by 
diverting capital from the more hasardons to less hasardoua sectors. This 
element of risk is taken account of in determining the capital value of a
project in that the market capitalises, at the given or appropriate rate of
discount, tibe income from the investment net of all oosta (including all 
critical taxes). To this extent the capital tax is preferable from the point 
of view of encouraging the undertaking of relatively risky investosnt ventures.
For purposes of illustration, assume two alternative investment 
opportunities 1 and B. Investment in A offers IOO96 safety of capital;
investment in B incolves a 10^ risk of loss of capital. If the return or
yield on A equals 44, therefore the appropriate rate of yield i.e. the yield 
neoessary to induce comparable investment in B will equal I496 including the 
risk premium. If the tax is a profits tax at 20)6, then the aftei-tax or 
net income for B will be 11.2)6 (i.e. 14 t  (.2 x I4). But since thelisk of 
losing the capital is not reduced, end is still computed at 10)6, the actual 
nominal net yield is in fact reduced from to 1.2)6 (i.e. 11.2 - 10). H m s  
the 20)6 tax on the nominal end uncertain income becomes a 70)6 tax on the net 
nominal income (i.e. ICO x And it can be shown that the weight of
this tax will become heavier with an increase in risk. On the other hand,
this conclusion implies that more secure incomes will be favoured because the
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nominal income would be closer to the actual income* So this extent the 
tax may cause a fli'^t of capital from more hasardoua to safer sectors of the 
economy* This effect would be harmful from the point of view of productivity* 
Suppose the tax is a capital tax at ^  and À and B are alternative 
investment opportunities such that A is safe and expected to yield an income 
of 59$. Investment risk in B is computed at 10)6. If the capital value equals 
1000 monetary units, the after-tax or net yield for
B
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here the tax maintains the 10)6 risk differential neoessary to make B suffio- 
iently attractive relative to 1* In this sense a capital tax is more favourable 
to relatively risky sectors of the majdcet#
Moreover, our royalty tax is a special capital tax in the sense 
that it has a built-in incentive for a more efficient use of productive 
resources* Thus, onoe the costings, and the valuation and the tax assessments 
have been carried out, there is virtually no limit to the extent to lAiioh 
efficiency may be encouraged. This will be especially so the longer the 
period between one assessment or valuation and another. In one important 
respeot, the success of this incentive claim will depend on the extent to 
which, at the time of valuation or assessment, the investors or the mining 
companies reveal genuinely their expectations of the cost trends. Indeed it 
is in their interest to do so, because what actually happens in the previous 
period sffeots the capital value of the investment in the subsequent period.
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In other words there is no incentive in over-etsting the expected trend of
H. Wooste at ^ e  time of one valuation in order to make oost-reduotions before 
the next assessment period* This is one distinct advantage in using pest 
records for oaloolations in our system. In a sense, as against the incentive 
factor, we oould say that our system also has a built-in control factor.
Given an expansionist industrial policy in Zambia our royalty formula 
is evidently a desirable instrument available to the Government. It is 
important only to remecbar that the tax is being conceived as part of the 
whole eye tern of taxation in Zambia. 3o that the overall success of Government 
objectives depends not only on our royalty tax, but also on other forms and 
structures of taxation in the mining industry and in other sectors of the 
economy. Viewed in this li^t, the implied favourable effects resulting 
from the application of our rsyalty principle can be seen to be not entirely 
hypothetical. In effect, our royalty system is not only preferable as 
against other forms of taxation, but also realistic in the context of the 
Zambian development plan, for whioh we presently recommend its application.
SECTION 5i PROPOSED ROYALTY VS. PLAN OBJECTIVES
As reference to Ohapter 2 of our woi^ will show, recurrent revenue 
will be the most decisive source of resources for implementing the plan 
objectives of the Government of Zambia for the period I966-70. It is mtnly 
beoause of the recognition of this fact that the Government tax policy will 
require to be constantly reviewed so as to ensure that the necessary resources 
are marshalled for the specific purpose of attaining the goals of the economic 
development programme. An integral part of this tax reform programme, as we 
will remember, is the emphasis on equity considerations, and increase in labour 
productivity and, naturally, an appropriate increase in treasury funds.
With reference to equity considerations, our royalty proposal will be 
seen to take account of equitable treatment between materprises. This is
143.
the logical ooneequenoe of the fact tiiat Xtie royalty required to he paid 
by each such enterprise is specific to that enterprise, having taken account 
of all relevant factors that influence the enterprise's level or scale of 
operation. It is also equitable as between the requirements of the 
Government (revenue) and those of the^nduatry (costs vis-a-vis profitability). 
This is because our system of royalty payment is based on an economically 
rational system of capital valuation. This is why, apart from equity 
considerations, we believe that our system would result in an increase in 
industrial productivity, which is a main objective of Government policy.
To the extent that this wo Id be achieved, it would help the Government tc 
achieve some of its important goals e.g. a maximum participation of the 
population in the activities of the economy (objective ii), which in turn 
would result (or be expected tc result) in an overall increase in revenue 
contribution to the national treasury as taxation would then be broadly based. 
Thus utlimately the capacity of the ^stem of taxation will depend on lAat 
changes take place in the existing tax structures and idiether new forms of 
taxation are introduced to help achieve the economy's development goals.
For our part lAat we set out to do was the examination of the 
existing tax rates in so far as these relate to the taxation of mines. And 
the conclusion arrived at is that the existing tax rates imposed on mines, 
especially the royalty (and the export tax), are not properly bosed and are 
basically inconsistent with the (other) objectives of Government policy.
Thus, if the Government requires to raise industrial productivity in the 
mining sector and in the economy in general, then the économie and most 
effective and efficient way to do this would be to adopt our system cf 
royalty payments. H m s  v e argue througd^out the relevant pages to show why 
our royalty principla is superior to the current formula idiioh, to put the 
matter in short, leaves much to be desired. We believe that unless the 
Government takes appropriate measures to redress the anomalous tax system
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it can hardly expeot that the ambitiouB development gomle (e.g. £70 m. per 
ennun on publie oepital inreatrMnt) would be aohiewed me well me mif^t be 
under more optimal conditions such as the ones we postulate in our royalty 
formula.
With our system we are confident that the development objectives set 
out in the Plan would not only be achieved, but would be achieved within 
the framework of economic rationality. Take for instance objective (i) in 
the Plan. An increase in the productivity of the mining industry following 
the application of our royalty payments formula would lead to an increased 
revenue contribution from this sector. This increased revenue would enable 
the Government to sponsor or personally to undertake (through say, the 
Industrial Development Corporation - a State owned enterprise) the develops#nt 
of other industrial activities so that ultimately the copper industry in 
pertiuclar is no longer the main or only main employer in tha economy. This 
would mean a higher level of employment opportunities in the economy as a 
whole; it would also mean a greater proportion of domestic demand would now 
be satisfied by domestic production from a large industriel base.
As ve mention above, all this activity should increase the capacity
of the tax system. With this increase in revenue the progra' ue of economic
diversification becomes even more real. Thus the prevailing dual economic 
system (mcney vs. subsistence economy) could now be minimised (o^jactive v)$ 
and from all su<A various economic activities we would expeot, on average 
an increase in monetary output per head over the plan period (objective iii).
One can visidLise a snow-balling effect of all this on the capacity
of the tex system to marshall resources in the hands of the government. Thus
with an increase in revenue due to all these economic activities whi<di in 
themselves follow from tho expenditure programmes of the State, the Stata 
will be further enabled to increase the provision of social infra-structure
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e.g. oommunioations (objective vill), and an overall Inoreeae in social (or 
public) investment e.g. to raise the general level of education (objective 
vi), and to provide more and better liring^ecooomadation (objective vii).
The provision of social or public goods i.e. social infra-structure 
is an important ingredient for a programme of dev6opment which emphasises the 
need of the development of private enterprise. This provides an important 
source of external economies without lAioh many would-be private enterprises 
would not venture to enter into economic production.
If we look at our proposed system of royalty payment as only one 
of the several possible tax structures, we will seo why it is consistent with 
the objectives and requirements of the Qovemnent plan. Thus, we mention 
elsewhere the fact that our system is not an alternative, but rather a 
complementary structure which enables the revenue of 'tiie Government and the 
cost and productivity of the industry affected to be related in a much more 
economic end realistic fashion. If our system should result in a smaller 
liability of tax falling on the mining industry, it is for the good of the 
industry in so far as this would imply a higher potential to expand capacity, 
and to that extent it would be in the long-run interest of the Government and 
the economy as a whole.
In conclusion we can say no more than reiterate that the attainment 
of all the development goals will depend by and large on the efficiency of the 
whole system of taxation. Thus, allocation, distribution and stabilisation 
(objective iv) will all depend on what happens to the revenue and expenditure 
programmes as envisaged in the Public Budget for the period in question.
Only we believe that our contribution in this respect would be invaluable, 
not only in respect of the period in question but also beyond that period.
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CHAPTER 7
HffTAifTT m  wi-fr njm
Before prooeeding to make a eaae for a apeoial royalty to apply 
to email mines ve propose first to define, in our oontezt, the meaning 
of a small mine, and then to spell out tha apeoial signifioanoe of amall 
mines in the economy of Zambia.
(A) DEPXHITIOI OF A SMALL MIXS
The process of mining itself is defined as any artificial ex­
cavation or extraction made ftom the earth's erust for tha purpose of 
winning mineral values. This definition incorporated both opan-plt 
and underground excavations for metal and coal woridngs, quarries and oil, 
gas, ^alt and sulphur veils, but excludes bwrrov pits, railway saver, and 
water tunnels and, in general, all diggings made for oommarcial purposes 
other than the exploitation of minerals.^^^
A mine as suoh can be defined as small, medium or large in either 
relative or absolute terms. In the former case, the sise of a given mine 
is compared to the sise of the other existing or potential mines. In the 
latter case, the siae of a mine is defined in technical terms with respect 
to say, its annual tonnage, ore reserves, etc. In both cases, however,
the sise to which a mine will grow depends largely on the quantity and 
quality of the underlying ore body on the one hand, and on the costs and 
prices on the other.
In this paper criteria for defining sise of a mine are
given, but only as an aid for purposes of discrimination when applying 
our royalty system to the various mines. It is therefore not strictly 
an economic classification in the usual sense. Our basis of dis­
crimination is largely physical rather than financial. It is noteworthy 
in this respect that some authors have suggested that apart from the 
big or large consolidations a mine producing around 100,000 tons a 
year may be regarded as operating at a moderate scale; if it produces
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quantities beyond 1,000,000 tons a year, it has a large aoale operation. 
Ftom ehioh observation it nay be inferred that a amall mine is that whose 
annual production is below 100,000 tons.
It is informative to observe in this connection that in Chile^^^
the law defines a medium sise mine as that which produces less than
75,000 metrie tons of metallic copper per year but which is not a small 
mine. A small mine is normally defined in terms cf the amount of 
capital and corporative status of an enterprise. This approach is, 
of course, also true of the definition of large and medium sise mines.
Our own classification cf the mines, by sise, is as follows#
(I) ami.t. urm
Ve shall say that a metalliferous small mine is one which satisfies 
at least one of the following conditions#
(a) Proved ore body of one million tons or less,
(b) A recoverable metal content of 25,000,
(o) An annual output of 5,000 tons of recoverable metal or less
(d) An actual or planned pre-production capital expenditure #md 
output capacity creating capital expenditure of Aim or leas.
(e) A total manpower of 250 men or less.
(II) m m
This is the stage between small and large mines. Ve may therefore 
identify such as one which satisfies any one cf the conditions under 
"small mine", but somewhat at a higher level. Ve may, for inst#mce, 
be more spécifié and say that a medium mine must exhibit properties (a) 
to (e) under (i) enlarged up to three times.
(III) LARQ»*™
Again, as a matter cf practical oonvwiience we may distinguish 
a medium fXom a large mine by stipulating that a large mine must satisfy 
any one of the conditions (a) to (e) under (i) at even a guch higher 
level.
U9r
(iv) NEW MINES:
The definition of a mew mime eantàined in paragraph 21 of the 
5th Schedule te Section 33 ef the Inceme Tax Bill, 1966, may suffiee 
fer our puxpeaea, and read# aa fellewat
*▲ new mime meana any independent workable mining urn ertakLng 
whether or not operated hy a peraon already oarfyiag en mining 
eperationa ahioh 
 ^(a) firat commenced regular production in the fiacal year juat 
ended,
(h) having previoualy been in production, had been cleaed down and 
had subaequently been reepened and recommended regular production in 
the fiacal year juat cleaed,
(c)haa changed ownership and was reorganised with aubatantially 
new develepment and new plant and commenced regular preduotion in 
the fiscal year juat closed. "
As we can see, mines whether they be amall, medium or large, 
or indeed new, cam be alluvial, epen-pit an^er underground. However, 
the definitions given abeve would apply primarily te epen-pit and 
undergreund mines.
Alluvial mines are of course the meat easily worked mines.
Ifo alluvial depesit has ae far ever been worked in Zambia. B«t there 
la always a peaaibility ef allukial deposits being discovered and worked 
profitably. If this were to happen, initially preference could be given 
to amall mines and to ceeperative societies, i.e. the State would be 
well advised to grant mining rights te amall operators to exploit the 
alluvial deposits.
It is perhaps proper at this stage te oempare the status of 
a new mine with thgt ef a pioneer industry. A pioneer industry enjoys 
certain privileges under Pioneer Induatxy Act Mo.55 ME. 1965, which a 
new mine does met. Of course the main purpose ef the P.I.. Act is to
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encourage the establishaent and developmemt in Zambia of new 
manufacturing and allied industries on a commercial scale. The Act 
stipulates four conditions that must be satisfied before am industry 
could qualify for the benefits. These conditions are found under 
Section 5 (i) of the Act and state that
(a) ne similar industry shall be operating on a commercial 
scale anywhere in Zambia#
(b) there exist good prospects ef viability for this Industry,
(a) there are Insufficient er deficient external economies
accessible te tha industry to permit it to enjoy full profitability 
in the early stages ef eperation,
(d) the industry in questien is judged te serve a substantial 
public interest.
From what we have seem of the definition ef a new mine, it 
is obvieus that suoh a mine is denied privileges that a pioneer industry 
is allowed te en jay. This is simply because a new mime, by definitien, 
does net qualify for such privileges under conditions (a) ef the P.I.Ast. 
As is well known, there will always be mines of similar stature and 
interest operating at the same time. In a given country, this is 
geologioally determined. In suoh a case, if a new mine came inte 
existence it would not have te develep its own domestic er foreign 
markets, for instance. Mere specifically, for a country like Zambia 
the output of a metalliferous mine cam always find a ready export 
market except in times ef a slump. Moreover, the mining methods te be 
used will be fully known and se will, except in special cases, the 
metallurgical methods needed to extract the metal from the ores.
There simply is no similarity between the pioneer industry 
and the new mime. In one important respect, however, they have a 
common featurei both are denied facilities for économie operation 
in remote areas.
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(!) A 31UU nUBi TIABILm AND BOB IN «ANBIA
The question ef eaeoureglng individual entrepreneurship 
in Zambia is one that oannet be over-stressed. And in a country 
where mining is the industry of the nation as wall as being essentially 
a large scale operatien, the epening ef a small mine becomes simply 
a logical necessity. This necessity arises from various phblic and 
private considerations which in turn must justify the treatment of 
small mines as fundamentally different from the large ones. In 
reeegiislng and accepting this difference the individual and the publie, 
inter alia, admit as natural the establishment of a small mines policy 
which is distinct frem one that would apply to the large mines.
There are many ressens fer èstahllshiag suoh a policy. We cam only 
mention a few here by way ef illustrating the necessity for this policy.
(i) Big mines often make mineral discoveries which might net or 
do net interest them# though such discoveries would er might interest 
small mines# Often small miners in Zambia have taken up deposits 
discovered and partly developed by big mines. If these could be worked 
profitably only by a large mine, small mines would offer them to the 
large miner. In all ether cases they themselves will work the deposits.
We may, in this respect, quote the develepment ef the mining industry 
in South Africa and Rhodesia, where the rde of the small miner has 
brought the industry te its present level ef activity. In contrast, 
the industry in Zambia is a big eexpcration enterprise tc which exclusive 
monepely rights te minerals were granted ever vast territories. Perhaps 
this explains, historically, the fact that south ef the Zasibesi river 
there was a greater rate of mineral discovery per annum, and else a 
substantial rate of discovery of types ef minerals which were never 
looked at in Zambia. A large part ef the mineral wealth ef Zambia 
requires to be disoavered, and the encouragement ef small mining could 
help raise the discovery rates to hlf^r levels#
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(il) During the last 40 years^*^ er so the whele ef Zsmbia has 
been several times osmbed by prospeotlBgcoapsmies. However, only 
smell pertioHs hare been prespeeted by sephistioated geogéte^^oal 
metheds which are beycmd tbs financial resouxoes of small prospeoters.
In the eld days individmals ceuld cencentrate on eutcrcfs. These 
were almv* rare in Zambia and mast ef then have been examined.
It is debatable whether small mines have much chance left te 
dissever payable new mineral reseurces. Riey may, however, discever 
seme in which big mines are net primarily interested and ethers which 
lie in undevelsped parts ef the country, eff the line ef rail. Little 
can be mere impartant fer the fntnre development of Zasbla than that 
profitable nem» agricultural pursuits are started eff the line ef rail. 
(Agriculture has always been an unattractive outlet for young talent 
in the rural areas though its sipdfioaw te develepment is undsnisble). 
While sectors like agriculture must eeatlnue to eo^emd and to play their 
rde, it is to the small miners that much ef this economic devdepment 
tf the rurd areas today will be due (d.^. devdepment in Gwembe area 
since the beginning of eed-mine workings there).
(iii) In generd, small mines are labour-intensive and Ci^itd- 
saving. The small mine has usually only limited eapitd resources and 
is therefore forced to think ef metheds ef prospecting and expleratien 
smd mining which meed the least amcunt ef capitd. This shortage ef 
eapitd dee forces the small miner te rdy chiefly iqpon lecd labeur 
in his activities, previdsd that this dees not invdve a large amount 
ef working eapitd. Voridlng in an epem agricdturd eeuntry he is 
able te make use ef and train the load pepdation. Therefore empley- 
msmt eppertunltLes for the lecd pepdatiem arise which wedd otherwise 
be lacking (outside cemmersid agriculture).
(iv) Having limited capitd and net hnewing whether at the end ef 
the revenue-earning life ef his present small mine he wedd find another
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commercial mineral depeait, ih» amall mimer limita hi# output capaeity 
so aa te prdemg tiie life of hi# mine. If he ean obtain a trainable 
lecal labeur feroe he mill enlarge the annual output capacity aomewhat 
but he would net ewer-extend it to the point ef eauaing himadf 
aufferance frem a lack of trainable labour reaexre.
This apparently eenaerwative attitude enaurea a rational exploit­
ation ef reaouxcea ever a relatively long period; and in doing ae the 
employment life ef labeur i# alae prolonged, i.e. pay-effa due te lack 
of eqploynemt are made more distant than otherwise.
(v) If there were many small mines in Zambia, their combined con­
tribution to the G.D.P. while only a fraction ef the centributien of the 
large mines, would nevertheless be noteworthy. Every eontributien 
helps to raise the standard ef living ef the natien, especially in the 
rural areas.
(vi) As the School ef lining Engineering at the Qhiversity of 
Zambia begins te preduse African graduates, these will at first be 
abseibed by the large mines in compliance with the gevexnment*# Zambiam- 
isatien programme ef manpower in the mines. The time smgr, however, 
net be far eff when African graduates will wish to bee os# small indspem- 
dent miners. This time ceuld arrive much sooner if the govexnment were 
to provide prudent credit facilities for the intending small miners
to open up the viable small mining prespeots. The advent of small 
independent African miners would materially eomtribute to a rapid growth 
of endogeneus entrepreneurship.
(vii) As the few existing mines reveal, many of them are re-epened 
old mines, which did net prove to be ef sufficient interest to their 
original discoverers^The small mining technique is therefore a 
means of saving precious national assets frem oblivion. There are of 
course many reasons why a previously abandoned mine may be worth re-
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epening; but it is else true that many of these reasons must be in the 
new teohnologiea ehioh are open to present day small minehe.
(eiii) Looking ahead, opportunities for opening up small and medima 
sise mines should present thesmelves onoe the two large mining groups 
in Zambia reneunoe their unused mining titles aiad rights which they 
cannot make use ef within;^say, the next twenty years# How many of 
them will contain payable ore bodies the future alone will show. But 
it will certainly be one of the deeply satisfying, though at the same 
time most difficult tasks of the Ministi^ of Lands and Mines, to obtain 
the release cf unused mining titles and ri^ts from the big wining 
companies. The declared policy of the Zambia government is not to do 
anything to discourage foreign investment in Zambia for the next two 
decades or so* Cansequently the endeavour of this Ministxy will be to 
obtain the surrender of the unused mining rights voluntarily from the 
big mines. It will probably have to be in return for some counter- 
concession; e.g. relieving mining oempanies of some anxiety as to coital 
and income seourity for ten to twenty years or any agreed reasonable 
time period. All this will of course have to be mfbzked out in the 
future.
(ix) There exist at the moment three sbmH copper mines in Zambia. 
One is Allies Mine belonging to Sable Syndicate emed by three foxuer 
native workers of the Roan Antelope Mine. On. lS/£/62 the present . 
operator acquired a tribute agreement from the omers for five years 
with an option of a renewal for a further five years subject to a 59^ 
tribute payment er £10 per month. • These rigiits were assigned to Con­
tinental Ores Ltd. which new owns 90^ ef the shares of the tributer 
company.
The second small capper mine is the Hippo Mine which is leased from 
the Kafue Develepment Compaay* %e third is Mtuga Mine leased from 
Falcon Mines Ltd. The new leaseholders have reached an agreement with 
the Zambia Angle-Amerioan on reasonable tezms for preapeeting the ad-
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joining land.
Each ef these existing smell eepper mines and these that might 
oeaa inte existenoe in future might beoeoe more viable if they vers 
enabled to prospect vigorously beytmd the boundaries of their present 
rights and find extensiSn of their evn ore bodies ahioh would allow 
their operations to enjay more Sf the eeenemies of medium seals mines, 
Zambia Inglo-Ameriean is already assisting a small mine (i.e.
Hippo oepper mine). This example might Set a powerful presedsnt.
(x) Large mines have the teofanieians, the equipment and the 
finanoe fer systematic and seientifioally up-te-date training of 
manpower. Any prefessienal, sub-prefessienal and skilled miner would 
get the best training there. Intending small miners need, however, 
in addition, a different type of training. In their woztc they will 
be fersed to improvise, to be masters ef many trades, to work aleme, 
relying on their own resouxeefulness. Their sippleaentary training 
to asquirs these eapaeities ef self-relianee oan seme only from pract­
ising successful small miners. They are usually qualified mining 
engineers er geologists and have on all-round training and wide ' 
ranging experience. Any African whom they train would be trained in 
the entire range of mining pursuits such as prospeeting, assaying, 
gedegieal analysis, mapping, mining teohnelegy, etc. The importance 
ef this mining training aspect of small nines cannot possibly be ex­
aggerated.
One immediate reaction to all these son sidérations is the questicm 
ef visibility cf a small mine. It is dear that w wmyy apportant part 
ff a T?fll mines policy will Jwve to consist cf making sure frem the 
wttrt that mr gainx wia» ■ortdng »«>ad k,
eecnonieally viable. Metlfjtfeg would be mere irritatinx to the Ministry
ef Lands end Mines hsvihs^  an its hands a let ef small mines, dl
' ; I
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of which were unprofitable or bankrupt and ol— ourimr inees— ntly for fin, 
anoial aid. The re^iAdion. in other words, would depend upon proof of 
viability. The small miner would therefore be required to give as nuoh 
information oonoeming his ppospeot as possible to the authorities in 
the Ministry, on the basis of whioh the registration oould or oould 
not be executed. A more liberal approach would be to register all 
nines but only to give financial loans to viable ones. The trouble 
with this approach is that the process of registration may become a 
resource consuming exercise which is not economically justified by the 
status of the particular mine or prospective mine.
(C) ROYALTY fOR SMALL MDŒ8 - DSTSRMIHATIGK
The value of a given tonnage of metalliferous ores in the 
ground at a small mine is likely to be less than the value of the same 
tonnage in the ground of a large mine. This is because in general 
large mines are low cost.mines compared to small mines.
#s outlined how this capital value, and the royalty associated 
with it, may be arrived at. In our computation schedule we lay out the
principle by whioh this value may be allocated or distributed between
the various critical claimants. Thus, fkom the value of a ton of re­
fined metal at the (overseas) point of consumption is deducted items
(2) to (9). The point is that small mines are faced with special 
cost factors not common to large mines. This raises the items (2) 
to (9) more for the small than for the large mines. Consequently this 
reduces the net csystal value of the small mines compared to that of
the large mine. Thus, not only must the small minor pay tribute (whioh
we define below) to the large minera, but also must or may have to incur 
other special costs, like the following:
(i) A small mine has different transport costs from a large mine.
The small mine is usually forced to build a feeder road to the nearest
whole life period of thehighway; this must also be maintained ty the
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(11) The email adne la usually «oh further amey from the main 
transport routes, i.e. the railway or the main trunk routes, than are 
the major nines. Thia inflates transport ooats «re for the small 
mime than for the large mime.
(iii) As they are often situated in rural areas whi^ are malaria 
and sleeping sioknees areas, small mines inour extra oosts in fighting 
malaria and the tsetse fly to protect workers against disease. In 
«et oases, large mines obtain these faoillties from the ssoial servioes 
of the government prinoipally beoauss of the looational advantages.
(iv) The oosQ)arativsly small aims of the ore reserves and the 
drawn out life of a small mine prevent the application of certain mining 
techniques, a fact which also gives rise to extra extraoticm costs.
It may very well be that after calculating the capital value of 
the mining programme of a small mine aooording to our formula the positive 
item [^ (1) - (2) to (9)J may be drastically reduced compared to the 
residual value of a large mine. That is, the likely effect of those 
special costs is to make the residual capital value of the small mine 
non-comparable to that of the large mihe. This is what would make the 
royalty payable by a small mine smaller th« that payable by the large 
mine.
Whatever the value of royalty that may emerge, this will be the
specific royalty to the mine per ton of metal and may be expressed as a
peroentage of the selling price of the final product (i.e. ton «tal) 
per given period of assessment of the small mines royalty.
Briefly recapitulated, the determining and the fixing of the 
actual royalty payment (or tax) is as follows#
(i) A six months «ving average of IJOi prices centred in the current
month is estimated by averaging the spot prices and the three months'
158.
forward prices for the last three months.
(ii) From this moving average are deducted the standard eztracticm, 
transformation and intervening costs for the current or relevant period 
of assessment, per toq/metal.
(iii) The specific royalty per ton of metal remains in force 
until the next period of re-assessment of the small mines royalty#
As hinted above, this royalty system takes into account 
the tribute payments which the small mines make.
What in fact is a tribute payment? This is the payment 
which small miners make to the large mining companies# no mineral 
and mining rights of small Zambian mines belong at present to the 
small nine operator; all mines belong to the large mining companies 
some of which are registered in Zambia and others outside of it. These 
allow a small miner to operate the mines on payment of a "tribute" which 
is normally expressed in terms of a large percentage of the metal content 
of the ore mined. In the case of small copper nines, the tribute amounts 
to yfL of the u n  price. For medium sise mines the tribute payment 
may be 79^  or more. Thus an operating small copper mine would have to 
pay this tribute plus the royalty, as presently assessed, of 15.%f 
u n  price less C8 plus the export duty which as we have seen, is equal 
to 40^ cf the excess of the i m  price above C300.
Thus, if tribute continues to be chargeable, this would be 
deducted from the vaJ.ue of the ores im the ground of small mines to 
arrive at the chargeable royalty.
Because of such special cost factors facing the small miner, 
it is desirable thatysmall mine royalty is payable under the above 
provisions, it should be payable by the siaall miner only after he himself 
has received payment for the product of his mine. This is strictly 
a matter of liquidity considerations.
Moreover, it may be desirable to entitle an owner or operator
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of a «all mine to apply for the deferment of the royalty payment in 
case he needs further productive investment in the mine to make it more 
viable, e.g. by enlarging its output capacity or modernising its produc­
tion technique, but is unable to raise the capital. The time allowed 
for the deferment oan be decided on. But a period half the voricing 
life of a small mine would be adequate if that life is not more than, 
say, three years. It must, of course, be ensured that the royalty so 
deferred is invested, in accordance with the agreement, in the creation 
of output capacity.
Alternatively, the govemmant may provide loan facilities 
for such small mines vdiich need funds for mine purposes but cannot raise 
them elsewhere because the cost of the funds is prohibitive.
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OHAFTSR e
,QgmZA3LÆOPOaALB FOB 8MAIÆ ICOOSt,, EXgORT JÜQ TOCMS ÏAX
Having mad# our pxopoml# on th# syetem of royalty payment 
for both large and email mine#, ee oan do no more in this chapter then 
make a brief comment on maasurea that could be adopted to complement our 
proposals specially for small mines#
In Chapter^, ee were particularly critical of the Income 
Tax Bill in its application to the small mines# It is thus natural 
that after discussing the royalty formula ee should now turn to these 
other related tax structures.
(a) INCOME TAX AND DBPLETION ALLOWANOBS FOR SMALL MIMES.
As ee will recall, the present Income Tax Bill is indiscriminate 
in its application between small and large mines* Yet we know that al­
though it is possible to distinguish the inoome of a large corporation 
into corporation inoome and personal (or shareholders*) income, 
it is almost impossible to make the same distinction regarding the 
inoome of a small operator. For a small operator the "oorporateT 
inoome and the personal income are hardly separable# the two compon­
ents, to the extent that they oan be distinguished as such, merely form 
a total gross profit for the small operator.
It therefore seems only logical, in the name of equity or 
fairness, that appropriate adjustments should be made to take account 
of suoh and other oonsiderations. We thus suggest that the main 
oonoession as regards the inoome tax on small nines, should consist 
in allowing the sole proprietors or self-employers to deduct from the 
net profit an imputed salary for his own services. This salary would 
have to be equal to, say, a manager's salary. Be would, of course, 
be liable to a private or personal income tax on this imputed salary.
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Icqputod salary would naturally rsduos the net profit of 
the small mine veiy loaoh* Nonetheless, a general system of profits 
taxation would go some tiling like this# from the gross profit (or 
simply the total revenue return) would be deducted the depletion 
allowances, the redemption allowances, the imputed salary and the 
full mine royalty, including the tribute p a y m e n t . T h e  remainder 
would then be liable to taxation #kOoording to the prevailing system.
From idiat we have Seen of the attendant cost factors of smfiJLl mines, 
the net taxable profit would, in many cases, be fairly small.
It may also be necessary to defer the income tax in case the 
small miner puts up a creditable case that the deferment of the income 
tax is necessary to enable him to create extra output capacity or 
introduce more profitable productif techniques which would enlarge 
the future income tax receipts.
Like the profits tax provisions of the Inoome Tax Bill, it 
would be desirable to relate depletion allowanceste the special 
conditions of a small income as distinct from a large mine. Thus, 
sinoe depletion is deduotàble from the income of the project to arrive 
at taxable profit, the part of this allowance which cannot be offset 
by the depletion allowance provisions may be offset by providing 
tax concessions for the small miner in other directions; if this proved 
insufficient the residue of the depletion allowanoe oould then be 
offset against say, the royalty payment. Should there still be an 
uncompensated balance of the depletion allowance, it might than be 
regarded as oonstituting a tax credit whioh would be carried forward 
to the next fiscal year (or years) in whioh they would be offset 
against net profits earned (i.e. before taxation).
It is needless to state that in order to safeguard possible 
wastage of capital through various concessions, an application by a
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■Ball mimar for deferaant to the next fleoal year of royalty and/or 
export duty would be granted only if he advanoed reaeonable proof 
that the capital allowanoe to whioh be wae being entitled in the current 
year would be equalled, but preferably exceeded by eubeequent earnings 
of the mine.
(b) iBXFORf DUTY FOR SMALL MIMES.
We mentioned earlier that the export duty is payable to the 
Government of Zambia within the month in which output is exported, 
and that the mining oompaniee do not receive payment for their product 
for at least three months after exportation. For a large or rich 
enterprise this system may be allowed to operate without (apparent) 
objections from the mining companies. The liquidity problem is not 
Immediately relevant for the richer or larger mine.
With particular reference to small mines, a rational system 
would be to provide that the export duty on the products of small mines 
should not be payable simply in relation to the month in which output 
was exported. Bather, the payment should be made only after payment 
for the products of the email mine has actually been received by the 
small miner.
As in the case of profits or Inooms tax, it may prove just as 
prudent to permit small mines to apply for a deferment of the ejqport 
duty if this oould enable them to make additional investments to create 
extra output capacity, or introduce more profitable production tech­
niques. Where this were the case, the Export Duty would then have 
to be paid in the subsequent or later charge year. (7)
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REFSRSMCES AND FDQTHOTES
1. Zn contrast, ea# tax trsatmsnt of small mines in Chile, 
Appendix 2 of this study.
2. See O.B.C.D. Report, op. pit. Bsp. Chapter 2.
). See definition of "Tribute Pigment" in Chapter 7 of this study.
4. See Chapters 3 and 4 of this study.
5» See O.R.C.D. Report, o p . oit.. Chapter 2, Section 10# "The
Taxation %eatment of Losses".
R.A.Uosgxave, op. oit. on depreciation and treatment of losses.
6. See Chapter 5 of this Study.
7. Ref. as at (5) above - Taxation treatment of losses.
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CHAPTER 9 
SÜWIAHY AMD OONCLOSIOW
The mein argument for our proposed royalty fozmuid is that it is 
speoifio to the mil» and is determined rationally on the basis of orucial 
relevant factors of the enterprise, given Government policy on the other 
hand# It may, to that extent, be regarded as something of a blueprint 
for both the legislators and the miners who find themselves in a situation 
similar to that which obtains in Zambia# The formula is, of course, 
specifically intended to deal with the problem as it is today in Zambia.
Once we have determined our royalty, we could Ihen integrate it into 
the whole system of taxation of mines in Zambia. Essentially our royalty system 
attempts to relate tax liability to productivity and profitability. A 
special aspect of it is that it permits all profits due to reduction of
oosts during a specified period to be treated as net profits i.e. our royalty
tax will not fall on this form of inooms. The idea is, of course, to 
encourage enterprises to be more efficient, sinoe any efficiency gsine are 
not taxable income. The effect would, of course, be to raise the marginal 
productivity of capital in the mining industry. Thia would be a most 
desired effect since it would imply expansion of the sector. And there is 
nothing whidi would improve the fortunes of Zambia more than the expansion of 
this sector. Ve have stressed what an important role this sector plays in
the economic life of ^e people of that country.
In partioular, with the objectives of the current development plan,^ ^^  
Zambia's needs for a wider revenue capacity from the mining sector cannot be 
overstrsssed. It is significant, but not surprising that the first of the 
eight goals in the development plan I966-70, is the desire and need to diversify 
the economy so that eventually the economy can rely less and less on the 
fortunes of the copper industry. More manufacturing, agriculture and other
166.
enterprises ere needed in Zambie. But to achieve this and other plan targets, 
an enormous amount of resources will be required in the bands of the Govern ment 
and all oonoemed. This fact is olearly recognised in the country's 
Financial Plan to cover this plan period.' *
It cannot be said too often that, for a start, a higher productivity 
in the mining sector is crucial for practically all the development needs 
of Zambia. It may be #rgued, however, that although this is largely true, 
it could defeat its own purpose. Thus, as Üiù industry becomes more productive, 
it also becomes more attractive to capital which would otherwise have gone 
into other lines of production. If this were to happen, the set-out purpose 
of diversification through tha mining sector would hardly be achieved. Both 
domestic and forei#» capital would find ttiat the mining industry was the only 
sector worth investing in.
This is, of course, idiere the fiscal and monetary authorities must 
come in. Ideally, they should continue to encourage a higher productivity 
in the mining sector, but giving at the same time partioular attention to the 
evils of perpetuated monoidistic or lop-sided economy. Ve have seen that 
some of theDwtificetion for introduoiAg the export du*^ was to regulate this 
tendeney# However, the Govennment cannot simply be oontent with regulation 
of the tendency. It has to go into business itself to establish at least 
the basic rudiments of a diversified eoonosy.^^^ This does not necessarily 
mean that the copper industry has to be subjected to a stifling tax system 
in order to avoid the eoomoaic imbalance and to secure resources for establish­
ing Cher enterprises. This attitude could lead to the same adverse effects - 
killing the goose that lays the egg, or, as sons authors have put it, draining 
the fish pond in order to catch the fish.
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Happily, the current Zambian Plan appreciates these difficulties.
The idea is to tap all scuroes of resouroes possible to meet the objectives 
of the Plan,^^^ Thus the Plan estimates a recurrent revenue of about 
£324«8m. for the needs of the Plan, and will be raised from various souroes.
It is farther expected that the State will raise loans, domestioally, amounting 
to ab ut £3Cm. Moreover, the Govemmant expects to secure external resouroes 
in the form of loans and foreign aid, estimated at about £58m# and cSm 
respectively#
On a general level, the Plan estimates that at a prioe of £)60 per 
ton of copper metal, expected revenue from all taxes oould range from £70m* to 
£90m# per annum over the period in question. Mote here, once more, the 
dependence of the economy on the well-being of the copper industry#
üu^ are some of the considerations on the basis of whioh Zambia's 
revenus-expenditure processes #mst be conceived. The suooessful implementat­
ion of the whole deiâopmeat plan will depend very nuoh on the eoooomio and 
administrative capacity of the tax system to marshal the necessary resources, 
just as the level of expenditure will depend largely on the effectiveness of 
the tax system in terms of productivity, efficiency and stability.^The 
whole revenue-expMditurs process itself can only be deemed successful or 
otherwise in terms of the extent to which the Plan objectives or the envisaged 
structural changes have been occasioned#
Meedless to mention in this conneotion that the very basis of a 
successful small enterprise policy depends on what happens in the overall 
revenue-oxpenditure process. Thus policies designed to encourage small 
enterprises to spring up and to grow are hardly possible, in view of the 
demands on resouroes and whi^ such small enterprises make, without the 
backing of an efficient revenue-expendituxe system. Thus the lAole essence 
of our small mines royalty policy is underlined by the basic assumption that
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resouroes to carry out suoh a policy are available, and that to the extent 
that they axe available, they will be utiliged eoonomioally, productively.
Thia is also %diy we make the point that in practioe, any small miner applying 
for registretion, would have to pass the viability test. This, as oan be 
seen, is an insurance against wastage of extremely soaroe resouxoes, which 
could be employed elsewhere perhaps better and more productively.
We believe ‘ttiat our royalty syst«n xeooomends itself to all interes­
ted, and if adopted it would do much justice to what has hitherto been an ad 
hoo, unproductive and inequitable system of mine taxation. We believe too 
that in view of all that we heve said, a policy of diversification is not 
only desirable, but feasible within defined limits. We specially address 
ourselves to the particular needs of Zambia today#
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CHAfTER 9 
HSFEroWCES AHB POOTIPTSB
1. See national Daralopnant Plan# op.oit*, Pp.
2. SeePp.
5. Thebody# has apeolal aignifioanoe in thia xaspaot. Its role in •atabliflhing entaspxlsM on behalf of the Govaiomeot ia invalnable, See "The London Timae" Kovamber 18 1968 - Snpplemant on Eooncmioa and Politioa of Zambia ainoe 1964.
4. See Rational Leeeloxaiant Flan# op.oit.# aa at (l) above#
5. On Taxation and Pxodnetivity# aee a dieeuaaion in the O.E.C.D. Report# op.oit.# Pp. 8-11#
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a k e b j h  o h M D M Œ P m r  i m u t i o k  
raaE wunovi « cuum
(1) n »  Ineom» Tax Act («t 1966)
InooQ» tax is levlad on both pejaonal and ooxporate inoomea# 
Personal levy is graduated to vary diraotly with taxable Inooma.
(2) Corporation TaxL Rate_(m_aB4 eftey jJw#
18^ on the first f()5#000 
47^ on the exoeas over ^ 35fOOO
Additional tax of itaposed under the provisiona of the Old Age 
Seourity Aot#
(3) Capital Coat Alloveno#
(a) Hoptaalatloa
Aaaet# aoquired for the purpoae of produoing inooma from a buaineea 
are# dependent upon ^ i r  nature# segregated into varioua olasaifioationa. 
Batea for eadi auoh claas art atipulated for the purpoaea of deteziciniag . 
the maTlBiun annual déduction# oomjuted on a diminiWiina balanea baalP. 
which may be used in ocmputing inooma# thus#
Aaseti
Y (l) Mining# maohinexy and equipment acquired for the purpose of 
gaining or produeing inoome from a mine 
Claaa of Aaaet 10
Bate of Charge )0g»
(il) A mine shaft# ain haulage way or similar underground work
designed for oontinuing use# or any extension tharof # sunk or 
oonatruoted after the mine came into pxoduotion# ooat of 
deaigning# auperviaion 
Claae of Asset 12
Rate of Charge 100^
in.
Capital ooat allowanoa la not coiapulsory and any write-off «p 
to the maximum paxuiitted for the partioular olaaa may be taken in the 
year.
In the event of the diapoaal of depreolable property# the 
allowanoe nay be subject to xeoapture. .
(b) Depletion:
Oners tore: An allowance (eonmonly referred to aa "depletion" 
ia permitted aa a deduction in conqmting the income of the operator 
of a mine or oil or gaa wall. Thia deduction is primarily intended 
to compenaate for the exhaustion of the natural reaouroe*
The amount deductable for a number of items including a 
matalliferoua mine (except a gold mine) ia 3)^ of the aggregate of 
the profit from all such mines# walla and depoaita# leas certain 
deductions# Including prospecting# exploration# drilling and 
development expenses.
R.B. "Operator" includes a peraw who has an interest in the proceeds 
of production from an oil or gas well# or a mine under an agreement 
which provides that he shall share in the profits remaining after 
deducting the costa of operating the well or mine.
"Non-Operator": A person other than an operator - with an 
interest in a well or mine and in the proceeds from the sale of the 
products therefrom or receives a rental or royalty computed by 
referanoe to the amount or value of the production from a veil or 
mine: deduction allowed «
(4) 36 Months fccarotion for Mines
A corporate# in computing its inooma# is not required to include 
the inoome derived from the operation of a mine for the period of 36 months 
oommamcing with the day on which the mine came into production in reasonable
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o«aaerolal quantitiee#
The date on \diioh a nsine oomee Into production ia a question of 
fact and is determined on the baaie of all relevant Information available 
at the time the claim for exemption is made#
(5) BatwmtloB tXfM Tvx of ProwrtiM «aJ OrutaUfcwi* Oaln.
zBona fide proapeotors and the persona who employ them or provide 
the financial backing for their prospecting activities are exempt from tax 
on amcunts received from the sale of all or any part of an interest ia a 
mining property acquired as a result of the prospectors* efforts # other than 
rents# royalties or similar payments received. If the consideration for Üw 
interest is shares of the capital stock of a corporation# rather than cash# 
any revenue derived from the subsequent sale of these shares is also exempt 
unless the owner disposes of them during or after carrying on a campaign to 
sell shares of the corporation to the public#
Amounts received from the sale of shares acquired by the exercise
of an optioh lAich was accepted as oonsiderotion for the proper^ are not
exempt from tax.
(b) Exploration and Development Expenses.
Prospecting# exploration# drilling and development expenses 
incurred# including general geologioal and geophysical exponses# may be 
deducted in computing the income of oertain corporations. The corporations 
entitled to this benefit are those whose principal business is# for instance:
(i) Mining or exploring for minerals# or
(ii) fabricating metals, 
etc.
These expenses incurred in a year are deductable in that year to
the extent of the corporation*a inoome from all sources# If the aggregate
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of suoh axpenses •acoeeds the inoome# the exoees any be deferred and is 
deduotible from tiie inoome of subsequent years#
(7) Tax on Dividends
A tax of 1596 ia imposed and ooUeoted at the souxoe on dividends 
paid to non-residents. Effeotive June 14* 19^5 the tax idll be xedueed 
to 10^ if the payer corpoxation has a degree of Canadian ownership# Tax 
paid at the fozmer rate# however# is subject to a refund of one-third thereof# 
if the corporation acquires the neoessaxy degree of Canadian ownership not 
later than in its first taxation year# commencing on or after January 1# 1967# 
Source: re: Summary Review. Fed. Taxation & Legislation Affecting The
Canadian Mineral Industry * Mineral Information Bulletin:
MR 82 by £# C. Hodgson & W. J. Beard# Mineral Resources 
Division# Dept, of Mines & Technical Surveys# Ottawa.
Also See: "Taxation in Canada" by J. H. Perry - asp. Pp. 2)6-249
and Mining Journal Toi# 271# July 3/66 - Mine Taxation ia 
Ontario# Deoisione Pending Pp. 3*^ #.
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Armcix II: siwttgf of CHHaa nx stotbw Apwiamüf TT compibim
1. C l«w lflo«ttoB of MUmb into 8m 11. fW iw , «nd L^ im i»
Legally# medium mine# are tho# which produce leas than 73#000 
LT/yr of metallic copper hut which are not email mine#. The latest 
axe small opexetions defined in function of amount of capital and 
comparative status*
2. Rate of Taxation
(a) Small Mines# Rate 2^ on sales proceeds
(h) Large Mines# Low Bo* 1642) at January 2) 1966 legislates b^m 
geneaeal system applied to
(i) Chile Exploration Co* (Chuquioamata) 52*#
(ii) Andes Copper Mining Co* (SI Salvador) and any 
other ooaqmnyi Bate $0)6.
(c) J int Mining Companies (Chile hns at least 2 #  of capital stock) 
and Medium Mining Companies* These have ^  general system applicable 
to any industzy in aooordanoe with the tax law with#-
(i) Rate of no less than 1#*
The actual rates are#
SI Teniente 5## Govt* of Chile 20)6 
Miners Andina 2## Govt* of Chile 1 #
Miners Exotica 2## Govt* of Chile 1 #
(ii) Tax of 30)6 on dividends of foreign shareholders if 
sent abroad*
(d) Housing Plan: 2)6 tax if the Coaqwny has an agreement with Housing
Corporation*
(a) Copper Corporation: Commission of 0*2# which is considered as an
expense*
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5. BegttXtimr Ægvt. in JoimT W nlM  &m»nlsa (From^  pertiflii>ation wfai<& include xlaks as CsBlwalio^
(i) Rate 20)6# and Participation 51)^
Tax 19»# (beoanae 20)6 applicable ex* - #  Houeing)
Houeing 2*0)6 
-21.#
Remainder IB»# ia divided $1)6 Govt» and 4 #  Foreign invaatora 
That ia:- 39.984 and 38.416
If the foreign investor sends bis total revenue abroad# hie share
of 38*416 will pay 30)6 tax# that is* 11*5248*
Finally the Government (and the Bousing Corporation) gets from taxes
and participation# vist-
21.6 + 39.984 + 11*5248 - 73.1088 and
Foreign Investor gets 26*6912 26*8912
To'Sl Inoome - 200*000
Of idiioh Govt* taxes & Part­icipa ti(m - 73.1088)6
Fkom the point of view of the foreign investor %d*o only invests
49)6 in the business# for each 100 of hie Shares he pays*
Tax 100
78.4
30)6 Dividend 23.52
Net Earnings 54.86
That is# the foreign investor's total tax on hie share equals 45.12)6*
(ii) Rate 15)6# and Participation 2 #
Tax 14*7)6 (because 1 #  applicable ex-2)6 Housing)
Housing 2*0)6 
-16.756
Remainder 83*3p is divided 29)6 Govt* and foreign inveator
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That la 20.825 and 62.475*
If the fcaalgn imroator sands his total revenus abroad# his share 
of 62.475 will pay 3 #  tax# that is 18.7425*
Finally# the Oovemasnt (and the Housing Corporation) gats from taxes 
and participation#
16.7 and 20.825 18.7425 • 56.2675# and the foreign investor
gets 62.475 - 18.7425 " 43*7325
Total Inooee - 100.000
of which GovexxuBsnt Participation and Taxes 56.2675)^
FToo the point of view of the fozeiga investor who only invests
7 #  in the business# for each 100 of his share# be pays
Tax ICC
16.7
dividend on 8).) 24.99 - î 
Hat Earnings 88.) • 24*99 • 58.31 
That is# 41*69)6 total tax on his share
Source: Extract from NU^4915/4#
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APPENDIX n i l MINING INOOME TAX (CQKPABISOHS)
#, CHILB (Large copper mines)
(i) Kixsd Sooietiea» (Present dapaelty 200*000 ST/lr; future oapaolty 4^,000 ST/Tr)
Sociedad Miners "El Teniente" (Kenneoott Corporation)
See. Miners Andioa (Cerro Corporation) and Soc* Minera Exotica 
(Anaconda Co.) which have 20)6 or 1 #  of income tax 
(less some allowances) plus 30)6 tax on the dividends sent 
abroad. That makes around 40)6 of taxation for the foreign 
investor,
(ii) Chile Explorations (Present capacity 300*000 ST/Yr., future capacity 390*000 ST/Tr.)
Income tax 32.#, less some allowanoa could be estimated 
around ##.
b. PSHD
(i) Inoome tax on a sliding scale with maximum of 3#
with some special abatements (3# tax for the Southern Peru 
Copper Corporation)
(ii) Depletion allowance of 1 #  of the grossvalue of production 
but not more ‘ttian 30)6 of annual taxable profits.
(ill) Allowance to depreciate the prospecting expenditure
(iv) Undistributed taxable profits with rates 11)6 and tax on 
dividends 2 #
The combination of all these taxes and allowances results in an 
average inoome tax of around 4 #  (Southern Peru wuld be around 
40JÉ).
0. U[gSj^Aj^
Income tax for the mining industry of 4 #  less depletion 
allowances* makes an average of 4 #  to 42)6.
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a. cmrn
Comparatively veqr favourable iqratem. E.G.: the international
Rikel Company has paid )0)6 to 3 #  of taxes in the immediate 
past years.
■
